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CHANGING THE RULES: PUBLIC ACCESS To DEPENDENCY
COURT
KATHLEEN S. BEAN*
Public access to American court proceedings is a metaphor for jus-
tice in America. Open courtrooms encourage truthfulness and discourage
perjury, they encourage fairness and discourage abuse, and most impor-
tant, they place our system of justice before the public and thus make it
accountable.' Open courtrooms, however, are not the norm for America's
system of juvenile justice. Since the creation of the juvenile court system
at the start of the twentieth century, the juvenile court has been largely
closed to the public. Closed proceedings fit with the early juvenile court
reformers' philosophy, which was not to punish, but to treat and reha-
bilitate children who had committed criminal acts. Closed proceedings
were seen as protecting children from the trauma of publicity, protecting
children from the stigma of being labeled delinquents, and accommo-
dating an informal setting, which was conducive to the parental role re-
formers envisioned for juvenile court judges.2 One hundred years later,
there is much debate about the wisdom of closed courtroom proceedings
for children who have committed criminal acts . As a result, juvenile
delinquency hearings have become more open to the public.4 There has
been limited debate, however, about the practice of the closed courtroom
for children in dependency proceedings, a group also subject to the juris-
diction of juvenile courts. Children who are abused or neglected and thus
in need of the protective services of the state are also subject to the
closed courtroom of the juvenile court system.5 The wisdom of closing
those child dependency hearings is the subject of this article.
* Professor of Law, University Distinguished Teaching Professor, Brandeis School of Law,
University of Louisville. I wish to thank my research assistants, Yuexin Li (Stephen) and Melissa
Ford, and the wonderful library faculty and staff, including Michael Whiteman and Scott Campbell.
I. Infra text accompanying notes 57-59.
2. Infra text accompanying notes 196-212.
3. E.g., C. Thomas Dienes, Access to Juvenile Proceedings, 13 COMM. LAW., Winter 7
(1996) (discussing the First Amendment right of access to juvenile proceedings); James F. Brelsford
& Rachel A. Silvers, Juvenile Courts: Part : The Battle for Access, 12 COMM. LAW., Summer 7
(1994) (discussing the ways courts strongly resist expanded media access and the potential
remedies); James F. Brelsford & Roger Myers, Juvenile Courts: Part I!: The Value of Access, 12
COMM. LAW., Fall 14 (1994) (focusing on media access to dependency hearings and related
governmental records).
4. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW DOCTRINE,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 1146-48 (2000) (some states have made proceedings and records more open
in juvenile delinquency court).
5. Statutes and court rules, of course, vary. However, most states have legislation mandating
closure with language such as the "general public shall be excluded," "the general public must be
excluded," the hearings "shall be closed to the general public," the hearings "shall exclude all
persons," or the hearings "shall be private." E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a) (Supp. 2000); ALASKA
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The last two decades of debate about closed-door juvenile hearings
has concerned the court's delinquency population. Critics argued, and
continue to argue, that the juvenile court's rehabilitative philosophy,
including its closure and confidentiality, simply cover up a system that is
not working.6 In particular, critics charge that confidentiality conceals a
"too lenient" system that "coddles" and lets juveniles "get away" with
STAT. § 47.10.070(a) (Michie 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-41(b) (Michie Supp. 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 16-1608(b) (Supp. 2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070 (3) (Michie 1999); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4007(1) (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 38 (West
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.163(l)(c) (West Supp. 2001; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C: 14
(1994); ); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-20.B (Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (Supp.
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.1.A.l(a) (West Supp. 2001); R.1. GEN. LAWS. § 14-1-30
(2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law Co-op Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36
(Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-115(1)(a) (Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, ch. 55, §
5523(c) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1.302(C) (Michie 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.299(1)(a)
(West Supp. 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-424(b) (Michie 1999). Any persons admitted in these
states must usually have a direct interest in the proceedings. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1608(b) (Supp.
2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-1 15(l)(a) (Supp. 2000). Occasionally these mandatory statutes
provide that the judge may order otherwise, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7003-4.1 .A. I ( Supp. 2000);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36 (1999), or that the hearing shall be open if the child "demand[s]
it." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.299(1)(a) (Supp. 2000).
A number of states provide that the hearings "may" be private or closed or that the court
"may exclude" the public. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(i)(2) (Michie Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 1063(a) (1999); KAN STAT. ANN. § 38-1552 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 3-812(f)(2) (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43(b) (West Supp. 2001); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 1043 (McKinney 1999). While this type of statutory language might suggest that hearings will
usually be open, too often the norm is closure. Doug Besharov addresses this in his Practice
Commentary to the New York statute: "On the basis of this section's wording, one might expect
court proceedings to be open to the public except in specific cases. However, in practice, the general
public is routinely and automatically excluded .... N.Y. JUD. LAW § 1043, Practice Commentary
123. Language in other state statutes suggests that closure is also the rule. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432B.430 (Michie 2000) ("only those persons having a direct interest in the case... may be
admitted"); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-807(A) (West Supp. 2000) (the person "who is the subject
of an investigation" may ask for an open hearing and the court "shall order the hearing to be open to
the public" unless the court for good cause determines the hearing should be closed); LA.
CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 661 (B) (West 1995) ("may admit any other person who has a proper
interest in the proceedings or the work of the court"). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801
(a)(b)(1999) (the court decides at its discretion, based on a list of factors, whether hearing will be
open or closed; "[n]o hearing ... shall be closed ... if the juvenile requests that it remain open.").
Only a very few state statutes or court rules affirmatively require or suggest hearings shall
be open. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(2) (West Supp. 2001) ("shall be open" but judge "may
close any hearing ... upon determining that the public interest or the welfare of the child is best
served by so doing."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.92 (West 2000) ("open to the public" but on motion
of any party or on court's own motion, court can close "if the court determines that the possibility of
damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in having an open hearing"); Mich.
Rules of Court, R. 5.925 (2001) ("shall be open to the public," although court may close "during the
testimony of a child ... or victim to protect the welfare of either."); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6-4
(Michie 1997) (if the court orders a proceeding closed, the court shall make findings concerning the
closure and "place the closure order in the file of the proceedings."); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-
106 (Michie 1997) ("general public shall not be excluded unless the court determines that it is in the
best interest of the child or of the community to exclude the general public").
6. Dienes, supra note 3, at 7.
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little punishment for their crimes Further compounding the problem,
confidentiality also withholds knowledge from the public concerning
which juveniles are threats to public safety.' Because the system is not
working, argue the critics, neither is the rehabilitation of the delinquents.
The closed juvenile delinquency system, then, does "little more than
conceal the ... system's failures and abuses." 9
The same can be said of the dependency system - the closed door of
dependency court has too long concealed from the public a system that
leads to failure and abuse. Advocates for closed dependency courtrooms
can make arguments similar to those made in defense of closed delin-
quency courtrooms. While juvenile courtrooms were originally closed to
the public in order to contribute to the rehabilitation of delinquents, de-
pendency proceedings, like delinquency proceedings, are similarly meant
to protect the child and to treat the problem. The state seeks to rehabili-
tate and preserve the family if possible, not to punish anyone.' Advo-
cates can thus argue that open proceedings will inhibit this rehabilitation.
Open proceedings can subject children to invasions of privacy by the
press and public. Having one's family story told in public can embarrass,
humiliate, traumatize, stigmatize and thus delay the psychological heal-
ing that must take place." A closed hearing can contribute to an informal
atmosphere, making it more conducive to the social work approach that
might best heal and protect the child. Indeed, it is argued that the need
for confidentiality is more compelling for dependency hearings than it is
for delinquency hearings,'2 and when the issue is neglect or abuse, it is
hard to deny the appeal of protecting a child from the public gaze. Given
these considerations, closed hearings in dependency court certainly ap-
pear to be "in the best interest" of the affected child, a standard that re-
flects the overall charge to courts when dealing with neglected and
abused children." But there is fallacy in a rationale that considers only
the immediate and isolated effects of a closed or open hearing in a par-
ticular case. The cumulative effects of a dependency court system that is
presumptively and customarily closed to public access must also be con-
7. Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in
the United States, J. L. & POL'Y 177, 181 (1996); Danielle R. Oddo, Removing Confidentiality
Protections and the "Get Tough" Rhetoric: What Has Gone Wrong with the Juvenile Justice
System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 117-118 (1998) (Citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1967)); WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT: THE CHILDREN OF JUVENILE COURT 25
(1997); Fox Butterfield, States Revamping Laws on Juveniles as Felonies Soar, NEW YORK TIMES,
May 12, 1996, at 1).
8. Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: Introducing
Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 368-69 (1996).
9. Id. at 370.
10. San Bernardino County Dep't. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 339-
40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
11. See In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 449-51 (Ohio 1990).
12. in re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 449-51.
13. See San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Mary Mcdevitt Gofen, The Right of Access to
Child Custody and Dependency Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 857, 861 (1995).
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sidered. These effects are visited upon all children in dependency court,
as all are subject to the court's justice. The current status of the depend-
ency court suggests that the presumptively closed courtroom has not re-
sulted in a system that serves the best interest of all children.
The health of dependency court is not good. Those who have tried
to stir interest in reform search for words to describe what they see. "Cri-
sis[,] shambles,"'' 4 "terrible plight,""5 "widespread frustration,"' 6 "so trou-
bled,"' 7 and, with much frequency, "failure,"' 8 are words used time and
again to try to communicate to the public the state of dependency court.
The reports of participants and others with some access confirm these
descriptions. Dependency court facilities are inadequate. Personnel are
underpaid, under-appreciated and under-trained. The caseload is massive.
The issues are serious and complex and at the same time, state and fed-
eral laws require courts to move quickly to determine a permanent home
for each child.' 9 Most telling, however, are the results of the system, the
stories of children harmed and more while under the jurisdiction of the
system charged with their protection. The frequent news stories of de-
pendency courts' child protective efforts gone deadly wrong are the easi-
est evidence to recite. Even closed courtroom doors cannot keep these
horrific stories from the media. In Georgia:
Once doctors concluded the child was a victim of battered child syn-
drome, records show that Miller [the chief of social work at the chil-
dren's hospital] hounded Fulton [Department of Family and Children
Services (DFACS)] not to return the child to the guardian. DFACS
went to court to remove the child but failed to subpoena Miller or the
doctors. On Feb. 10, 1995, a Fulton Juvenile Court judge returned the
child to the guardian without hearing any testimony from hospital
staff. By April 1996 Tavelle [the child] was dead. 2°
In Washington, D.C.:
On Dec. 22, [1999,] D.C. Superior Court Judge Evelyn E.D. Queen
ordered Brianna out of foster care and back to her biological mother,
who had been found neglectful of Brianna and her seven siblings
during a trial last year. Brianna died two weeks later in what was
ruled a homicide. D.C. police and a grand jury are investigating.
14. Jennifer R. Gavin, Child Welfare Law Curricula in Legal Education: Massachusetts'
Untried Opportunity, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 9, 10, 13 (1998).
15. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14.
16. Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey, The Roles of Counsel for the Parents in Child
Dependency Court Proceedings, 22 GA. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1988).
17. Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 639 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Discussion infra, Parts III.B.
20. Jane 0. Hansen, DA takes up dead child's case; Ruled slaying in 1996, it languished, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL - THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, May 9, 2000, at B 1.
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The attorney representing Brianna said the toddler's social worker
told him the mother's house was safe. The social worker denies that.
The social worker also hadn't turned in a report on time to Judge
21Queen urging that Brianna not be returned to her mother ....
In Florida:
Judge Lockett said Thursday he won't hear any more cases in which
DCF [the state Department of Children and Families (DCF)] investi-
gators are unprepared .... Lockett is the judge who sent Kayla back
to her home after getting incomplete information on her case from
DCF investigators. Later, after the child was slain, Lockett vowed he
22would never again send a child home without complete background.
We at least know part of what went wrong in Tavelle, Brianna and
Kayla's cases. A witness was not subpoenaed, a report was not timely
filed, and an investigation was not completed - all possibly deadly mis-
takes. In many cases we do not even know this much. In Indiana:
Eight-month-old Ashley Whetzel died, prosecutors allege, at the
hands of a man who had been hurting her much of her short life....
Exactly what happened ... is unclear - since Indiana law keeps child-
protection cases and their records secret, and many of the people in-
volved in the case would not talk about it.
23
In Missouri:
Eight-year-old Larry Bass weighed less than 30 pounds when he died
Wednesday .... Because case records are closed to the public, the
Missouri Division of Family Services would not release any details
24about the family's case or say whether it had investigated the family.
These stories, of course, are among the most notorious failures of
dependency court - children returned to the homes of their abusers, or
children abused by the foster families meant to protect them. But hun-
dreds of thousands of children are subjected to the dependency court21
process every year, in a system that can afford "no longer than five or
21. Sari Horwitz & Scott Higham, Record Numbers of D.C. Children Go to Foster Care;
Briana's Death 'Scared' Caseworkers, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 28, 2000 at Al.
22. Karin Meadows & Frank Stanfield, Broken Safety Net Puts Kids in Danger; as DCF,
Bridges Go to War, Children are the Casualties, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 1999, at Al.
23. Todd Murphy, Protective System on Trial With Father of Infant Who Died, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Oct. 17, 1995, at At.
24. Christine Vendel, Mother of Dead Boy Charged With Abuse Some Had Expressed
Concerns Children Were Neglected, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al.
25. Jane Waldfogel, Rethinking the Paradigm for Child Protection, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 104, 104, 107 Figure 1 (Richard E.
Behrman, M.D. ed., 1998). Close to a half million children a day, for example, can be counted in
foster care. Gavin, supra note 14, at 10.
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10 minutes, 26 "about ten minutes, 27 or "an average of 16 minutes' 28 to
hear and decide a case. While closed doors keep unknown the specific
justice or injustice meted out in individual cases, most accounts of de-
pendency court do not inspire confidence. Most describe a system that
has learned simply to make do with its grossly inadequate resources, one
that focuses on processing cases at the expense of protecting children:
[H]eavy calendars . . . require cases to be moved through quickly.
There is no time for thorough and careful consideration of all the
facts and concerns. Giving too much time to any one case disrupts the
entire calendar. Neither the judges nor the attorneys can be com-
pletely familiar with these cases because of the number of cases
which they handle.... The caseloads maintained by most profession-
als working in these systems [are] too high to expect quality perform-
29
ance.
The children who are the subjects of these ten minute hearings in today's
dependency court, will, if they are lucky, never make the headlines of the
newspapers. But most assuredly, dependency court is failing many of
these children too.
The state of today's dependency court and the known failures of the
court require that we reconsider the wisdom of closed proceedings. First,
as a practical matter, to demand accountability from the delinquency
proceedings of juvenile court and not to do so with dependency pro-
ceedings is shortsighted. The two are linked. Personnel within the juve-
nile court system frequently comment that they expect to see many of the
children now in dependency court - abused, neglected or abandoned
children - "down the hall" in delinquency court a few years later.30 Their
26. Juvenile Court Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means 105th Cong. 25, 28 (Feb. 27, 1997) (statement of Kathi L.
Grasso, American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law, on behalf of the American Bar
Association).
27. ABA Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and Their
Families, America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action (Executive Summary),
reprinted in, 3 Ky. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS J. 18, 22 (1994).
28. Samuel Broderick Sokol, Comment, Trying Dependency Cases in Public: A First
Amendment Inquiry, 45 UCLA L. REV. 881, 913 n.232 (1998) (quoting Juvenile Servs. Comm. of
L.A. County Grand Jury, Legal Representation in Dependency Court 6 (1992)).
29. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 118-19 (1997). See also Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians
Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the Rules to Improve Effectiveness, 27
FAM. L. Q. 327, 347 (1993).
30. Personal observations of author during two year stint as Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA). CASA is a well-known and respected example of an organization that trains and
coordinates lay volunteers to serve as guardian ad litems (GALs) in dependency proceedings,
sometimes alongside the child's lawyer. Mark Hardin, Responsibilities and Effectiveness of the
Juvenile Court in Handling Dependency Cases, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE
COURT 111, 113-20 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
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suspicions are correct.' Children who end up in juvenile delinquency
court often enter the system of juvenile justice first as abused or ne-
glected children. That violence is a predictor of violence, and thus delin-
quency, is well known. That neglect is a predictor of delinquency, how-
ever, is also supported by research . Some researchers have concluded
that neglect, which constitutes the majority of dependency cases,33 "may
be more harmful to a child's emotional development than abuse," 3 and
that it is the combination of abuse and neglect that often produces "anti-
social behavior."35 Other factors are implicated, including sub-standard
housing, sub-standard health care, inadequate education, and there is a
36strong correlation between poverty and delinquency. Most indicators,
however, which appear to be linked with the child's earliest develop-
mental years, implicate family functioning including, most prominently,
abuse and neglect. 7 The impact is tangible. A child who is subject to
abuse or neglect, compared to a child who is not abused or neglected, has
"a 53% greater chance of being arrested as a juvenile, a 38% greater
chance of being arrested as an adult, and a 38% greater chance of being
arrested for a violent crime. 38 Protecting these children now from abuse
and neglect will pay off in the long run.
More fundamentally, however, to argue about access and account-
ability in the delinquency wing of juvenile court in the name of protect-
ing the public, without considering it in the dependency wing, is to rele-
gate to secondary status the protection of our nation's children. These
children are a part of the public that must be protected.
That the system is failing, of course, does not mean public access is
the answer, and it does not mean that public access will bring reform. It
is possible that a presumption of public access to dependency proceed-
ings would not have made a difference in the quality of the court's ef-
forts in the cases of Tavelle, Brianna, Kayla, Ashley, or Larry, for exam-
ple, or in many of the thousands of other cases dependency courts hear.
But it seems likely that it would have. Further, if children are dying be-
cause of careless mistakes; if courts are consistently deciding in ten min-
ute hearings to take children from parents, or to leave children with par-
ents accused of neglect or abuse; if all of this is going on behind closed
doors; and if, as Chief Justice Burger writes, "the presumptive openness
3 1. See Jane Watson, Crime and Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Policy: Time For Early
Childhood Intervention, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 245, 246-47 (1995).
32. Id. at 247.
33. Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, 8 THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT 39, 43-46 (1998).
34. Watson, supra note 31, at 247.
35. Id.
36. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get Juvenile
Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401,426 (1999).
37. Id. at 426-27; see also Watson, supra note 31, at 246-47.
38. Watson, supra note 31, at 247.
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of the trial" has long been regarded as "'one of the essential qualities of a
court of justice, ' '39 why do we continue to deny public access to depend-
ency proceedings as a matter of course? The public needs to see the
inadequate system of justice dependency court offers to its children.
Whether that opportunity for public accountability will bring reform and
a greater measure of justice for the children of dependency court remains
to be seen. But the case for creating the possibility is a persuasive one.
I. HISTORY AND FUNCTION
While I argue that public access to dependency proceedings should
be legislated because it is in the best interest of children and not because
it may be constitutionally required,n° the Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis in court access cases is a good starting point. In a series of
opinions in the 1980s, the Court recognized the public's First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal proceedings, beginning with Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia4' and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court2 (trials) and continuing with Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court3 (hereinafter Press Enterprise I) (jury selection process) and
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court" (hereinafter Press-Enterprise II)
(preliminary hearings). In each case, the Court relied upon a two-fold
analysis, looking first at the history of access to the proceeding and sec-
ond, at the function served by access to the particular proceeding. 5 The
Court's analysis suits a policy discussion in two respects. First, the
Court's analytical framework informs the discussion in two essential
areas: (1) reviewing the history of access to dependency proceedings
provides an opportunity to look at society's judgment about access to
proceedings over time and (2) examining the functional role of access to
dependency proceedings provides an opportunity to consider the logic of
open proceedings today. In addition, however, the Supreme Court's
analysis in these cases also contributes substantively to a discussion of
dependency proceedings. While the cases in which the Court considered
access questions all involved criminal proceedings,4 6 the Court's analysis
39. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Daubney v. Cooper, 10 B. & C. 237, 240, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829)).
40. Some state courts have dealt with the constitutional aspects of access to dependency
courts. San Bernardino County Dep't. of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 339 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991); Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dept. of Children & Soc. Servs., 780 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla.
2001).
41. 448 U.S. 555, 575-581 (1980) (plurality opinion); Id. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
42. 457 U.S. 596, 604-06 (1982).
43. 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984).
44. 478 U.S. 1, 10-13 (1986).
45. See also Waller v. Ga., 467 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1984) (using the same analysis as the First
Amendment access cases, held that a closed suppression hearing, over defendant's objection,
violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights).
46. The Supreme Court has thus far explicitly recognized a right of access only in criminal
cases. But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("[W]e note that
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includes the history and function of access to courtrooms generally, thus
also providing an introduction to these aspects of dependency proceed-
ings.
The Court's opinions first consider the history of courtroom access
in America. 7 In Justice Brennan's words, "a tradition of accessibility
implies the favorable judgment of experience." 8 In other words, our his-
torical experience tells us something about how we have valued access.
Chief Justice Burger provides the foundational history lesson in the
Court's plurality opinion in Richmond.4 9 His discussion gives more focus
to the criminal trial, the issue before the Court, but also tells the history
of trials generally in the Anglo-American justice system, and makes
plain that not only criminal, but also civil trials have traditionally been
open. In tracking the open trial from England to America, Justice Burger
begins "before the Norman Conquest [when] cases in England were gen-
erally brought before moots, such as the local court of the hundred or the
county court, which were attended by the freemen of the community."'
These were courts of general jurisdiction and heard both civil and crimi-
nal matters.' Justice Burger's discussion moves on to another court of
general jurisdiction, "the Eyre of Kent, a general court held in 1313-
1314, [which] evince[d] a recognition of the importance of public atten-
dance apart from the 'jury duty' aspect." 2 From the Eyre of Kent, Justice
Burger takes us to the colonies:
historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."); Richmond, 448 U.S. at
599 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and
the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal."); Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979) (observing that history demonstrates a "common-law rule of
open civil and criminal proceedings").
Lower courts, however, have relied upon Richmond, Globe and subsequent cases and
found that the right of access extends to civil cases also. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super.
Court, 980 P.2d 337, 359 (Cal. 1999); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir.
1984); In re Cont. Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Newman v. Graddick, 696
F.2d 796, 801 (11 th Cir. 1983); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-
79 (6th Cir. 1983). A few authors have also argued that the public may well have a constitutional
right of access to dependency proceedings. E.g., Jeanne L. Nowaczewski, Comment, The First
Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 286, 306-10; Sokol, supra note 28, at 881; Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14; Gofen,
supra note 13, at 857.
47. The historical analysis the Court uses can serve two objectives. First, a history of access
can suggest a constitutional right. Important to a policy analysis, however, is the second objective,
what our experience tells us about the value of access. Nowaczewski, supra note 46, at 290-91.
48. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 556.
50. Id. at 565 (citing Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, I SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AM. LEGAL HIST. 88,89 (1907)).
51. Nowaczewski, supra note 46, at 294. Nowaczewski also notes both criminal and civil
trials were open in England and that there was originally no significant distinction between the two.
As the two became more distinct, public access remained constant. "[Elarly commentators either
expressly or implicitly regarded civil trials as necessarily open to the public." Id. at 295.
52. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 566.
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[W]hen in the mid-1600's the Virginia Assembly felt that the respect
due the courts was 'by the clamorous unmannerlyness of the people
lost, and order, gravity and decoram which should manifest the
authority of a court in the court it selfe neglected,' the response was
not to restrict the openness of the trials to the public, but instead to
prescribe rules for the conduct of those attending them.53
And in a footnote, Chief Justice Burger notes that "historically both civil
and criminal trials have been presumptively open. '' 4
Justice Burger then turns to the second part of the Court's analysis,
asking what function is served, what values are gained, by public access
to trials.55 And again, while the Chief Justice looks specifically at the
function public access serves in criminal trials, his rationale extends to
civil proceedings.56 Presumptive openness, Justice Burger observes, has
"long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-
American trial. 57 Hale in the 17th Century, Blackstone in the 18th cen-
tury, and Bentham in the 19th century all recognized the value of the
open trial.5  Among those benefits accruing from access Burger discusses
were giving assurance of fair proceedings, discouraging perjury, discour-
aging other misconduct, enhancing the performance of participants, pro-
tecting the judge from "imputations of dishonesty," discouraging deci-
sions based on "secret bias or partiality," educating the public, and en-
couraging public confidence in the system.59
The Court's discussions on the history and the functional role of
access suggest dependency proceedings should be subject to public ac-
cess. First, history has valued highly public access to trials, and depend-
ency hearings are trials. The dependency court adjudicates. Further, the
matters adjudicated in dependency court are no less worthy or needful of
the benefits access brings - fair proceedings, truthfulness, credibility, an
educated public, public confidence in the system - than are the matters
adjudicated in criminal court. Dependency courts decide whether a child
53. Id. at 567 (internal source omitted).
54. Id. at 580 n.17. See also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 (1979):
For many centuries, both civil and criminal trials have traditionally been open to the
public .... [And] in the American Colonies ... [firom the beginning, the norm was open
trials .... Indeed, many of the advantages of public criminal trials are equally applicable
in the civil trial context. While the operation of the judicial process in civil cases is often
of interest only to the parties in the litigation, this is not always the case [citations
omitted]. Thus, in some civil cases the public interest in access, and the salutary effect of
publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most criminal cases.
55. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 575-78, 580.
56. Id. at 569.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 569, 572. These iatter observations served as the basis for the "function" prong of
the Court's history and function analysis. See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982) (listing the benefits of public access to criminal trials).
60. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 458 (Ohio 1990) (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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has been abused or neglected; they determine whether a child needs the
intervention of the state for protection; they decide the parents' rights to
the custody of their children; they separate children and parents; they
place children in foster homes. If preliminary hearings and voir dires in
criminal cases are, as the Supreme Court has said, as important as the
trial itself,6' and thus subject to public access, then a dependency pro-
ceeding, which is the "trial," should be as well.62
The Supreme Court has also recognized that access to proceedings
is even more critical when no jury participates and the judge acts as both
61fact finder and decision maker, as is the case in dependency hearings.
The Court's statement concerning preliminary hearings applies equally to
other proceedings conducted without juries: "[T]he absence of a jury,
long recognized as 'an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the complaint [sic], biased, or eccen-
tric judge,' makes the importance of public access ... even more signifi-
cant."
Thus, the Supreme Court's general discussion of the history and
function of access supports the wisdom of public access to dependency
trials. Justice Brennan, in Richmond, however, cautions against generali-
ties, and rightly so. Just as the protection of the First Amendment can
theoretically be made "endless" by asserting that an action informs the
65public and thus should be protected, we need to be cautious in a policy
analysis of access to court proceedings. A policy analysis, like a consti-
tutional analysis, "is not advanced by rhetorical statements that all in-
formation bears upon public issues; what is crucial in individual cases is
whether access to a particular government process is important in terms
of that very process." 66 Here, trials that they are, one cannot ignore a one
hundred year history that has treated America's juvenile proceedings,
including dependency, differently, and treated them so for particular
policy reasons. Accordingly, it makes sense to examine specifically the
history of dependency court proceedings to see if it reveals any "judg-
61. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (quoting San Jose Mercury News
v. Mun. Court, 638 P.2d 655, 663 (Cal. 1982)).
62. The Supreme Court has described the role of preliminary hearings in criminal matters as
"often the final and most important step" and often the "sole occasion for public observation of the
... system." Press Enterprise Co. 478 U.S. at 12. Federal and state courts have extended the
Richmond right of criminal trial access to numerous types of legal proceedings, including bail
hearings, change of venue hearings, chambers conferences, and closure proceedings, by interpreting
"trial" broadly. Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of
Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 266-67 (1995).
63. Juries are sometimes involved in termination of parental rights cases. See e.g., WIS. STAT.
§ 48.31(2) (West Supp. 2000). However, judges almost always decide abuse and neglect dependency
proceedings. See Gofen. supra note 13, at 857; Sokol, supra note 28, at 917-18. But see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-3-202 (2000) (providing for a right to jury trial).
64. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968)).
65. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555. 588 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 589.
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ment of experience." Likewise, we need to analyze specifically the na-
ture of dependency proceedings to determine if the function of access is
important in terms of that particular process.
II. THE HISTORICAL JUDGMENT OF JUVENILE DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDING
While our country's modem dependency proceeding, with its confi-
dentiality strictures, is directly traceable to the invention of the juvenile
court in 1900, its earlier origins are legitimately traced to English laws
and judicial proceedings as far back as the 1300s. 6' These early statutes
and proceedings show that confidentiality was initially not a concern, but
then, neither was protection of children. Both concepts came later. The
historical starting point includes England's Poor Laws and to a lesser
extent, the English Court of Chancery's recognition of parens patriae in
cases concerning children.
A. England's Poor Laws
Modern dependency proceedings are probably most frequently traced
68to the English Poor Laws. The Poor Laws were England's legal mecha-
nism for dealing with its poor in the 1300s through the 1800s. 69 Begin-
ning with the Statutes of Laborers of 1349 and 135070 and leading up to
the Poor Law Act of 1601,71 the Poor Laws sought to deal with several
economic and social issues that involved the poor and adversely affected
the rich and middle classes . Certainly the earliest legislation was not
motivated by a desire to aid the poor or to protect dependent children.
The Statutes of Laborers, frequently cited as the beginning of the Poor
67. Some would argue earlier. See William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor
Laws, 1349-1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73, 73 n.3
(1996).
68. Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patraie: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L.
REV. 205,210-11 (1971).
69. Id. at 210; William P. Quigley, Backwards Into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the
Millenium Resemble English Poor Laws of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101, 102-03
(1998); Quigley, supra note 67, at 125.
70. The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3 (Eng.) and A Statute of Laborers, 1350, 25
Edw. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at Large 248-253 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
71. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in II THE
STATUTES AT LARGE 702-05 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). The exact span of the Poor Laws varies
from author to author, but the 1601 law is usually seen as the high mark. See Jacabus TenBroek,
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 257, 258 (1964).
72. For example, the early acts forced the poor to work for fixed wages; the later acts provided
some means of relief for the "impotent" poor. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210-11; Quigley, supra
note 69, at 102-03. Much of the need for the Poor Laws was triggered by the decline and breakup of
the system of feudalism and the resulting social and economic changes. The black plague, famine
and the resulting labor shortage, along with various other factors, also contributed. Quigley, supra
note 67, at 73, 77, 82-83; Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210; Quigley, supra note 69, at 102.
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Laws,73 were designed to accomplish two goals: to keep scarce workers
from taking advantage of their position in the labor market by demanding
excessive wages, and further, to deal with those poor who would rather
live by begging than live by working - a situation becoming increasingly
disturbing to the public . The statutes dealt with these concerns by first
keeping the wages of the working poor in check; in effect, the laws es-
tablished maximum wages. Second, these maximum wages were cou-
pled with forced labor of the able-bodied poor, who "shall be bound to
serve him that doth require him, or else committed to [prison]."76 Finally,
as added insurance for the labor pool, and as a way to eliminate the
scourge of idleness, vagrancy and begging, the public was prohibited
from almsgiving to those "able to labour.,
77
By the 1500s, economic and political changes had resulted in a large
number of poor and homeless in England, 7  resulting in significant eco-
nomic strain and social disorder,79 and, consequently, in a 1535 Poor Law
that established a system of public relief.80 Once the public assumed the
burden of supporting the poor, it also felt the price tag, and one way of
keeping the price as low as possible was to put poor children to work,
either as indentured servants or apprentices. Under the Elizabethan Stat-
73. TenBroek, supra note 71, at 261; Quigley, supra note 67, at 82 n.50.
74. See generally A.L. Beier, MASTERLESS MEN: THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND
1560-1640, 1-13 (1985).
First, they were poor, lacking any regular income apart from wages from casual labor.
Secondly, they were able-bodied - 'sturdy', 'valiant' and fit to work. Thirdly, they were
unemployed, or in contemporary terms 'masterless' and 'idle'. Fourthly, they were
rootless,: wandering, vagrant. 'runnagate' [sic]. Finally, they were lawless, dangerous,
and suspected of spreading vice and corruption .... [Laws against vagrancy] reflected a
conviction of the ruling elites that vagabondage was a hydra-headed monster poised to
destroy the state and social order, for of the vagrant's five characteristics the leitmotiv
that ran through them all was disorder.
Id. at 4. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 83-84 (discussing the birth of the Poor Laws pursuant to
the Black Plague); TenBroek, supra note 71, at 270-71 (describing the rise of the Poor Laws in
response to the English labor shortage): The Statute of Labourers. 1349, 23 Edw. 3 (Eng.). reprinted
in I The Statutes at Large 248-49 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
75. Quigley, supra note 67, at 84-91 (a labor shortage was causing workers to demand
"excessive" wages).
76. The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. I (Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at
Large 249 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See also Quigley, supra note 69, at 102 (laws establishing
maximum wages).
77. The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 7 (Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at
Large 250 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 87 (delineating who was
eligible for alms giving). The 1349 statute gave some nod to "helping" the poor by requiring that
some necessities be sold at "reasonable prices." The Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 6
(Eng.), reprinted in I The Statutes at Large 250 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
78. Thirteen to twenty percent of the population in the 1520s was destitute, and the number
continued to rise throughout the 1500s. Quigley, supra note 67, at 92-93.
79. Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894-95 (1975).
80. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L.
REV. 175, 180 (1955).
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utes of Artificers of 1562,"1 children as young as one year and up to age
twenty could be involuntarily apprenticed as workers for "seven years at
the least. 82 In theory, "apprenticeship involved training [in] the master's
'craft, mystery, or occupation .... ,,,3 Indenture, on the other hand, was
"simply a work contract. '" "In practice, both usually involved little
training," '85 and both involved separating the child from its parents, as the
child was required to live with the master for whom the apprenticed or
indentured child worked.86 Putting children "to service" reduced the drain
on the public purse and as a further benefit, kept them off the streets, a
particular concern of the Crown's at the time.87 The homeless of these
years were called a "new class of poor, the wandering ones,"88 triggered
by the large number of "wandering, vagrant, [and] 'runnagate' [sic]" per-
sons8 9 "terroriz[ing] town and country. ' 9°
The next major legislation in the succession of Poor Laws was the
Act of 1601. While England continued to revise its laws concerning the
poor after this date, the 1601 legislation is the trademark of the English
81. An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry &
Apprentices (Statute of Artificers), 1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng.), reprinted in 1H The Statutes at Large
535-43 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See e.g., Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210 (referring to it as the
Statutes of Artificers).
82. An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of Husbandry &
Apprentices (Statute of Artificers), 1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 4, § 27, 35, 43 (Eng.), reprinted in H The
Statutes at Large 540, 541, 542 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). See also Quigley, supra note 69, at 103
(children one years old to twenty years old were eligible for apprenticeship); TenBroek, supra note
71, at 274, 279-82 (defining the apprenticeship).




86. Id. at 895-96. While the training extended to many children was probably minimal or non-
existent, some surely did acquire skills they would not have otherwise had. Id. at 896 n.43. Further,
child labor "in this pre-child labor law era" was not untoward, nor was sending children away to
acquire skills; "upper class families of the time frequently sent adolescents to other families for
training." Id. at 894-96. "Adolescents" are a far cry from one year olds, however.
87. Id. at 894-96.
88. Quigley, supra note 67, at 93. See also Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common
Law: The Renaissance Debate Over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 390
(1998) (discussing "what has been called the 'crisis of order,' as population growth outstripped
economic opportunities, resulting in growing poverty, vagrancy, social polarization,
landlessness....").
89. Beier, supra note 74, at 4. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 83-85, 87 (describing how
much of the population left the feudal manor in pursuit of better work); Areen, supra note 79, at 894-
95 (detailing how the "sturdy beggar began to fill the roads"); TenBroek, supra note 71, at 270-71
(describing the relationship between Poor Laws and the maintenance of the labor supply).
90. Areen, supra note 79, at 895. Children were again addressed in a 1576 act where the value
of providing work for children was specifically mentioned - "[t]o the intent youth may be
accustomed and brought up in labor and work" - but so was the public concern with the homeless
poor - "and then not like to grow to be idle rogues." Philip Harvey, Joblessness and the Law Before
the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 16 (1999) (quoting An Act for the Setting of the
Poor on Work, and for the Avoiding of Idleness, 1575-1576, 18 Eliz., ch. 3, § 4 (Eng.) (spelling in
quotations was modified)).
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Poor Laws. It "fixed the character of poor relief for three centuries," 9'
and served as an archetype for early efforts in the American colonies,
and later, for legislative efforts in the states.92 The Poor Law Act of 1601
continued forced work for children, but also specifically linked forced
work and apprenticeships to children of those poor thought not "able to
keep and maintain their children."93 By 1601, then, the Poor Laws had
established a pattern that is discernible in today's dependency court. The
legislation empowered the state to deal with children whose parents were
unable to support them and part of that legislative model included taking
those children from the custody of their parents.94
While the obligation of the public to care for the poor became the
focus of the Poor Laws, protecting poor relief recipients, whether chil-
dren or not, from any associated stigma or trauma was not a special con-
cern.9 Generally the laws did not seek to stigmatize affirmatively those
individuals sanctioned as needing relief;96 there was simply little effort to
91. TenBroek, supra note 71, at 258.
92. Id. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 127-28 (explaining how the English Poor Laws
represented the first attempt to remedy poverty through legislation).
93. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § I (Eng.), reprinted in I1 The
Statutes at Large 702 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763). The statute also made financially able family
members of "every poor, old, blind, lame and impotent person, or other poor person not able to
work" financially responsible for each other, thus imposing a legal duty upon parents to support their
children, a duty not found in the common law. Id. at § 7 (included were fathers, grandfathers,
mothers, grandmothers and children), reprinted in H1 The Statutes at Large 703 (Owen Ruffhead, ed.,
1763). The responsibility laws applied only to the poor, and "the common law did not seek to
augment the poor law.... The courts continued to find that parents were under a natural duty and a
moral responsibility [to support their children] but not a legal obligation." TenBroek, supra note 7 1,
at 290. "If the son is left to starve, the exclusive remedy of the law is to apply to the parish poor law
authorities who will 'compel the father, if of ability, to pay for his son's support."' Id. at 291 n. 148
(quoting Shelton v. Springett, 138 Eng. Rep. 549, 550 (1851)). See also Quigley, supra note 67, at
127-28 (discussing how children of the poor could be taken from their families by operation of law).
94. TenBroek, supra note 71, at 286.
95. The concern was control and regulation by the state:
The Elizabethan poor law system proved ... a fertile source of special legal provisions
about the poor. These governed their subjection to public control, their condition of
idleness or labor, their freedom of choice of living arrangements, their right to travel and
settle where they pleased, their personal and civil rights. and their family relationships.
Regulation of those family relationships included the denial or subordination of parental
rights to custody, control, and determination of training or education .... The poor law
was thus not only a law about the poor but a law of the poor. It dealt with a condition, and
it governed a class ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
96. See generally Quigley, supra note 67, at 84, 87, 93, 102. By contrast, those designated as
not legitimate recipients, those seen as able-bodied persons refusing to work, were singled out for
punishment, and sometimes for the stigma of public punishment. The 1531 Act, for example,
provided that an unauthorized beggar who was a repeat offender would have "the upper part of the
gristle of his right ear cut off." An Act Concerning Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds, 1531, 22
Hen. 8, ch. 12 (Eng.), reprinted in V Historical Documents 1485-1558 at 1027 (C.H. Williams, ed.,
1971).
Further, legitimate recipients were not always spared. The Poor Relief Act of 1662, An
Act for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom (The Act of Settlement), 14 Car. 2, ch. 12
(Eng.), reprinted in 1Ml The Statutes at Large 243 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763), for example, was
enacted primarily to respond to a concern that the rural poor were moving to cities and placing an
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eliminate social stigma associated with poor relief. Workhouses, for ex-
ample, establishments designed to thus reducing the cost of poor relief, 97
were designed to "make the receipt of aid so psychologically devastating
and so morally stigmatizing that only the truly needy would request
it....'98 While the implicit humiliation of the workhouse was theoretically
reserved for the able-bodied,9 their children were not exempt. A descrip-
tion of a 1795 workhouse: "The number of Paupers in the workhouse at
present... is 136 .... Of these 38 are under 10 years of age; 26 between
10 and 20 .... Their employments are various ... [and] children are
generally sent to the different manufactories ....
unfair burden on cities. Id. at § 1. See also Quigley, supra note 67, at 103-04 (describing how
London was being overrun by migratory rural settlers). As later amended, the Act required that poor
relief recipients, including children, wear a red or blue cloth "P" on their clothing:
And to the end that the money raised only for the relief of such as are well impotent as
poor, may not be misapplied and consumed by the idle, sturdy and disorderly beggars; be
it further enacted .. that every such person... [who] receive[s] relief [from] any parish.
• .and the wife and children of any such person cohabiting in the same house ... shall
upon the shoulder of the right sleeve of the upper-most garment of every such person, in
an open and visible manner, wear such badge or mark as is herein after mentioned and
expressed, that is to say, a large Roman P. together with the first letter of the name of the
parish or place whereof such poor person is an inhabitant, cut either in red or blue cloth,
as by the church wardens and overseers of the poor it shall be directed and appointed ....
An Act for Supplying Some Defects in the Laws for the Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom, 1697, 8
& 9 Will. 3, ch. 30 § 2 (Eng.), reprinted in III The Statutes at Large 681 (Owen Ruffhead, ed., 1763).
See Quigley, supra note 67, at 106. The Act simply substituted stigma for judgment, and relied on
public branding as the mechanism for sorting out the truly needy from the merely idle.
97. Quigley, supra note 67, at 109. Workhouses were the most significant feature of the
modifications and reforms enacted in years after 1601 and were a primary component of the Poor
Relief Act. Id. at 109-113.
98. Id. at 110 (citing Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionabiliy Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract, 24 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 283, 310 (1995)).
99. Quigley, supra note 67, at 109.
100. See id. at 111 (quoting Rules of Kendal Workhouse, 1797, quoted in Sir Frederic Eden,
The State Of The Poor (1797) at 754-57, reprinted in 11 English Historical Documents (1783-1832)
at 446-48 (David C. Douglas, ed. 1959)). Workhouses went out of favor in the late 1700s, emerged
again in 1834, and retreated yet again. Quigley, supra note 67, at 112-13, 117, 124-25. See also Peter
M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in
the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 5, 76-77 (1996); George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold,
104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1295-96 (1995).
The workhouse reflected English society's prevailing belief about the poor, and thus its
lack of concern about stigmatizing the poor. Being poor was usually a personal failing, not a result
of economic or societal factors. There was thus no need to protect those who deserved no protection.
The consideration for the design of poor relief was cost efficiency. Quigley, supra note 67, at 126-
27; TenBroek, supra note 71, at 286. Other motivations were sometimes present, however; for
example, the laws seemed to recognize "ethical concepts about the need for the individual to work,
and criminological concepts about the social results of idleness and vagrancy - but these forces were
only contributory .... The seminal source of the law of the poor .... was the need to curtail public
expenditures and to conserve public funds once the public undertook the burden [of support of the
poor]." Id. at 286-87.
The pain or stigma that accompanied relief ensured that assistance to the poor would only
be provided to those who had genuine need. Quigley lists as one of the "seven major principles one
can glean from the poor laws over these 500 years" that "assistance to the nonworking poor must not
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With the exception of providing poor relief to children in various
ways, the histories of the Poor Laws and any attendant institutions or
practices reflect little concern with protecting children. Relief was
grudgingly given, many apprenticeships and indentures were harsh, and
the stigma and trauma visited upon the recipients, including the children,
were largely irrelevant to the public paying for the support of the poor.
The Poor Laws may have established the legislative basis for modem
dependency court, but they did not establish a practice or custom, a his-
torical judgment, favoring confidentiality in dependency proceedings.
B. England's Parens Patriae in Chancery Court
While lacking support for confidentiality, the Poor Laws do provide
a good basis for arguing that the intervention in the parent-child relation-
ship in today's dependency court is a descendent of the English legisla-
tive branch.'"' The rationale for the court's authority to intervene, parens
patriae ("parent of the country"),' ° however, was borrowed from judicial
law developed in the English chancery courts.0 3 It makes sense that the
English chancery court felt obligated to justify its intervention. The Poor
Laws dealt with only the children of the poor; the chancery courts, how-
ever, dealt primarily with the children of the rich.'04 The English chan-
cery court appears to have been, like other English courts, an "open
court." However, the operation of the chancery court, along with its ju-
risdiction over matters involving children, does provide some support for
a historical judgment of confidential hearings for children.
The history of the Court of Chancery and parens patriae is difficult
to review briefly. Ample literature is available for more detail, but the
following summary will do for our purposes.)° The chancery court's
be generously given nor made too easy to accept," thus helping to ensure that "only those worthy of
help receive it." Quigley, supra note 67, at 126-27. Similarly, the removal of children from their
families and homes was not to safeguard children from the hands of neglectful or abusive parents; it
was to put the children to work, a "product of cost consciousness." Areen, supra note 79, at 896.
101. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 223.
102. DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELINKOFF'S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE (West.
Pub. Co. 1992).
103. See generally Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of
"Parens Patriae," 22 S.C. L. REV. 147 (1970); Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210; TenBroek, supra
note 71, at 262.
104. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 210-11; Quigley, supra note 69, at 102-03.
105. For two excellent histories, see John Seymour, Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers:
Their Nature and Origins, 14 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) and Cogan, supra note 103.
Cogan's self-appointed task was to show how the court's authority to take "special care" of infants
had evolved from extending care to infants "who were properly before [the court]" to when "the
court could properly bring infants before it to give them special care." Id. at 180. As Seymour warns,
however, it is important to exercise caution when drawing any conclusions from these or other
histories. "It is... impossible to be sure about the character of Chancery's jurisdiction at this time..
..'No inference can be drawn from the irregular proceedings of ancient times, when grievances of
every kind were pressed upon the Chancellor's attention."' Seymour, supra, at 166 (quoting
MACPHERSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO INFANTS 103 (1842)).
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origin is traced to matters that originally were brought before the King's
Council. These matters were often referred to the Chancellor, as a mem-
ber of the Council and the King's "chief secretary" and advisor.' °6 By the
close of the fifteenth century, this custom had evolved into a chancery
court.'0 7 The court's parens patriae authority seems to have developed
from its jurisdiction in wardship and guardianship issues,08 which origi-
nally concerned land and profits, and only incidentally, children. "Ward-
ship .... procedures... (and the role of the courts in administering these
procedures) were directed towards the administration of the property of
infant heirs. Wardship procedures were not designed with the purpose of
facilitating judicial intervention in the lives of vulnerable infants."', 9 By
the seventeenth century, however, so long as the ward-child was properly
before the court on an accounting or other similar matter," the reported
cases show the chancery court beginning to reflect a broader concern for
the child's care, for example, in matters related to custody."' By name,
however, parens patriae seems to have first appeared (as "Pater patriae")
in a chancery "infant case" in 1696. '12 Falkland v. Bertie"3 was a testa-
mentary trust case in which the court was asked to release an infant from
a condition precedent to a legacy, the condition precedent being a mar-
106. SIR GEOFFREY CROSS & G.D.G. HALL, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 98-101, 114-15 (4th
ed. 1964).
107. The Chancellor sat at the hearings and issued decrees in his name. Id. at 118.
108. Seymour, supra note 105, at 167.
109. Id. at 172. Wardships arose when a tenant of the land would die and leave an infant heir.
In wardships arising from military tenures (knight service), the lord who held the wardship,
including when the King was the direct holder, had the right to the profits of the lands until the child
came of age, along with other significant feudal benefits, including custody of the child and the right
to arrange the child's marriage. Id. at 162-163. See also Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. J. 195, 196 n.12 (1978); Cogan, supra note 103, at 148-
49. These wardships, and thus their benefits and profits, could be purchased and were a source of
revenue for their holders, particularly the King who was "always lord and never tenant." Seymour,
supra note 105, at 164. See also Cogan, supra note 103, at 148. By contrast, there were also
wardships of land held in socage, not military tenure. In these cases, the wardship of the child went
to "the nearest relation to whom the land could not descend" and the holder of the wardship was
required to account to the child for any profits of the land. Seymour, supra note 105, at 163-665
nn.16 & 17. Because socage tenure required the holder to account to the ward-child for any profits of
the land, socage wardships suggested the fiduciary aspect inherent in a modem guardianship of a
child; it reflected an obligation of the guardian to the child. Id. at 162-65. Still, "[tihe orphaned
infant was treated as an adjunct to his lands," id. at 165 (quoting THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNE'rr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 545 (5th ed., 1956)), and a guardianship at that time did
not resemble a modem day fiduciary relationship. Id, at 163.
110. Cogan, supra note 103, at 154-55.
111. E.g., Corsellis v. Corsellis, 23 Eng. Rep. 192, 194 (1678) (ordering that a guardian could
not have custody of "the Infant, but that he shall remain at Eaton till this Court give farther [sic]
Direction").
112. See Cogan, supra note 103, at 166. Cogan questions whether the phrase was in the case at
the outset, however. Id. at 167-68.
113. 23Eng. Rep. 814(Ch. 1696).
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riage."4 The court in Falkland recognized its parens patriae duty and
authority to take care of infants:
And as to the plea of infancy, it is true infants are always favoured. In
this court there were several things that belonged to the King as Pater
patriae, and fell under the care and direction of this court, as chari-
ties, infants, ideots, lunatics, etc., afterwards such of them as were of
profit and advantage to the King, were removed to the Court of
Wards by the statute; but upon the dissolution of that court came back
again to the Chancery, where the interests of infants are so far re-
garded and taken care of .... "'
The phrase appeared in a handful of chancery infant cases after
Falkland,"6 but the 1827 Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort' 7 infant case
is traditionally the case cited for the clear recognition that parens patriae
gave the chancery court broad power to make orders that would protect
the child, without first having the child before it on some property mat-
ter.''
8
The facts of Wellesley began when Mr. Wellesley had an extra-
marital affair; as a result, Mrs. Wellesley left with their children. Not
long afterwards, Mrs. Wellesley died. The children remained in the
physical custody of Mrs. Wellesley's sisters. Mr. Wellesley filed a ha-
beas corpus action to retrieve his children, and the sisters petitioned the
chancery court for relief."9 The chancery court's discussion of the basis
for its jurisdiction in the case, a private custody case, included a discus-
sion of parens patriae, 20 and the court concluded that it had jurisdiction
to protect the child:
The important consideration is, - is it necessary that the Court should
thus interpose? If this Court has not the power to interpose, what is
the provision of law that is made for the children? .... Wherever the
power of the law rests with respect to the protection of children, it is
clear that it ought to exist somewhere: if it be not in this Court, where
does it exist?'
2'
114. Falkland, 23 Eng. Rep. at 814.
115. Id.at818.
116. Two are traditionally discussed as bookends for the evolution of parens patriae in cases
involving children: Eyre v. The Countess of Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722) and Wellesley
v. Duke of Beaufort, 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827). Custer, supra note 109, at 204, 207. Parens
patriae's appearance in 1722 in Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, was not by the court, but was in the
reported argument of the Countess of Shaftsbury. See Sarah Abramowicz, English Child Custody
Law, 1660-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1344, 1352 n.37 (1999).
117. 38 Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827).
118. See Cogan, supra note 103, at 180.
119. Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 236-38.
120. Id. at 243 ("[wlith respect to the doctrine that this authority belongs to the King as parens
patriae").
121. Id. at 244.
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Thus, by the time of Wellesley, the Poor Laws had established the
legislative basis for separating children from their parents when neces-
sary; Wellesley then provided the rationale for the judiciary to intervene
in the parent-child relationship. This legislation and this judicial rationale
would eventually combine to create America's juvenile court, where
confidential dependency proceedings would reside. But while the
groundwork for the proceedings existed, closed hearings for these types
of proceedings were not yet factors, or at least not yet newsworthy fac-
tors. Until this point, discussions concerning confidentiality in any of
these proceedings, especially as needed to serve the child's best interest,
are lacking in the reported cases and histories.
However, while histories of the English Court of Chancery, from
which parens patriae emerged, suggest that the court was, by all indica-
tions, open; Wellesley and a smattering of other authorities around the
same time indicate that there were some exceptions, sometimes in cases
involving children. In addition, even "open court," at least in chancery
court, did not necessarily provide public access in the way that open
court does today.
Wellesley is notable for its mention of a private hearing for "matters
of [its] kind,"' 23 and the case provides a brief discussion indicating some
matters in chancery court, and perhaps some matters involving children,
were heard in private. It also suggests some matters should be held in
private. What is not clear is whether the court's concern for privacy in
the immediate case was for the children, the adult parties, or the public:
I will give no opinion (because it does not become me to do so), as to
whether it were a discretion properly or improperly exercised, that
this matter was not heard in private. In most cases, certainly, it has
122. The absence of sources discussing private or confidential hearings indicates public access
was the norm for chancery court. In his book, W. J. Jones frequently refers to the Chancellor holding
hearings in "open" court. W.J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 54, 208, 253, 253
n. 1, 295 (1967). Other descriptions, by omitting any reference to closed hearings, imply the hearings
were open. E.g., EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 165-169 (6th ed., Methuen &
Co., Ltd, London 1949). Other sources affirmatively suggest the court was open. E.g., Vernon
Valentine Palmer, "May God Protect Us from the Equity of Parlements ": Comparative Reflections
on English and French Equity Power, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1287, 1296-97 (1999) (comparing the French
and English Equity powers: "[Tihe [French] parlements [judicial tribunals] operated in total secrecy.
• . .In contrast, the English Chancellors operated an open court and pronounced reasons for their
decrees."). In addition, the reproduction of the illustration "The Lord Chancellor's Court at Lincoln's
Inn Hall," E.S. TURNER, MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP 193 (Michael Joseph Ltd. 1971), shows
an open court with spectators, and one author describes the King's Bench and the chancery court "at
the upper end of Westminster Hall" as "both remaining open to the hall, and a bar being erected to
keep off the multitude from pressing on the judges." JOHN G. HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE
143 (T.H. Flood & Co. 1904).
123. Wellesley, 38 Eng. Rep. at 243.
[Vol. 79:1
PUBLIC ACCESS TO DEPENDENCY COURT
been thought expedient that matters of this kind should be heard in
124private ....
Also notable is that in the same breath in which the court acknowl-
edged the possibility of a private hearing, thereby contributing to a his-
torical judgment favoring closed dependency hearings, it also contributed
to a discussion about the functional value of public court proceedings for
the important matter before it:
[B]ut if the parties choose to have matters of so much delicacy, but of
such mighty importance, discussed and argued in public, I know that
it is one of the best securities for the honest exercise of a judge's
duty, that he is to discharge that duty in public. That duty I will dis-
charge as well as I can - recollecting that what I am called upon to do
is a strong measure; that the interposition of this Court stands upon
principles, which it ought not to put into operation without keeping in
view all the feelings of a parent's heart, and all the principles of the
common law with respect to a parent's rights; and that, though the
Court has interposed in many instances of this sort, the application is
one of the most serious and important nature.' m
Wellesley is not the only evidence indicating that hearings involving
children around this time could be closed in chancery court. One infant
case decided six years prior to Wellesley, Lyons v. Blenkin,"6 also men-
tions a hearing held in chambers in another (unnamed) case. The court
states in a note to the opinion, "In a case which was heard in private be-
fore the Lord Chancellor in August 1821, his Lordship observed, that
where the infant was a ward of the Court there were many circumstances
to which he could give attention .... , 27 Lyons appears to have been held
in open court. Other infant cases, cited in the major articles discussing
the evolution of parens patriae in chancery court, also appear to have
been held in open court. However, none of the cases make any mention
of private or in-chambers hearings.'
28
In addition to cases sometimes mentioning private or closed hear-
ings for children, a later report by John David Chambers, from 1842
(fifteen years after Wellesley), states that, by that time at least, some suits
in chancery court involving infants were closed: "[P]etitions regarding
infants were heard before 'all proper parties,' but if a bill leads to a suit
'no person can so attend ... without special leave."" 129 Other commenta-
tors who have described the operations of Chancery court and infant par-
124. Id. at 242-43.
125. Id. at 243.
126. 37 Eng. Rep. 842 (Ch. 1821).
127. Lyons, 37 Eng. Rep. at 848 n.5.
128. See e.g., the cases cited in Cogan. supra note 103, at 180 (supporting the position that
none of these cases indicate they were heard in private).
129. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 909 n.209 (quoting JOHN DAVID CHAMBERS, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTY OF INFANTS 2 at 82 (London, Saunders & Benning 1842)).
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ens patriae cases (mostly from earlier years), however, have not men-
tioned that infant cases were subject to any special rules concerning be-
ing held in private.
30
Another factor to consider, when reviewing the history of hearings
involving children in chancery, is that chancery hearings were not con-
ducted like modern day trials. As a result, there was at least a coinciden-
tal lack of openness. Generally, witness testimony was taken with written
interrogatories administered by court-appointed examiners; these proofs,
and others, were placed before the court, and the court, after hearing the
arguments of the lawyers, would issue its decree. 3' Viva voce, or oral
examinations of witnesses in open court, appear to have been limited.
32
In addition, because of the great number of cases, a matter set for hearing
would frequently be referred to an administrative "Master," 33 who would
"draw up a report on which the Lord Chancellor would base his deci-
sion.' 3" And, when detailed inquiries were needed before a court could
130. Id. at 909 n.210 (stating that S. ATKINSON, PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 15-19
(London, S. Sweet et al. eds., 1842) and CHARLES BARTON, AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF A SUIT IN
EQUITY (Dublin, Byrne ed., 1796), never mentioned this). See also JONES, supra note 122; CROSS &
HALL, supra note 106.
131. CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 148-49. A typical description of witness testimony is
as follows:
[A] number of questions in writing were framed by the party calling the witnesses, and
these questions... were put to the witness by an examiner appointed by the court. The
answers, given on oath, were recorded and copies could be taken by the other side....
When the depositions . . .had all been taken the case was set down for hearing and
eventually would come on in court. The allegations of each side would be explained to
the Chancellor (who had copies of the affidavits before him) and counsel would address
him on the points of law involved. It was then for the Chancellor to make up his mind on
all the issues of law and fact involved in the case and to pronounce a decree ....
Id. While the witness testimony was "published" (made available to the parties after the examiners
deposed the witnesses), the parties had separate examinations and did not have access to copies of
the other party's examinations until publication. This ensured that the "adversant party's 'cross-
examination' could not be inspired by any knowledge of the witness's evidence in chief." JONES,
supra note 122, at 238-39.
132. JONES, supra note 122, at 252-54.
133. CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 153,
134. JONES, supra note 122, at 253. A part of this process might include the advantage of some
oral examination of witnesses; the disadvantage is that this was done not in open court, but in
chambers: "In the privacy of his chambers, a Master ... could get to grips with a witness, or for that
matter with one of the parties, and fight it out with the aid of flexible cross-examination." Id. at 254.
In addition, while "It]he Lord Chancellor might order viva voce examination at a hearing ... [t]his
was a rare procedure in open court ..... Id. at 253. One author also reports a method used for a time
by which witnesses were examined ad informandum conscientiam iudicis, id. at 250, "intended for
the sight of the judge alone." Id. at 499. Examinations ad informandum conscientiam iudicis were
meant for circumstances when embarrassing information might be revealed by the interrogatories put
to the witness. This evidence, "regarded as unfit for general publication, and thus reserved for the
eye of the bench, was often concerned with the interests, activities, or investments of the Crown." Id.
at 250-51. Such examinations were also frequently used even when there was not potential for
embarrassment, but simply to obtain more information when the ordinary interrogatories failed to
cover matters relevant and important to the suit. Id. at 252. Examinations ad informandum
conscientiam iudicis were no longer used by the latter half of the seventeenth century, however. Id.
at 252 n.3.
PUBLIC ACCESS TO DEPENDENCY COURT
rule, such as when the question was whether a trustee had discharged the
necessary duties,' "the Chancellor, who was far too busy a person for
such details, would refer the matter to a Master for investigation in the
presence of the parties and for a report on which the Chancellor could
subsequently found his decree."'
' 36
It seems likely that, given the chancery court's procedures and
practices, some of its proceedings were not routinely subject to public
access. With the court's awakening concern for protecting children and
its willingness to act as parens patriae, it is also likely that some of those
proceedings involved children. Histories of the court, however, do not
suggest any substantial portion of the court's "courtroom proceedings"
involving children were purposefully and routinely conducted in a court-
room closed to the public until Chambers' report in 1842. Nor do the
earlier histories suggest the public was frequently barred from hearings
involving children in order to "protect" the children. Finally, even when
some hearings were being closed, the court's comment in Wellesley also
indicates the chancery court was aware of the value of open court, in-
cluding in cases involving the welfare of children.
37
C. America's Poor Laws and Parens Patriae
The Poor Laws and parens patriae both found their way to America.
Colonial America first relied on forced apprenticeships and institutional
"houses" to deal with the children of the poor 38 and, when the original
thirteen states enacted legislation, England's Poor Laws were quite evi-
dent. 39 At least eleven of the thirteen states provided that poor or unruly
135. CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 122.
136. Id. at 123. In addition, many matters were not dealt with in hearings before the Chancellor,
but referred to administrative personnel for action or resolution in chambers. W.J. Jones' thorough
description of the Elizabethan Court of Chancery (1558-1603) also shows that court personnel did
much of the work of the Chancery court. JONES, supra note 122, at 6, 52, 208, 287. How "open"
these investigations and other inquiries were is not clear. Descriptions or references to the Chancery
court suggest much work was done in chambers, CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 271; JONES,
supra note 122, at 6, 52, 208, 287, and also done with very little oversight by the court. "[T]he
detailed, and often very important, administrative business which was transacted in chambers was
left entirely to the Masters and clerks of the court." CROSS & HALL, supra note 106, at 271.
From time to time a Chancellor would issue a set of "general orders" prescribing (among
other matters) the method of procedure to be followed in the prosecution of accounts and
enquiries [sic] before the Masters, but in the nature of the case he was not able to exercise
much control in the matter, and the masters were in fact given practically a free hand ....
Id. at 155.
137. The Wellesley court did not take it upon itself to close the proceedings, apparently
believing it could do so only upon request of one of the parties. Wellesley v. The Duke of Beaufort,
38 Eng. Rep. 236, 243 (Ch. 1827) ("but if the parties choose to have matters ...discussed and
argued in public").
138. William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 35,48 (1996).
139. See William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States, 31
U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (1997).
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children could be "bound out" or apprenticed for work.'40 Children were
institutionalized in almshouses and poorhouses, along with workhouses,
houses of correction, and houses of employment.' 4' Thus, children of the
poor continued to be separated from their parents and were subjected to
forced labor under harsh conditions, just as they were under the English
Poor Laws.42 While this separation was "independent ... of any Latin
rubric,"'143 the Latin rubric would eventually join up with the Poor Laws,
although not until 1839.'" There are hints that in the interim, some con-
cern existed for "protecting" children from stigma in related welfare ar-
eas.' 4 An 1804 Washington, D.C., act making public schooling available
to poor children, for example, provided that the names of the children
who could not pay for their education should be withheld from public
reports.'4 Similar statutes in Delaware 47 and Pennsylvania, 48 however,
had no such provisions, and like in England, most legislation was fo-
cused on caring for the poor at the least cost to the public.
49
In 1839, the rationale for court intervention to protect children and
the legislative provisions for separating children from their parents fi-
nally joined." Ex parte Crouse,' a Pennsylvania case, is credited with
first using parens patriae to justify a state committing a child to an in-
stitution over the objection of the parent.'52 The court committed the "in-
corrigible" girl, Mary Ann Crouse, to a house of refuge without a jury
trial after her mother complained that the child was beyond her control.'53
Her father brought a habeas corpus action arguing that the authorizing
legislation was unconstitutional.'" The court upheld the statute and the
commitment, reasoning:
The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school .... The object of
the charity is reformation, by training its inmates to industry; by im-
buing their minds with principles of morality and religion; by fur-
nishing them with means to earn a living; and, above all, by separat-
ing them from the corrupting influence of improper associates. To
140. Id. at 119-40, and 153.
141. Id. at 156.
142. Id.
143. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 212.
144. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
145. See generally CHILDREN AND YouTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, vol. I:
1600-1865 (Robert H. Bremner ed. 1970).
146. Id. at 252.
147. Id. at 253.
148. Id. at 251.
149. See Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 301 (1972).
150. Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839).
151. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
152. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 212.
153. Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
154. Id.
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this end may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of edu-
cation, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or
common guardian of the community? It is to be remembered that the
public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge of its
members, and that of strict right, the business of education belongs to
it. That parents are ordinarily intrusted with it is because it can sel-
dom be put into better hands; but where they are incompetent or cor-
rupt, what is there to prevent the public from withdrawing their fac-
ulties, held, as they obviously are, at its sufferance?'55
What indeed? Under a theory of child protection, Ex parte Crouse
upheld a state's authority to separate a child from its parents, or in the
words of one author, to "sever ... poor parents from their children."'
56
Most courts followed suit, upholding the reach of the Poor Laws into the
lives of poor families and, later, upholding the reach of the juvenile
court."'
D. America's Child Savers in the 1800s
At the beginning of the 1800s in America, just as in England, poor
children and poor children neglected by their parents were taken from
their parents and apprenticed or placed in almshouses or similar facili-
ties, many of which also housed "adult outcasts - paupers and insane and
mentally retarded persons."'5 s Except for that intervention into the lives
of the poor, however, public intervention into the family life to protect
children was rare. 5 9 Parental child abuse was frequently overlooked be-
cause the right of parents to discipline their children usually legitimated
all but the most egregious cases of abuse.' 60 Children accused and con-
victed of crimes were not subjects of protection for the state; they were
tried and punished much like adults were, often sharing space in the
same correctional institutions.' 6' Reformers sought to change this, how-
ever, and their nineteenth century reform agenda pushed for a more pro-
tective attitude concerning the country's children and culminated into the
country's first juvenile court. Not until the advent of the juvenile court,
however, would closed hearings and confidential proceedings be a cog-
nizant aspect of the protective agenda.
155. Id.
156. Rendleman, supra note 68, at 212.
157. See, e.g., Marlow v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W. 1137 (Ky. 1911); Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905).
158. Thomas, supra note 149, at 301-03. See also, Rendelman, supra note 68, at 205-12
(reasoning that statutes designed to protect children makes the state the legitimate guardian of the
child).
159. Thomas, supra note 149 at 301.
160. Id. at 300-06.
161. Paul R. Rudof, Throwing out the Baby with the Bathwater: Utah's Serious Youth Offender
Statute, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 443, 444 (1998); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 106 (1909).
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Although social reform efforts at the start of the century were broad-
based, they particularly targeted children. "Child savers," as they came to
be called, sought to address issues associated with poor children, includ-
ing education, nutrition, and neglect and abuse.' 62 Also, they were con-
cerned with child crime. 63 Central to the child-savers' philosophy was
that children were products of their environments. Any criminal behavior
by a child was, thus, "learned" behavior.' 64 To reform a child who had
committed a crime, and to prevent the predelinquent child from adopting
a life of crime, it was necessary to address the child's environment.'65
This meant public intervention into the child's family life.'66
Because of the large number of immigrants entering the country and
especially the cities in the 1800s, public intervention was a remedy that
particularly invited abuse. The new city dwellers were poor and "differ-
ent":
Immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and from rural Amer-
ica flooded into the burgeoning cities to take advantage of new eco-
nomic opportunities and crowded into ethnic enclaves and urban
ghettoes. The "new" immigrants' sheer numbers and their cultural,
religious, and linguistic differences hindered their assimilation and
acculturation, and posed a significant nation-building challenge for
the dominant Anglo-Protestant Western Europeans who had arrived a
few generations earlier .... Progressives attempted to "Americanize"
the immigrants and poor through a variety of agencies of assimilation
and acculturation to become sober, virtuous, middle-class Americans
like themselves. 167
Reformers targeted the children of these new urban dwellers not
only to keep them from crime, but also because they were a threat to the
social order middle-class child-savers were accustomed to and favored.
Just as England enacted its Poor Laws to protect society from the "wan-
162. Rudof, supra note 161 at 444.
163. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation Of The Juvenile Court--Part I: Race And The "Crack
Down" On Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 395 n.16 (1999); Rudof, supra note 161, at 444-45.
164. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIENCE 36
(Hill & Wang 1978).
165. Id.
166. Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 363 (West 1988).
167. Feld, supra note 163, at 332-34. While concern for the children was perhaps the primary
motivation for efforts by the end of the century, xenophobia and fear of crime were still present. The
creation of the juvenile court system and its antecedents was, according to M.A. Bortner, "a thinly
disguised system of oppression, dedicated to controlling the indigent and powerless." M.A.
BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 2 (New
York University Press 1982) (citing ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977) and THE CHILDREN ISHMAEL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Barry Krisberg & James Austin eds., Mayfield 1978)); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV., 1187, 1187-95 (1970). These concerns still
echo in the literature today. E.g., Feld, supra note 163, at 330.
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dering" poor "terroriz[ing] town and country," '6' the child-savers sought
to use similar legislative remedies to save not only children, but also
America's middle-class culture.' 69
Consequently, the child-savers' early legislative efforts, directed at
preventing children from lives of crime, went beyond delinquent and
predelinquent children and focused on a broad range of indicators re-
formers considered to be troubling.' 70 This meant dependent and ne-
glected children were included in the reformers' child-protective efforts,
but' lines were blurred. Poor children became dependent or neglected
children; dependent and neglected children became delinquent children.
An 1875 Wisconsin statute defining children who could be committed to
industrial schools, for example, included children who had been aban-
doned "in any way" by their parents; children "without means of subsis-
tence or support"; children "begging or receiving alms"; children "being
in any public street or place for the purpose of begging or receiving
alms"; children "found wandering and not having any home or settled
place of abode"; and children "found wandering in streets, alleys or pub-
lic places, and belonging to that class of children called 'ragpickers.""0 7'
Some states defined "wayward behavior" as criminal conduct; others
"broaden[ed] the committal grounds for noncriminal conduct.' ' 2 Chil-
dren subject to institutional commitment during this period were
"broadly worded under the aegis" of social reform,' 73 and these broad
definitions would be used in the twentieth century juvenile court legisla-
tion.
The salvation of these children and, thus, of society, required re-
moving them from the corrupting influences of their home environments
and acculturating them anew.' 74 Many were sent to institutions, and espe-
cially to "Houses of Refuge."' 715 Beginning with New York in 1825 and,
over the next twenty-five years, continuing in Philadelphia, Boston, New
Orleans and other cities, "laws authorized the courts to commit ne-
glected, destitute, abandoned, and vagrant children to the houses of ref-
168. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
169. Fox, supra note 167, at 1192.
170. Thomas, supra note 149, at 306, 323-25; Corinne Schiff, Child Custody And The Ideal Of
Motherhood In Late Nineteenth Century New York, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 403, 413
(1997).
171. Thomas, supra note 149, at 314 (quoting 1875 Wis. Laws 633, ch. 325, § 5).
172. Robert W. Sweet, Jr., Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders: In Perspective, 18 PEPP.
L. REV. 389, 392 (1991).
173. Thomas, supra note 149, at 314.
174. Fox, supra note 167, at 1189. These actions were done with little regard for the rights of
the parents or the children. "The child-savers expounded the Protestant work ethic, were primarily
philanthropic, and supported the rehabilitation model. They had little real interest in the law or legal
issues. Any overreach of the legal rights of the children was excused under the concept of parens
patriae." CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 18 (3d ed. 1991). See also
Thomas, supra note 149, at 315 (also reporting that parens patriae served as the catch-all
justification for removing children from their homes).
175. Thomas, supra note 149, at 306; RYERSON, supra note 164, at 18-19.
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uge along with child offenders."'76 Unfortunately, refuge houses and their
successors were not always the protective facilities envisioned by their
backers. The New York house, for example, "evolved into a prison-like
structure without facilities for rehabilitation.' 77 Other institutional facili-
ties that continued from earlier years, or developed after refuge houses,
were subject to similar criticism.' The Reverend Charles Loring Brace's
"program of 'moral disinfection,"' according to one cynic, 79 which took
children from their homes and their urban environments to live in foster
homes with Western farmers"' ° or, in Brace's words, "good families in
the country,"' 8 was a noteworthy alternative placement.
Until the latter part of the 1800s then, dependent and neglected chil-
dren were included within the child-savers' efforts, but primarily under
the rubric of delinquent or predelinquent children. In 1874, however, the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC)
was established. The NYSPCC emphasized removing children from their
homes and placing them in institutions. 82 Their efforts, however, seem-
ingly were directed more towards protecting children from abuse and
neglect per se, than preventing delinquency." The NYSPCC was not
only instrumental in seeking out neglected and abused children, but also
was dedicated to punishing adult offenders by encouraging criminal
prosecution of abusive or otherwise harmful parents1H Their focus was,
therefore, distinguishable from that of the English Poor Laws and the
earlier child-saving efforts.
Similar anti-cruelty groups were established in other localities over
the next twenty-five years. Massachusetts and Philadelphia, for example,
moved further and adopted a less punitive and more remedial approach
to the problem, aimed at helping families and keeping children in the
176. Thomas, supra note 149, at 306.
177. Carla J. Stovall, Justice and Juveniles in Kansas: Where We Have Been and Where We
Are Headed, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1999).
178. Fox, supra note 167, at 1223; John N. Kane, Jr., Dispositional Authority and Decision
Making in New York's Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 925, 931
(1994); Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Cultural Differences and
the Right to Treatment, 16 LAW & LNEQ. 573, 590 (1998); Mary E. Spring, Extended Jurisdiction
Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1356-57 (1998).
179. Thomas, supra note 149, at 307.
180. Id.
181. Charles L. Brace, The Best Method of Disposing of Pauper and Vagrant Children 12
(1859), as quoted in Lucy S. McGough and Annette Peltier-Falahahwazi, Secrets and Lies: A Model
Statute for Cooperative Adoption, 60 LA. L. REV. 13, 90 n.67 (1999).
182. Thomas, supra note 149, at 310-12.
183. ELIZABETH HAFKIN PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 79-86 (1987).
184. Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private Chips Petitions in Minnesota: The
Historical and Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protection or Services, 20 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 781, 794-96 (1994); Thomas, supra note 149, at 310-11.
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home." 5 This social work approach found some favor in the early 1900s
with professionals in the field who were supportive of family preserva-
tion, especially when poverty was the only issue. 8 6 While concern for
children was perhaps a greater motivation for the anti-cruelty groups'
efforts than others, however, "these reformers [also] were responding to
the new urban poverty and immigration" and the resulting fear:
The "large influx of foreigners who are not familiar with our laws,"
explained Elbridge Gerry, the president of the NYSPCC, in 1895,
"necessarily leads to the continual ill-treatment of children, under the
pernicious idea that liberty means license and that children are born
slaves of their parents." Without the work of the NYSPCC, Gerry
maintained, nothing would be done to protect the children of the
"poor and unfortunate," and most of these "little outcasts" would be-
come "mature criminals."' 87
In addition to implementing efforts to rescue children from lives of
crime, reformers also had some success in changing the judicial proce-
dures that removed children from their homes and committed them to
institutions or foster homes. Some legislation specifically provided for
children's hearings to be separate from adult court. An 1870 Massachu-
setts statute, for example, provided that children in Suffolk under the age
of sixteen should have "complaints against them heard and determined,
by themselves, separate from the general and ordinary criminal business
of said courts."' 8  New York provided, by 1892, that "[a]ll cases involv-
ing the commitment or trial of children for any violation of the Penal
Code... may be heard and determined by such court, at suitable times to
be designated therefore by it, separate and apart from the trial of other
criminal cases . ,,89 Rhode Island too provided for children's hearings
to be separate from the rest of the court business.' 9° Closed hearings were
not statutorily mandated, but the separateness of the hearings presumably
accommodated or encouraged private hearings. Further, juvenile com-
mitment hearings also were likely to be informal, summary, and with
little due process,' 9' making it probable that some were held away from
public view. Closed and confidential hearings per se, however, seem not
to have been a concern.
Thus, at the close of the nineteenth century, the institutions, legisla-
tion, and procedures designed to deal with abused and neglected children
had their problems: the motivation for removing children from their
homes was often suspect, the due process accorded the families was of-
185. Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 794-96; Thomas, supra note 149, at 312.
186. Thomas, supra note 149, at 312; PLECK, supra note 183, at 129.
187. Schiff, supra note 170, at 413.
188. Bremner, supra note 145, at Vol. , 494-95.
189. Id. at Vol. H, 495.
190. Id. at Vol. 11, 495-96.
191. Fox, supra note 167, at 1212-15, 1229; see also Thomas, supra note 149, at 315. But see
People ex rel. O'Connell v. Tumer, 55 Ill. 280, 285-87 (1870).
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ten absent, a family's poverty was frequently the basis for a child's re-
moval, and the institutions or homes to which some of the children were
sent were far from nurturing and humane places. Indeed, these same
problems were present during the enactment and implementation of the
Poor Laws in England. As for confidential hearings, some delinquency or
dependency-type proceedings may have been heard separately from the
other court business. Also, there may have been, as there was in Eng-
land's chancery court, specific cases heard in chambers, either upon re-
quest of the parties or perhaps even at the initiative of the judge. It does
not appear, however, that these type hearings were traditionally closed to
the public. 92
There was, however, at least in the rhetoric of the late nineteenth
century, an intent by society to protect children - to reform, rehabilitate,
and treat - instead of merely punishing them for their wrongful acts or
removing them from their homes and forcing them to work. Eventually,
the modem dependency proceeding emerged from this philosophy and
justified the confidentiality provision of modem proceedings. In the ju-
venile court born in 1900, however, protecting dependent and abused
children remained a handmaiden to protecting society from delinquent
children.
E. America's Juvenile Court and its Confidentiality Provision
In 1899, Illinois passed legislation, which created the country's first
juvenile court. 19 3 By 1904, other states embraced the concept and eleven
states had juvenile court legislation; by 1912, twenty-two states; and by
1925, forty-six of the country's forty-eight states had juvenile court leg-
islation. 94 When Illinois founded its court in 1900, however, the goal was
to deal with children committing crimes and, in society's view, children
destined to commit crimes. Earlier legislation grouped delinquent, ne-
glected, abused, abandoned, and poor children together and Illinois con-
tinued that grouping.9 5 Central to the treatment of these delinquent and
192. See Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 17.
193. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws § 3, 130, 132.
[T]here has been some mild controversy about the exact place of origin of the first
juvenile court. Various earlier pieces of special legislation bore resemblance to the latter-
day juvenile court. It seems clear, however, that the first real juvenile court, as we
understand the institution today [1958], was organized in the United States during 1899.
Most authorities agree that Illinois deserves credit for fathering the juvenile court
movement, though Colorado's ebullient Judge Lindsey claimed this honor on the basis of
his use of the state's 'school law' for the handling of juvenile offenders some months
before the Illinois law was enacted .... [But] Colorado's legislature did not specifically
organize the state's juvenile court until 1903.
Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101, 103-04 (1958)
(footnotes omitted) (citing 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 85).
194. Geis, supra note 193, at 105.
195. "Delinquent" children were defined as "any child under the age of 16 years who violates
any law of this State or any city or village ordinance." 1899 Ill. Laws § 1. The statutory definition of
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pre-delinquent children, however, was not punishment, but remedial ac-
culturation."' The goal of the juvenile court was to identify and remedy
factors in the child's life that had led, or might lead, the child astray.'97
While the protective aspects of a confidential modem dependency pro-
ceeding were not the focus of the court, the genesis of the proceeding
was there; so was the genesis of legislated confidentiality.
The Illinois legislation did not mandate confidentiality.'98 The stat-
ute did require, however, "[a] special court room, to be designated as the
juvenile court room... .- '99 Still, this provision has long been recognized
as a "confidentiality" provision and it seems apparent that it soon was
treated as such. In addition, it also seems likely that many juvenile court
hearings initially were confidential by practice and, later, by legislative
the "dependent child and neglected child" mixed what would today be classified as status offenses,
dependency, abuse and simple poverty:
[Any child [under age 161 who for any reason is destitute or homeless or abandoned; or
dependent upon the public for support; or has not proper parental care or guardianship; or
who habitually begs or receives alms; or who is found living in any house of ill fame or
with any vicious or disreputable person; or whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or
depravity on the part of its parents, guardian or other person in whose care it may be, is
an unfit place for such a child; and any child under the age of 8 years who is found
peddling or selling any article or singing or playing any musical instrument upon the
streets or giving any public entertainment.
1899 11. Laws §1. The effect of the Illinois statute was no discernable category for children who
needed to be protected from abuse or neglect, but instead a catch-all grouping of poor children, pre-
delinquent children, and delinquent children, who were to be "treated in substantially the same
manner." Charles E. Springer, Vice-Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Nevada, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Justice for Juveniles at 21 (1986). The
definition of delinquent was expanded substantially in a 1905 amendment, Act of May 13, 1905,
1905 Ill. Laws § I, and all sorts of acts or conditions qualified a child as "delinquent," including
children who were "incorrigible," children who ran away from home, children visiting pool rooms,
and children who "habitually used vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language." Id.,
196. RYERSON, supra note 164, at 35-37.
197. See id.
198. See Samuel J. Barrows, CHILDREN'S COURT IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN,
DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS, H.R. Doc. No.701 (58  Sess. 1904).
199. "A special court room, to be designated as the juvenile court room shall be provided for
the hearing of [cases under this act], and the findings of the court shall be entered in a book or books
to be kept for that purpose and known as the 'Juvenile Record'...." 1899 111. Laws § 3.
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200provisions. Judge Thomas Murphey, a Police Justice in Buffalo, N.Y.,described in 1904 how he ran his court:20'
At the first session over the court at which I presided I announced that
thereafter children would be tried separately and apart from adults,..
. and I insisted that at the trial of the children the court room be
cleared of all spectators. No one was allowed to be present at the tri-
als but the defendants, the complainants, and the court officers and
witnesses. 2
A 1958 article discussing confidentiality of juvenile court proceed-
ings also reports that the practice of excluding the public seems to have
occurred early on. "By 1901, judges were reported to be employing-their
own authority to hold the hearings of juveniles in private,"2 3 relying on
their contempt power to do so. '2 4 And "a hit or miss survey" done in
1910 showed that "a few states" excluded the public from juvenile court
trials.205 By 1939, a substantial number of states had some confidentiality
provisions concerning their juvenile courts.206 "IT]he public was excluded
from juvenile courts by law in seven jurisdictions, and could be excluded
in twenty-four additional jurisdictions. Eight states specifically prohib-
ited the publication of the names of juveniles without the court's con-
sent." 207
200. Determining precisely how and where the confidentiality aspect of juvenile court
originated is difficult. From early on, affirmative mentions of confidentiality were not explicitly
associated with the stigma, shame and embarrassment concerns for the juvenile delinquent. It may be
that the need for closed hearings was so apparent, and so much a part of the prevailing philosophy,
that there was no need to discuss it. "Removing these cases from the criminal courts" may have also
meant keeping them from the public eye, without explicit mention of that need. The custom of the
predecessor proceedings also probably played a part. These proceedings were sometimes
confidential; it seems, not so much from an affirmative legislative decision, but from a practice of
informal, "summary," and chambers-like proceedings that did little to suggest there should be a
public involvement. Thus, it is likely that hearings concerning delinquent, abused or neglected
children, were occasionally closed in the later 1800s, that closed hearings simply continued at the
beginnings of juvenile court, and that they quickly became legislatively or rule mandated.
201. The applicable statute provided that the proceedings for commitment or trial of any
children charged with violating the Penal Code "may be heard ... separate and apart from the trial of
any other criminal cases, of which session a separate docket shall be kept." See Barrows, supra note
198, at 10.
202. See id.
203. Geis, supra note 193, at 116.
204. See id.
205. Id. (citing Abbott, A Topical Abstract of Juvenile Court Laws Governing the Trial and
Disposition of Juvenile Offenders, in JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 132 (Hart. ed.
1910)).
206. Seeid. atll6-17.
207. Id. at 117. Geis says there were only "insignificant roadblocks" as the juvenile court made
its way through some constitutional challenges, and in "none of the early cases did the question of
the publication of juveniles' names by newspapers, the coverage of juvenile court hearings by the
press, or the privacy of the hearings come into controversy." Id. at 110, 110 n.37.
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One of the factors that probably contributed to the quick evolution
of confidential hearings was the informality thought critical to delin-
quency hearings. Richard S. Tuthill, Judge of the Circuit Court of Illi-
nois, described the Illinois statute in a Congressional Report in 1904,
writing that the "[t]he hearing of the case is in the open court,""2 ' but
adding that it was done:
with little of the formality usually observed in court proceedings. I
have always felt and endeavored to act in each case as I would were it
my own son that was before me in my library at home charged with
some misconduct .... I first speak to him in a kindly and considerate
way, endeavoring to make him feel that there is no purpose on the
part of anyone about him to punish, but rather to benefit and help...
209
The lack of formality was consistent with the reformers' reform philoso-
phy and set the tone for concern and help, as opposed to judgment and
punishment.210 Closed hearings were conducive to this desired informal-
ity.
Closed or confidential hearings also were consistent with another
concern the reformers had - protecting the delinquent child from the
stigma of being branded a criminal. Keeping delinquency proceedings
confidential would bury the errors of the child's youthful mistakes from
others and further protect the child from the stigma and trauma of pub-
licity generally. 21' "[T]he duty of the state ... [is] not to degrade but to
uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make [the child] a criminal but
a worthy citizen."22
208. See Barrows, supra note 198, at 3.
209. See id. Judge Julian Mack, one of Chicago's juvenile court's first judges, described the
scene juvenile court proponents envisioned:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a
specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done
in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.... The
child who must be brought into court... [must] be made to feel that he is the object of its
care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can never
evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he
can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge ...
will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Mack, supra note 161, at 119-20.
210. "The elimination of procedural formality in the courtroom presumably freed the judge to
employ all available resources in gaining the child's confidence . . . thereby beginning the
resocialization process." RYERSON, supra note 164, at 39. See also Mack, supra note 161, at 107,
120.
211. See Susan S. Greenebaum, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior
Restraint of a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 142-43 (1993); Oddo,
supra note 7, at I 1; Zierdt, supra note 36, at 420.
212. Mack, supra note 161, at 107.
Although not a criminal conviction, a delinquency adjudication has the same stigmatizing
effect in practice. The stigma can have serious, adverse consequences for a juvenile
offender and his chances for rehabilitation.... Society perceives delinquency as deviant
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Both of these concerns however - informal hearings and eliminating
stigma - along with closed hearings, were associated with delinquency
proceedings. Abuse and neglect matters remained secondary to delin-
quency concerns and the literature discussing juvenile court during the
first half of the century reflected that. A 1909 Harvard Law Review arti-
cle by Judge Julian Mack, for example, talked about "the juvenile court"
in connection with "the delinquent child."23
A 1943 article in the Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly ob-
served that "[i]t is the aim of our laws to protect society and its members.
It is the aim of our juvenile laws to save an erring and ofttimes head-
strong boy from continuing a life of crime.",214 A children's court judge in
White Plains, New York wrote in 1949 that the purpose of the juvenile
court,
in working with children is to endeavor to understand the problems
which have caused them to become in need of the care and protection
of the State, to alleviate adverse conditions as far as possible, and to
bring understanding and guidance to the children who have become
delinquent, as well as to those verging on delinquency because of ne-
glect."'
A 1957 article on confidentiality in juvenile court began by noting that
"U]uvenile court proceedings are often regarded as the most progressive
and promising avenue for the handling of youthful offenders. 21 6
Eventually, however, governmental involvement in children's issues
would elevate abuse and neglect concerns. In 1909 the White House held
its first Conference on Children217 and three years later, Congress created
behavior; therefore, society responds negatively to juveniles who have been labeled
delinquent. Specifically, once aware of the juvenile's label, as well as his deviant acts,
society responds differently to the juvenile, attempting to ostracize him from the
community. At this point, the juvenile becomes aware of his delinquency label and his
self-image is adversely affected. The juvenile begins to believe that "he is no good or that
he can't make it on the outside." Eventually, the juvenile "becomes committed to deviant
activities and peers" and views himself as a deviant. Unable to escape society's label, the
juvenile engages in more delinquent behavior. Consequently, the label's stigma creates a
self-fulfilling prophecy that tends to incite and exacerbate the very behavior that was
complained about in the first instance.
Kara E. Nelson, Comment, The Release of Juvenile Records Under Wisconsin's Juvenile Justice
Code: A New System of False Promises, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 1101, 1149-53 (1998) (author reporting,
but not agreeing with, what proponents of confidentiality argue).
213. See Mack, supra note 161, at 104.
214. Paul N. Schaeffer, Pennsylvania's Juvenile Court Law, 14 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 253, 260
(1943).
215. Judge George W. Smyth, The Juvenile Court and Delinquent Parents, 13 FED. PROBATION
12, 12 (1949).
216. Geis, supra note 193, at 101; see also Roger J. Waybright, Florida's New Juvenile Court
Act, 6 MIAMI L. Q. 1 (1951); Helen S. MacPherson, The Juvenile Court in Connecticut, II CONN. B.
J. 231 (1937) (treating the dependency aspects of juvenile court more fully and independently, while
still viewing the juvenile court as one created primarily for delinquency problems).
217. See Thomas, supra note 149, at 312.
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the United States Children's Bureau.2 In 1935, The Aid to Dependent
Children program was established to provide states with federal funds
(on a matching basis) to help support children in single parent homes.1 9
The Act also encouraged states to develop protective programs for chil-
dren who were dependent or neglected and, consistent with the philoso-
phy of juvenile court, for children "in danger of becoming delinquent.,
220
In 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act required states to adopt
plans extending child protective services to "every political
subdivision.,, 22 ' By 1967 every state had passed some form of a child
abuse reporting bill.222 The 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act 223 further encouraged states to enact mandatory reporting laws. In
addition, the 1974 Act provided funding and model legislation.224 States
responded by developing procedures for investigating child abuse and
neglect and creating "the government entity known as child protective
services. ' 2  In the late 1970s Congress held hearings on the concern that
children adjudged dependent because of neglect, abuse or abandonment
were being left in foster care for years.226 The hearings resulted in the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA),227 which
emphasized family preservation and keeping children in their homes if
possible. Then in 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 (ASFA), 228 an act that emphasized finding adoptive homes
for those children who would not successfully be returned to their par-
ents.229 Today, dependency court proceedings are no longer mere adjuncts
to delinquency prevention; they are a separate and significant part of
juvenile court designed to protect children from neglect and abuse. They
retain, however, one of the early and primary characteristics of juvenile
delinquency hearings: they are presumptively closed to the public.
The history of dependency proceedings, extending from its Poor
Law origins in England to today's modern child protective proceedings,
does not reflect a "virtually immemorial custom '230 of either closed or
218. See LEROY ASHBY, ENDANGERED CHILDREN. DEPENDENCY. NEGLECT AND ABUSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 189 (1997).
219. See Thomas, supra note 149, at 313; Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 799.
220. Thomas, supra note 149, at 313 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (1970)).
221. Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 799 n. 132 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1970)).
222. See PLECK, supra note 183, at 173; see also Walling & Debele, supra note 184, at 801.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1974).
224. See id. § 5102.
225. Mary B. Lamer, Carol S. Stevenson & Richard E. Behrman, Protecting Children from
Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 4, 8 (Richard E.
Behrman, M.D. ed., 1998).
226. Id.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1980).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 678 (1997).
229. See Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back Into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 309-310 (1999).
230. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 593 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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open proceedings, as does the history of open trials generally.23' The Poor
Laws seemed not concerned with confidentiality, stigma, or any matters
relevant to protecting children, with the exception of providing poor re-
lief. The English Court of Chancery also seemed not concerned with
protecting children at the outset. When it began to show broader concern
for the child's welfare, however, evidence suggests some hearings were
probably held in private.
In this country, although the evidence is not absolute, it appears
that, while dependency-type hearings sometimes may have been held
away from full public access, closed courtrooms were not an articulated
mandate for delinquency or dependency-type proceedings until at least
the late 1800s and, more likely, until the juvenile court began to establish
itself in the first part of the 1900s. Even then, the confidentiality practice
was motivated by proceedings concerned with delinquency. The protec-
tive dependency hearing of today had not yet emerged as a focus of most
juvenile courts.
The history of closure for dependency hearings then, is not only
relatively recent, but, in America, is also largely rooted in its affiliation
with juvenile delinquency proceedings. That the practice had some ori-
gins in England, that it began in America over one hundred years ago,
and that it has continued in dependency court despite its American ori-
gins being primarily anchored in delinquency proceedings, certainly
speaks to the historical judgment. But this history, contrasted with the
"virtually immemorial" and "abiding adherence to the principle of open
trials" considered in Richmond and its related cases, does not reflect any
"profound judgment about the way in which" dependency hearings
should be conducted.232 Further, while historical judgment informs, it
does not dictate. Looking at the functional role access might play today
remains critical. As Justice Brennan stated in Richmond, "what is crucial
... is whether access to a particular government process is important in
terms of that very process. 233
III. FUNCTION: IS PUBLIC ACCESS TO DEPENDENCY COURT IMPORTANT
TODAY?
The composition of juvenile court varies from state to state, but
usually includes delinquency cases, status offense cases and dependency
cases. 234 Delinquency cases, which tend to give juvenile court its identity,
involve children who violate the law and who, but for their age, would be
231. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
232. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
234. See Carol S. Stevenson, et. al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and Recommendations, in
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 4, 6 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
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charged with criminal offenses."' Status offenses involve children who
have committed acts that are not illegal for adults, but are made so for
children, such as truancy, running away, and violating curfew.236 Delin-
quency and status offenses involve some act of wrongdoing on the part
of the juvenile. Dependency cases, on the other hand, involve situations
where children are believed to be victims of neglect or abuse and the
state moves to protect those children by bringing an action in depend-
ency court.237
A usual dependency case arises from a report of neglect or abuse.
Neglect occurs when a child's parents or guardians fail to provide even
minimal care for the child, including abandonment. Abuse can be physi-
cal or sexual. Once a report has been made, the state's child welfare or
child protective agency determines if an investigation is warranted. 238 If
so, and if the case is substantiated, that is if there is "good reason" to
suspect abuse and neglect, further action is taken.239 In most cases, the
child agency deals informally with the family, without a court petition or
235. See id. at 6, 7; Howard N. Snyder, The Juvenile Court and Delinquency Cases, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 53, 53-58 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
Instead of being charged criminally and tried for their crimes, juveniles are charged with committing
a delinquent act and the court is asked to "adjudicate" them as delinquent. Whereas adults are
sentenced and imprisoned, juveniles are committed and provided "treatment" so that they can be
rehabilitated. Id. at 58; Siegel & Senna, supra note 166, at 8. The court's disposition can include
residential placement (detention facilities), restitution, community service, fines or probation, or the
court can "dismiss the case in consideration of actions already taken." Id. Residential placement can
range from placement in a large custodial institution such as a state training school, to a group home
to a wilderness program or boot camp. See Peter W. Greenwood, Responding to Juvenile Crime:
Lessons Learned, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 75, 79-81 (Richard E.
Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996). Further, state laws vary, but courts generally lose jurisdiction for
purposes of disposition when the juvenile reaches a certain age. It is usually 18 or 21, but in some
states it can extend past age 30. See Snyder. supra at 58-59; Spring, supra note 178, at 1352 n.5.
Whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction to begin with varies widely from state to state, but often
involves a consideration of several factors, including age, type of crime committed, and whether it is
a first offense or not. See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role
of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 390 (1998); Zierdt,
supra note 36, at 416 n.109.
236. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 13 (discussing that status offenses can also include
underage drinking and children who are "ungovernable"). Delinquent behavior is often preceded by
status offenses, and today we would think of status offenses as "predelinquent" behavior. See James
W. Payne, Our Children's Destiny, 35 TRIAL 83, 85 n.4 (1999). Many of the status offense
problems, "as many as 80% of all cases," are addressed primarily through diversion and dealt with
through community service programs or the school system and are not formally a part of the court
caseload. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 13; David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 86, 88 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996). Examples of
dispositional alternatives for status offenders, in addition to commitment, include probation,
community service, fines, and canceling the juvenile's driver's license. See Erin M. Smith, In a
Child's Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve Procedural Due Process, 10 LAW & INEQ.
253, 784 n.75 (1992).
237. See Stevenson, supra note 234. at 15-16.
238. See id.
239. Richard P. Barth, The Juvenile Court and Dependency Cases, in THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 100, 101 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996).
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court oversight.2' ° In essence, the agency "offers voluntary services," and
the family "agrees" to those services. 24' When this does not work, how-
ever, the agency files a petition, initiating the court's jurisdiction.24'
Dependency cases are usually heard in juvenile court, although
more recently states with family courts have placed juvenile and, thus,
dependency proceedings there.243 Once a petition is filed, the court is
charged with several tasks, primary of which are making sure the child is
protected and seeking a permanent home for the child, either with the
child's family or elsewhere.2"
To evaluate the functional role public access might play in the "par-
ticular government process" we are concerned with (today's dependency
court), it is important first to look at the current state of the court. Com-
mentators and scholars, almost en masse, characterize juvenile court,
including dependency court, as overcrowded, under funded, and failing
to protect adequately the children who are subject to its rule of closure.
Further, understanding something of the legal, procedural and substan-
tive requirements in neglect and abuse cases provides some appreciation
for the scope of the dependency court's responsibilities and, thus, the
characterizations of failure. The issues the courts must deal with are
many and are complicated, the hearings are frequent and the number of
participants is considerable. Dependency courts devote much of their
efforts to just getting through the docket. Time for thoughtful considera-
tion of issues is rare. Finally, an understanding of the culture of depend-
ency court is important. The cultural dynamics, largely defined by the
emotional issues with which the courts deal, the imbalance of power
between the parties, and the informal but ingrained customs of the regu-
lar participants, characterize the system. All of this gives form to the
particular government process of dependency court.
A. The Current State of Dependency Court
Juvenile court, including its dependency proceedings, is, by most ac-
counts, a dismal mess. First, the workload is simply too great and the
resources too meager for court personnel to adequately protect the chil-
dren. Second, too many juvenile court personnel are untrained for or
240. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16-17.
241. Barth, supra note 239, at 101.
242. See id.
243. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 6; H. Ted Rubin, The Nature of the Court Today, in THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 40 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996); Hon.
Leonard P. Edwards, The Future of the Juvenile Court: Promising New Directions, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT 131, 132-33 (Richard E. Behrman, M.D. ed., 1996); Justice
Frank Sullivan, Jr., Unified Family Court Structure Recommended, 42 REs GESTAE 28, 28-29
(1998). Statutes usually create both juvenile courts and family courts. Rubin, supra, at 41. Most of
the literature addresses abuse and neglect cases assuming they are heard in juvenile court. As
discussed earlier, juvenile court was designed to include what has now become dependency court.
244. See infra Part III.B.
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uninterested in their work. Finally, the court and its work are often held
in low esteem, sometimes even by those who work there, and turnover of
personnel is great.
The juvenile court must oversee too many cases with complex is-
sues and must do so with far from adequate resources. One source re-
ports that Chicago judges who hear dependency matters have up to 3000
cases at any given time.24 5 "[F]rustrations of being responsible for an
unmanageable number of cases" can lead judges to "eventually stop
seeing respondent parents as individuals. 246 As a result, judges can end
up doing their jobs with resigned attitudes produced by the seeming im-
possibility of their task. "In this overburdened system, then, an effective
lawyer . . . is essential to making [the] client's circumstances fully
known to and understood by the court., 247 Unfortunately, that part of the
system also is overburdened: children's lawyers in Chicago, for example,
represent an average of 350 children each; 24 8 "reporters have compared
hearings in the overwhelmed juvenile courts to cattle calls. 2 49 Further, it
is not just the judges and lawyers who are overloaded. The rest of the
system looks the same. "Every facet of the child welfare system is now
overburdened. Social workers and their supervisors regularly handle
more cases than recommended by licensing organizations: in some juris-
dictions, more than four times more."'
245. Laura Duncan, State's Attorney's Office Adds 20 Lawyers for Surging Abuse and Neglect
Caseload, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 24, 1994, at 1.
246. Kathleen A. Bailie, Note, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective Proceedings:
Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2285,
2313 (1998). See also Thomas F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 190, 232 (1997) (In delinquency court, "[hligh caseloads pressure
children, prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges to gloss over relevant facts, to ignore possible
defenses, and to avoid the kind of attention to detail that makes for accurate determinations of
fact.").
247. Bailie, supra note 246, at 2313.
248. Steve Johnson & Colin McMahon, Year's Toll: Our Loss, Our Failure 61 Young Victims
Leave Behind a Trail of Anger, Abuse & Blame, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1994 (available in 1994 WL
6536741).
249. Gordon, supra note 17, at 679.
250. Id. See also Geraghty, supra note 246, at 232 (Juvenile courts everywhere "struggle with
[a] lack of resources and [an] inability to obtain meaningful services for children."). Massachusetts,
for example, passed a court reform act directed at improving "a fragmented [juvenile court system]
nearly strangled by an ever increasing caseload of matters involving more complex and demanding
issues of family dysfunction." Five years later, the system "remain[ed] under funded: the lack of
resources for adequate courthouse facilities and court personnel contributes to docket delays and
severely limits the ability to address serious family needs." Gavin, supra note 14, at 15-16. New
York's child protective system was described by Judge Elaine Slobod: not enough foster parents, not
enough trained aides and caseworkers in child protective services, inadequate mental health services
for children, only intermittent services for families to help them keep their children - in short, there
is not the "necessary services and resources" needed. In re S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d 192, 198-199
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988). See also Marcia Sprague & Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and
Criminal Court Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 239, 293 (1997)
(arguing that coordination of juvenile and criminal proceedings resulting from a single incident can,
in part, increase court efficiency).
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Professor Weinstein described how this overload plays out within
the juvenile court system for dependency cases:
[H]eavy calendars . . . require cases to be moved through quickly.
There is no time for thorough and careful consideration of all the
facts and concerns. Giving too much time to any one case disrupts the
entire calendar. Neither the judges nor the attorneys can be com-
pletely familiar with these cases because of the number of cases
which they handle.... The caseloads maintained by most profession-
als working in these systems is too high to expect quality perform-
ance .... It is not unusual to see judges reading through case files
during the presentation of the case, nor to have critical reports dis-
tributed on the day of the hearing. In ordinary litigation, that would
be sufficient reason for delay. In these cases, however, each cause for
delay means that a child's life is put on hold.
The work of attorneys, too, is impacted by high caseloads. Attorneys
may be unable to investigate their cases, consult with experts, or pre-
pare for hearings. It is typical for cases to settle just before a sched-
uled hearing, not because the parties suddenly discovered a way to re-
solve their differences, but simply because this may be the first time
all of the attorneys have had the opportunity to discuss the case with
each other....
High caseloads prevent social workers from designing case-specific
services for families, as required by [federal law]; instead, families
often receive "boilerplate" service plans which can add to, rather than
alleviate the families' problems, waste valuable resources and time,
and heighten levels of frustration for all participants....
Support services for families are very limited .... In the child protec-
tion arena, services are mandated by ... federal requirement[s] ...
but are underfunded and often inadequate or unavailable to families
251
due to long waiting lists or inconvenient locations.
Kathi Grasso, testifying in Congressional Hearings in 1997 on be-
half of the American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law,
reported that "emergency removal hearings, foster care review hearings,
and other pertinent court reviews [too often] last no longer than five or
,,25210 minutes. The Report of the ABA's Working Group on the Unmet
Legal Needs of Children and Their Families states that "Chicago juvenile
251. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 118-121.
252. Juvenile Court Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 25, 28 (1997) (statement of Kathi L. Grasso,
American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law, on behalf of the American Bar
Association).
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court judges have about ten minutes to devote to each case." 253 These are
not descriptions that evoke confidence.
Given these working conditions, it is not surprising that the juvenile
court sits at the bottom of most judicial hierarchies. Whether the court's
lack of resources is responsible for the court's low status or vice versa,
the result is the same. 54 Many judges and other personnel are discour-
aged from coming to and staying in juvenile courts. There are good and
dedicated judges, lawyers and other personnel in juvenile court - this
author has seen them - but many are ready to leave it and its many
problems. Turnover of juvenile court personnel is high and is one of the
biggest obstacles to protecting children within the system.25
Second, although many have interest, not all personnel in juvenile
court have adequate training and desire:
[M]ost jurisdictions choose attorneys for children in child protection
proceedings merely because the attorneys have expressed an interest
in representing children; many of these attorneys bring to this task no
special training in child advocacy and consequently may, despite
good efforts and intentions, provide less than optimal representation
to children.256
Some lack even minimum qualifications: "In some jurisdictions, where
juvenile courts are regarded as legally unsophisticated, judges are ap-
pointed to juvenile court who wouldn't be trusted to judge major civil or
criminal cases. 257 Others simply do not have the interest: "Attorneys
often accept appointments to specialized juvenile courts hoping for later
promotion to higher judicial positions., 25 8 All of these scenarios result in
253. America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action, 3 Ky. CHILDREN'S RTS.
J. 18,22 (1994).
254. See Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond and Gault: Addressing Media
Access to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Through A Functional Analysis, 28 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1155, 1181 n.172 (1998) ("The juvenile court generally ranks low in state judiciary hierarchy;
this [too] keeps many qualified judges away.") "Many juvenile courts have meager staff support and
other resources. This is probably due to their lack of visibility within the court system, a lack of
understanding of their unique characteristics, their typically low position in the judicial hierarchy,
and the low regard in which they are held by the judiciary as a whole." Mark Hardin, Child
Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. L. Q. 147, 197 (1998).
255. See Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson, Reaching Timely Permanency Decisions: A
Recapitulation, in CHILDREN CAN'T WAIT: REDUCING DELAYS IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE 129, 135
(Katharine Cahn & Paul Johnson eds., 1993).
256. Annette R. Appell, Responses to the Conference: Decontextualizing the Child Client: The
Efficacy of the Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1968
(1996). "[Tlhe poor quality of some legal representation of children has been linked to low
compensation .... high caseloads, and judicial concerns about the impact of hourly payment of
these attorneys on courts' coffers." Id. at 1967.
257. Hardin, supra note 254, at 197.
258. Id.
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personnel who lack the necessary commitment and training to discharge
their responsibilities to the children committed to dependency court. 9
The low esteem in which juvenile court is held is reflected in other
ways too. "Many juvenile courts ... are old and dilapidated or located in
the basement of the local courthouse. The physical appearance of the
courts often reflects their [low] position within the court system.' '260 In
addition, "[i]n many jurisdictions, specialized juvenile court judges or
referees draw the lowest judicial salaries. 26'
B. The Responsibilities of Dependency Court
Dependency courts are responsible for a much greater number of de-
262
pendency proceedings today than they were twenty-five years ago. In
1976, there were 10 reports of abuse or neglect per 10,000 children; in
1994, there were more than 40 reports per 10,000 children, numbers to-
taling four percent of America's children.263 The real impact on work-
load, however, has come from the increased scope of responsibilities in
the typical abuse or neglect case, and most of that comes from the re-
quirements of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA)26 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).265
These federal acts, along with some additional state and constitutional
requirements, have resulted in a greater complexity of issues and an in-
creased number of hearings. Finally, an increased number of participants
in dependency cases has also contributed to the system overload. 2"
As discussed earlier, the usual dependency case starts with a report
of neglect or abuse.267 While sexual and severe physical abuse cases tend
to be those cases the public hears about, the majority of cases are neglect
259.
Advocates for children, be they prosecutors or defense lawyers, repeatedly have their
efforts undermined by inefficient, ill-informed, or downright hostile judges. Judges who
want to make a difference find themselves hamstrung by lawyers and child welfare
personnel who are not as knowledgeable or as committed as they should be.
Geraghty, supra note 246, at 234. See also Appell, supra note 256, at 1968 (commenting on the
lack of training child advocates have).
260. Hardin, supra note 254, at 197.
261. Id.
262. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16; Barth, supra note 239, at 102.
263. Barth, supra note 239, at 102. All states require certain professionals who serve children to
"report suspected child abuse" to the proper authorities. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 15-16. Of
these 2.9 million children on whom reports are made, "[n]early one half' were reported as neglected;
twenty-six percent as victims of physical abuse; and fourteen percent as victims of sexual abuse. Id.
at 16. See also Barth, supra, at 239.
264. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C., primarily in 42 U.S.C.).
265. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C., primarily in 42 U.S.C.).
266. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 113-20.
267. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16.
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situations. 26' The state's child protective agency investigates the report
and, assuming the report is substantiated, takes appropriate action, which
may include filing a petition in state court. 69 Prior to AACWA in 1980, a
judge in a dependency proceeding was charged primarily with deter-
mining whether child abuse or neglect had occurred and deciding
whether the child could stay in the home with agency supervision, or
whether the child needed an out-of-home placement (foster care). Two
hearings were involved in the usual case.27 ° Since 1980, however, the
courts are responsible for much more. "The Child Welfare Act
[AACWA] tripled the number of issues to which lawyers and judges
must attend in juvenile court proceedings. 27'
AACWA came about in part from the criticism that children were
being placed in foster homes when, with state-provided support services,
they might have been able to stay safely in their homes.7  AACWA re-
sponded by shifting emphasis to "permanency planning" for children, so
they would not languish in foster homes. 273 The centerpiece of the Act's
permanency planning mandate was the "reasonable efforts"
requirement. States were now required to provide support services to
make "reasonable efforts" to maintain or reunite the child's in home-
placement by providing services to the family, thus maintaining the sta-
275bility and permanency of that placement. Instead of emphasizing foster
care placement as a means of protecting abused or neglected children, the
Act shifted the focus to protecting the child while the child remained in
his or her home; foster care was to be the "last resort," not the first. "76
To carry out AACWA's reasonable efforts provision, states were
277required to develop a case plan for each child in foster care. Each
child's plan was to detail what had been done to try to keep the child in
his or her home: the foster care placement; the services to be provided to
the child, the foster family and the child's family; and the plans for re-
turning the child to his or her home or another permanent placement.
278
"A typical case plan specifies case goals, such as family reunification,
and areas of parental improvement; agency and parental tasks needed to
268. See English, supra note 33, at 43-46.
269. See Stevenson, supra note 234, at 16-17. See also Barth. supra note 239, at 101.
270. See Hardin, supra note 30, at 112-13.
271. Gordon, supra note 17, at 679.
272. See Kim, supra note 229, at 287-89. The emphasis was on protecting children by placing
them in foster homes, as was the focus of federal funding. After congressional hearings on the foster
care system in the late 1970s the AACWA legislation was passed.
273. See id. at 288-89. Permanency advocates emphasized stability and finding permanent
homes for children. The widespread use of long-term "temporary" placement, foster homes, was the
antithesis of permanency. See also Hardin. supra note 30, at 112.
274. See Kim, supra note 229. at 289-90.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 290 n.22 (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 6942 (1980)).
277. See id. at 290.
278. See id.
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achieve the goals; and timetables for the achievement of the identified
goals and tasks. 279
AACWA also increased the number of court hearings required for
most dependency cases. States were required to judicially review the
child agency's actions to see if there were "reasonable efforts" to keep
the child with the family28° and to conduct periodic administrative or ju-
dicial review hearings for children in foster placements "to determine,
among other things, the appropriateness of the placement, the extent of
case progress, and compliance with the [child's] case plan."28' In addi-
tion, state courts were required to hold permanency planning hearings (so
that a new permanent home could be "secured" for children for whom
reunification with families was not a safe option) within eighteen months
after foster care placement.
2
Then in 1997, additional federal legislation was added. While
AACWA was prompted in large part by children "languishing" in foster
homes,283 the Act did not necessarily remedy the foster care problem.28
The states had interpreted the Act's reasonable efforts provision as re-
quiring them to work towards reuniting children with families, even
'85when there was little or no prospect of that becoming a safe placement.
As a result children were kept in foster homes while fruitless efforts were
expended to make their former homes safe for them.8 6 When Congress
passed ASFA in 1997, then, it attempted to clarify and limit the reason-
287able efforts requirement. It did so in various ways, primarily, however,
by shifting greater emphasis to the child's safety and to permanency, as
opposed to family preservation and reunification. 2 8 ASFA specifically
emphasizes finding adoptive homes for those children who will not suc-
cessfully be returned to their parents89 Consistent with these goals,ASFA also requires a permanency hearing within twelve months after a
279. Hardin, supra note 30, at 114.
280. See id. at 112-13,119.
281. Id. at 114, 120. See also Kim, supra note 229, at 291 (explaining periodic reviews).
282. Hardin, supra note 30, at 114, 120. See Kim, supra note 229, at 312 (explaining change to
requirements for permanency hearings from eighteen months after placement in foster care under
AACWA to twelve months under ASFA). As of 1996, however, at least 21 states had sued child
welfare agencies on behalf of children who had not received the benefits of permanency planning
envisioned by this law. See also Stevenson, supra note 234, at 17.
283. Jill Chaifetz, Listening To Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The Failure to
Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4-5 (1999).
284. See Kim, supra note 229, at 287.
285. See id. at 287-89, 309.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 287.
288. See id. at 309 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(I 5)(A) (West Supp. 1998)).
289. See id. at 309-10. In addition, specific limitations on reasonable efforts to keep intact or
reunite families were enacted. For example, states are no longer required to meet the reasonable
efforts requirement for family reunification if there are "aggravated circumstances" (e.g., torture or
sexual abuse), if a parent murders another child, or if a parent loses his or her parental rights to a
sibling. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (Supp. IV 1998).
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child enters foster care (as opposed to eighteen months under AACWA)
and moves states more quickly towards initiating termination of parental
rights hearings (to facilitate adoptions).29
The requirements of AACWA in 1980, combined with those of
ASFA in 1997 have significantly expanded the courts' responsibilities in
dependency actions in the last twenty to thirty years. 9' Today's depend-
ency court, in addition to determining the validity of abuse or neglect
allegations, may need to determine emergency placement issues, assess
reasonable efforts to keep the child in the home,293 assess reasonable ef-
forts to get the child back in the home, review case plans, review imple-
mentation efforts of case plans, hold (more quickly) a hearing to termi-
nate parental rights, and deal with adoption issues. 94 "In 1976, the same
case might have had two hearings and two issues for the court to deal
with. Today the court might have to hold an emergency hearing, several
review hearings, several permanency planning hearings, a parental rights
termination hearing, and an adoption hearing. 295
Adding further to the complexity of cases with which juvenile de-
pendency court must deal is the increased number of persons, including
lawyers, needed or required to participate in the hearings. Federal and
state constitutional and statutory requirements regulate who is repre-
sented in child dependency proceedings and at what stage.296 First, the
child's interests must be represented. The Child Abuse and Neglect Pre-
vention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) requires the appointment
of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for each child who is the subject of a child
297protection proceeding. While the GAL does not have to be a lawyer,
many states provide lawyers to children.9  The rest of the states use
Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs) or other laypersons. 299Some children have both a lawyer and a GAL.399
290. See Kim, supra note 229, at 309-14. Even in 1996, prior to ASFA, Mark Hardin reported
an increase in termination proceedings resulting from "[t]he emphasis on finding permanent families
for foster children who cannot safely be returned home." Hardin, supra note 30. at 115.
291. See Hardin, supra note 30. at 114. See also Hardin, supra note 254, at 154-60.
292. Stevenson, supra note 234, at 17.
293. Hardin, supra note 30, at 113.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 116. See also Kim, supra note 229, at 302 (describing the shelter care hearing,
adjudicatory hearing, dispositional hearing and review hearing typical of the juvenile court process).
296. See generally Hardin, supra note 30, at 118-19.
297. Id.; Daniella Levine, To Assert Children's Legal Rights or Promote Children's Needs:
How to Attain Both Goals, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2023, 2025 (1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107
(1998 & Supp. 1994)).
298. Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 900 n.12 (1999) (citing Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey,
Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What
Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 346-47 (1987)).
299. Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 95, 108 (1999) ("[Imn only half of the states ... do children in dependency actions have
attorneys. In the other half ... children are represented either by [CASA or laypersons.]") (citing
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Next, the interests of the parents must be represented. In each case
that involves termination of parental rights the court must determine
301whether the parents have a constitutional right to legal representation.
However, most states give parents the right to request or the court the
discretion to appoint counsel' 0° Fewer, but still most, states give parents
the right to request or the court the discretion to appoint counsel at all
103stages in child dependency cases. In some cases separate counsel repre-sents each parent.3t '
While in theory lawyers assist the court in substantive and proce-
dural matters, this is not always the case. Inadequate training of juvenile
court personnel, high employee turnover, inadequate pay, and status is-
sues influence the outcome.3 5 CASA volunteers, either serving as GALs
or as an additional voice for the child, enjoy a deserved reputation for
their contributions to ensuring that the child's interests are represented.
However, "they generally offer neither expertise (training is good, but
does not turn volunteers into social workers or psychologists) nor a par-
ticularly intimate knowledge of the child."3°6 In addition, while lawyers
and GALs theoretically ensure that the interests of the parties are repre-
sented, representation of varied interests can also make for a more adver-
sarial hearing, and thus increase the court's workload.
Lawyers or representatives, along with other participants have
changed the look of the dependency case. In 1976, a dependency pro-
Interview with Howard Davidson, Director of the American Bar Association Center on Children and
the Law (Feb. 1999)).
300. Hardin, supra note 30, at 118-19; Levine, supra note 297, at 2025.
301. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
302. Hardin, supra note 30, at 118 ("[l]n some states the right to counsel originates only with
procedures to terminate parental rights"). See also Indigents' Rights to State Funding in Civil
Actions, 95 HARV. L. REV. 132, 142 n.82 (1981) ("Lassiter may have little practical effect on the
provision of counsel in termination proceedings. . . .Most states have statute[s] authorizing
appointment of counsel."); Amy Sinden, 'Why Won't Mom Cooperate?': A Critique of Informality in
Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 348-49 (1999) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE 13.34.090 (1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6337 (West 1992)).
303. William Wesly Patton, It Matters Not What is but What Might Have Been: The Standard
of Appellate Review for Denial of Counsel in Child Dependency and Parental Severance Trials, 12
WHITTIER L. REV. 537, 539 (1990). See also Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: The States' Response to Lassiter, 14 ToURO L. REV.
247, 262 (1997) (explaining that ten states currently "require the appointment of counsel for indigent
parents" in termination cases "absent an intelligent waiver," while "[tiwenty-two ... states and the
District of Columbia require that counsel be appointed" if the "parent requests counsel and meets
local standards for indigence").
304. See e.g., John Haney & Lisa Kay, Making Reasonable Efforts in Iowa Foster Care Cases:
An Empirical Analysis, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1650 n.140 (1996) ("In some cases, the court will
appoint separate attorneys for each parent when their interests conflict.").
305. Hardin, supra note 30, at 118-19.
306. Buss, supra note 298, at 954 n.191.
307. Bailie, supra note 246, at 2310 (citing Weinstein, supra note 29). See generally Hardin,
supra note 30, at 118-19.
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ceeding typically included only the caseworker and the custodial
parents.) Today, participants might include the caseworker, the custo-
dial parents, the noncustodial parents, the parents' attorney or attorneys,
the child's attorney, the child protective agency's attorney, a CASA vol-
unteer (acting as a GAL) and even foster parents. 309
Increased caseloads, increased complexity of cases, and inadequate
resources, including personnel, and the resulting overload and ineffec-
tiveness of dependency courts are all important to understanding the
"particular government process" of dependency court. However, one
must understand another aspect of the court in order to evaluate the rela-
tive costs of open versus closed proceedings; perhaps more than any-
thing, the culture most characterizes the institution of dependency court.
C. The Culture of Dependency Court
The government wields enormous power in dependency court.3 ° It
takes children away from their parents, and often thrusts children "into
strange surroundings with perhaps no understanding of why this trau-
matic event is happening or when it might end.""' At the same time, the
government deprives the parents of the "liberty to direct and control
[their] care and upbringing."32 Further, while the parents and children are
usually strangers to the dependency court, the other participants are not.
The judge, the lawyers, the social workers, the GALs, and the other court
workers are usually daily participants in dependency court. The familiar-
ity that these court workers have with the system and with each other can
breed a "go along to get along" philosophy that pressures not only the
regular participants, but also the parents and thus their children to con-
form and comply. The culture that results is one that does not always
encourage thorough and accurate fact-finding or thoughtful decisions
about the important matters before the court.
It is important to grasp the nature of a dependency action. "A de-
pendency case ... pits parent against state."3 '3 "[I]t is no secret that the
people affected by the child welfare system are some of the least power-
ful members of our society: women, many of whom belong to racial mi-
nority groups and virtually all of whom are desperately poor," 114 and
children. Further, it is possible that neither mother nor child will have a
lawyer. If they do have lawyers, it is likely the lawyers are not highly
308. Hardin, supra note 30, at 115.
309. Id.
310. In re Welfare of R.L.K., 269 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Minn. 1978).
311. Sinden, supra note 302, at 363.
312. Id. at 362.
313. Id. at 346.
314. Id. at 364-65. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 917 ("[Tihe parents who end up in
dependency court frequently are drawn from the most powerless segments of our society.") (citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30
(1981)).
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trained or experienced. This is in spite of the fact that the government is
there to take or interfere with the parent's right to direct the upbringing
of her child. The Supreme Court's language in Stanley v. Illinois35 con-
cerning this right bears repeating:
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed
,essential,' . . . 'basic civil rights of man,' . . . and '(r)ights far more
precious... than property rights,' .... 'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder.'... The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . .. the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .... and the Ninth Amendment.
16
The government, through the dependency court judge, has the
power to deny parents this precious right. The judge has the ultimate
power to terminate the child's legal relationship with his or her parents.317
The result is that the government presides over a critical court proceed-
ing that is initiated by the government against a poor and vulnerable pri-
vate party.
In addition, all the participants in this proceeding, except the parent• • 318
and the child, are regular dependency court participants. The repeat
presence of these individuals fosters a "clubbiness" and contributes to the
court's informality, both of which can influence the dynamics and the
results of the hearings.319 First, the regulars in dependency court know
each other. They know each other's children, partners and lives. When
people know each other well and see each other regularly, they develop
"a set of unwritten rules and shared expectations that govern the ex-
pected and accepted behavior., 320 Theoretically, this familiarity, "learn-
ing each other's styles, understanding expectations, and developing
trust," could work to the advantage of the court system, "but only if each
participant is vigilant in monitoring the professional behavior of
315. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
316. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner v.
Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince v. Mass., 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
317. See Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 16 (citing In re Tarshawn J. and Carlos V., Nos.
71752, 69605, Reporter's Trans. at 9-11 (Cal. Super. Ct., Fresno Cty., June 25, 1991).
318. Sinden, supra note 302, at 351-52.
319. Id. at 352-55. See Bremner, supra note 145, Vol. 1I at 1162-65, for an excellent
discussion of this dynamic.
320. Sinden, supra note 302, at 352 ("[F]rom the lawyers and social workers to the judges, their
courtroom deputies, stenographers and clerks - [all] have well-established relationships and a kind
of collegiality that comes from daily contact."). See also Bremner, supra note 145, Vol. III at 1162-
65.
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others. ' 2' Instead of vigilance, however, this clubbiness too often en-
courages judges, lawyers, and others to place collegiality and relation-
ships ahead of their responsibilities. They conform to the group's expec-
tations and make implicit pacts of non-aggression. 2  This is especially
true because of the tremendous caseloads in dependency court. "Giving
too much time to any one case disrupts the entire calendar. 3 23 Lawyers
and other court workers understand this and understand that raising trou-
blesome issues or arguments will consume time and resources that are
simply not available. 4 This may be particularly true of attorneys ap-
pointed by the court under a contract system.3 2' Again, because of the
limited resources allocated to dependency court, the pay under these
is . 326contracts is inadequate compensation given the services they require.
Still, "the attorney must agree to these demands or risk receiving no fu-
ture appointments .... The judge is clearly in a dominant position ...
because the judge has control over whether the attorney may appear in
the courtroom in the first place.
3 27
The familiarity with which these regular courtroom participants
interact also contributes to what is already a purposeful atmosphere of
informality in juvenile dependency proceedings . 2 8 This informality cre-
ates yet another obstacle to the court fulfilling its responsibility. Formal,
open court adversarial proceedings are associated with relevant and accu-
rate fact-finding.329 While even formal court proceedings can include
decisions based on prejudices and other factual inaccuracies, informal
proceedings exacerbate these problems. Without formal constraints, de-
cision-making is more "susceptible to being swayed by prejudices,
stereotypes, and snap judgments based on innuendo and rumor. ' ' 310 Simi-
larly, part of the informality of dependency court is influenced by the
"social work norms and discourse" that dominate.' Social work norms
discourage conflict and emphasize cooperation and non-adversarial
means of resolving issues. Amy Sinden, a lawyer who has represented
parents in dependency court, argues persuasively that these values oper-
321. Shari F. Shink, Hallmarks: New Directions in the Defense of Children, 26 CoLo. LAW. 39,
40(1997).
322. Sinden, supra note 302, at 354-55.
323. Weinstein, supra note 29, at 118.
324. Id.
325. Shink, supra note 321, at 40.
326. Id.
327. Id. See also Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation
of Children, Report of The Working Group on the Judicial Role, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1389, 1392
n.18 (1996) ("Many members of the Group, including the three members of the judiciary, believed
that an appointment process that relieves judges of the responsibility for selecting and monitoring
attorneys may be an appropriate step in assuring high quality representation for children.").
328. See supra text accompanying notes 208-210.
329. Sinden, supra note 302, at 379-80. See also infra, § 111D. . (examining the importance of
full and accurate information in dependency court).
330. Sinden, supra note 302, at 380.
331. Id. at 353.
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ate especially to pressure parents to cooperate. A non-cooperating parent
already accused of neglect or abuse, risks being accused of harming his
or her child a second time.332 Cooperation in these situations, says Sin-
den, is "frequently just a code word for the parent doing whatever the
social worker tells" the parent to do, if that parent wants to be reunited
with his or her child.3 3 This pressure to cooperate can also generate un-
reliable facts on which the court might base its decision.
It is the convergence in dependency court of all of these factors -
the imbalance of power, the emotionally charged issues that are before
the court, the conformity and cooperation required of all participants, and
the informality of the proceedings - that defines the culture of depend-
ency court. The stakes are high in dependency cases, and the issues -
child rearing, child abuse, child neglect - are particularly susceptible to
prejudices. When possible harm to a child is the issue, the temptation to
"cut comers" in order to reach the outcome one wants to reach is great.3
As Sinden so succinctly points out, this combination of factors is de-
signed to produce inaccurate information:
[Slince Miranda v. Arizona, we have recognized that informality in
the context of the power imbalance that exists when the state elicits
information from an individual under a palpable threat of a substan-
tial deprivation of liberty (there, physical restraint - here, removal of
child) is a recipe for coercion and that such coercion can actually re-
sult in inaccurate information being elicited.335
Each act of conformity and cooperation in a child's dependency pro-
ceedings - every agreement of non-aggression - runs the risk of hurting a
child whose best interest needs someone at that particular moment not to
conform, not to cooperate, not to operate on instinct or prejudice, but to
find the facts and to "make waves. 336
Thus, the proceeding to keep in mind as we look at the function of
open or closed dependency hearings is a proceeding about a child the
government believes is abused or neglected; it can separate the child
from his or her parents; it takes place in a grossly overburdened and un-
der funded system that resides at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy; it
is one of an overwhelming number of cases with complex issues; and it
332. Id. at 353-54.
333. Id. at 354. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 914, n.233 (arguing that dependency cases
often place parents in the awkward position of being required to admit wrongdoing in order to be
"acquitted").
334. Sinden, supra note 302, at 380.
335. Id. at 381 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
336. Shink, supra note 321, at 40. See also Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in
the Legal Representation of Children, Report of The Working Group on the Judicial Role, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1389, 1392 n.18 (1996) (discussing the Work Group's process of selecting
attorneys to represent children).
[Vol. 79:1
PUBLIC ACCESS TO DEPENDENCY COURT
is resolved in an informal environment in which there is great pressure to
"not make waves." And, it takes place in a system that was charged with
protecting Tavelle, Brianna, Kayla, Ashley, and Larry. The question is,
what function would public access to this proceeding serve?
D. The Value of Access to Dependency Court
Even if history yielded a stronger judgment about the confidentiality
of dependency proceedings, the functional role of access today must be
closely scrutinized. Historical judgments yield the judgment of the past,
not the present. The function of closed dependency proceedings is
largely defended as being in the best interest of the children whom the
court is to protect, and the historical origins link the practice to that pur-
pose. The seemingly dismal state of the dependency court system today,
however, raises the question of "how?" How exactly does presumptively
closing dependency hearings serve the best interest of the children?
Dependency court is charged with the responsibility of protecting
children from abuse and neglect; to that end, dependency court is ac-
corded the power of disrupting and severing the parent-child relationship.
Such responsibility should be carefully discharged and such power
should be carefully exercised; the consequences of the courts' actions
will likely have significant and irrevocable consequences for the children
and their parents.
The best interest of the children would first seem to demand that the
court be designed to encourage the fullest and most accurate information
about the important issues before it. Further, to operate in the best inter-
est of the children, the court also needs the confidence and support of the
public. Closed hearings discourage full and accurate information and
closed hearings fail to provide to the public information needed for the
public's confidence and support. It is "the sure knowledge that anyone is
free to attend [a trial that] gives assurance that established procedures are
being followed and that deviations will become known.,, 337 A closed
hearing can sometimes serve the best interest of a child, but presump-
tively closed hearings do not serve the best interest of children.338
1. Full and Accurate Information
Full and accurate information about the matters before dependency
court ought to be a major factor in determining how dependency court
will operate. "No decisions have a more profound impact on the daily
lives, emotional well-being, and safety of litigants than those made every
337. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
338. Richard D. Hendrickson, Media Access to Juvenile Courts: An Update, 44 (No. 3) Juv. &
FAM. CT. J. 27, 40 (1993).
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day in family courts. '39 Dependency court factual questions are also
"among the most difficult... and most sensitive [questions] litigated in
American courtrooms., 340 An open courtroom has long been recognized
as one of the most important means of enhancing the reliability of judi-
cial evidence and should help to make more accountable those who tes-
tify or otherwise provide evidence in dependency proceedings. The pub-
lic scrutiny of open proceedings can further encourage accurate and reli-
able evidence in dependency proceedings by countering the culture of
informality and familiarity of current proceedings. Finally, public scru-
tiny should encourage dependency court decisions based on reliable evi-
dence, and discourage decisions based on prejudice, bias and good inten-
tions - all of which are more likely to prosper behind closed doors.
Dependency court proceedings are judicial proceedings. The court
engages in fact-finding and makes decisions based on those findings.
One premise of our judicial system is the belief that justice emerges from
full and truthful testimony,34 and it has long been recognized that open
courtrooms help ensure the reliability of the testimony offered and thus
the accuracy of the fact-finding. 34' A courtroom audience who knows the
truth can discourage perjury and encourage full and complete testimony.
The same audience might also realize they have additional information to
share that might be helpful.343
While dependency proceedings may have more than the normal
share of specific situations that require private testimony, such as when a
child is testifying about sexual abuse, for example, dependency pro-
ceedings are still court proceedings. There is no general reason to except
them from the rationale that applies to testimony in all other court pro-
ceedings. Children testifying about sensitive matters can be dealt with in
the way other courts deal with it - using the court's discretion on a case
by case basis to determine if the testimony should be taken in private. 3"
Further, inaccurate and unreliable evidence that may also result
from the culture of informality and familiarity in dependency court can
339. Catherine J. Ross, Unified Family Courts: Good Sense, Good Justice, 35 TRIAL 30, 30
(1999).
340. Sokol, supra note 28, at 913.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 913
(examining dependency court fact finding).
342. Gofen, supra note 13, at 878 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982)). "As noted in Globe Newspaper, public presence at trials aids accurate fact-finding." See
also Sokol, supra note 28, at 913 (examining dependency court fact finding).
343. Karla G. Sanchez, Barring the Media From the Courtroom in Child Abuse Cases: Who
Should Prevail?, 46 BuFF. L. REV. 217, 224-25 (1998). See also Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at
15-16 (examining mandatory closure and conditional closure of juvenile proceedings); Gofen, supra
note 13, at 864 (discussing the lower court recognition of the First Amendment right of access to
dependency proceedings).
344. Sokol, supra note 28, at 914.
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be countered somewhat with public access.345 While informality was
central to the original vision of juvenile court, and while both familiarity
and informality can and likely do contribute to some beneficial outcomes
in dependency court, an open courtroom can provide a check to their
possible negative effects. "Several courts acknowledge that juvenile
cases exhibit far more procedural errors than do comparable adult cases
and suggest that confidential proceedings and the absence of counsel
may foster a judicial casualness toward the law that visibility and appel-
late accountability might constrain. '4 6 This state of affairs seems par-
ticularly troubling when it concerns cases as critical as dependency pro-
ceedings. Amy Sinden emphasizes some of the benefits of both formality
and formal rules in courtroom hearings:
The formal rules that govern trial procedure also help to assure accu-
racy. Witnesses testify under oath under threat of penalty for perjury.
The judge excludes unreliable evidence, like hearsay, as well as evi-
dence likely to cause prejudice. The requirement that judges state the
basis for their decisions helps to ensure that decisions are based on a
rational view of the evidence and not on prejudice or bias. Numerous
rules governing judges' conduct in adversarial proceedings encourage
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. Thus, judges sit
higher than and at some distance from the parties, and usually address
only the lawyers. When they do address the parties directly they do so
formally and on the record. And they do not communicate with one
party out of the presence of the other party. -4'
Open hearings would not preclude informality in dependency pro-
ceedings, but the openness should operate to minimize procedural errors
resulting from that informality. It should similarly help prevent actions
and decisions based on bias or prejudices, and abuses,348 some of which
are aided by the culture of dependency court.
As discussed earlier, the process and dynamics of dependency court
create a significant imbalance of power between the family and the gov-
ernment. The informality and clubbiness, the fact that a child's health
and safety are at issue, and the significant discretion accorded the court
can skew the proceedings to result in the resolution that the government
345. See supra, text accompanying notes 57-59. See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 918 (arguing
that public access would heighten procedural regularity in dependency cases).
346. Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1346 n.290
(1989) (citing RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971); In re Dino. 359 So. 2d 586, 597 (La.
1978)).
347. Sinden, supra note 302, at 379-80.
348. Jan L. Trasen, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do Closed
Hearings Protect the Child or the System?. 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 379 (1995); Dienes,
supra note 3, at 7; Erin M. Smith, In a Child's Best Interest: Juvenile Status Offenders Deserve
Procedural Due Process, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 253, 260 (1992); Gofen, supra note 13. at 877.
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favors. 349 Because dependency courts are charged with making major
decisions about children's lives, the potential for misuse of power is
great.
In addition, the subject matter in dependency court requires judges
to exercise a great deal of discretion.350 Standards are vague and judges
must ultimately decide where and with whom a child will do best. Solu-
tions must often be fashioned around: 1) parents who love a child, but do
not know how to care for that child; 2) support services that are assumed
to exist, but that do not - because the resources are not there; and 3) a
foster system that is overloaded and inadequate. Because of the overload
on the system, judges must often make their decisions with hurried
hearings and incomplete information. Prejudices or biases are more
likely to be called upon when reliable information is lacking and are es-
pecially called on in such an "emotionally-charged arena" like depend-
ency court. The safety of a child is at stake and if cutting comers - pro-
cedural comers and evidentiary comers - will keep a child'from what the
judge suspects is a dangerous situation, cutting comers is likely to be
done.352
Public access can check the shortcuts and abuses that stem from
these probably good-intentioned impulses. Indeed, the inappropriateness
of many of these actions may not be visible to the daily participants in
dependency court. The implicit agreements fostered by the familiarity in
juvenile dependency court, for example, those which discourage partici-
pants from "making waves," and challenging the decisions or actions of
colleagues, may be so much a part of the culture of the court that the
regular participants simply fail to see them. It sometimes takes the out-
side view, someone to say "but why do you do that?" before insiders can
see practices that need to be reformed. Thus, open hearings would work
to create self-awareness in a system that may have become so closed that
it has lost the ability to see some of its own faults. Open hearings would
give insiders a fresh view, not only of the court, its personnel, and its
practices, but of the employees of the social services agency, all of whom
"wield vast 'authority on the State's behalf."' 353
349. Abuse can first result from governmental oppression. Formality not only aids in accurate
fact finding, but it also helps to "prevent ... governmental oppression." See Smith, supra note 348,
at 260.
350. Sokol, supra note 28, at 916.
351. Id. at916.
352. Id. at 917. See generally Sinden, supra note 302, at 380-81 (arguing that the evidentiary
constraints and protections against bias and prejudice provided by formality are important in the
child welfare context).
353. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 17 (quoting Kahn v. Bower, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1599,
1613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). See also Sokol, supra note 28, at 917-18 (arguing that public access
would heighten procedural regularity in dependency cases).
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Finally, without public scrutiny, court personnel can intentionally
hide or explicitly agree to ignore shortcuts they might feel are needed for
the system to produce what they perceive as the needed result3 4 Almost
all persons are a bit more conscientious about not rounding the edges of
their performances if their actions are open to scrutiny by others.355 Criti-
cal decisions about a child's future must not be the result of bias, preju-
dice or "instinct." Open hearings provide an accountability that can help
prevent this.356
2. Educate and Inform the Public
A court charged with serving the best interest of abused and ne-
glected children also needs the confidence and support of the public.
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institu-
tions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing., 37 For the dependency system to have the support of the pub-
lic, the public must either believe the system is functioning properly or
understand what is necessary for reform. In either event, the public needs
access to dependency proceedings. Further, the "public" includes those
who appear before the court. Parents, children, foster parents and other
affected individuals need to know about the court that decides matters so
important and central to their lives.
Again, the dependency court system deals with important and criti-
cal issues. The system must have the support and confidence of the pub-
lic. Further, not only is juvenile court a public institution, the public is
also a party to dependency proceedings, alleging through its government
that a child is in need of protection. Thus, the public has a need, but also
a right to know what occurs in its own judicial proceedings. The oppor-
tunity for criticism of government institutions is also particularly valued
in our society.358
The first reason to provide access to dependency court proceedings
is to provide the knowledge necessary for intelligent public discussion
and debate. Public access can let the public know if judges are making
decisions based on what the evidence supports, or on individual biases or
personal beliefs.3 9 Public access can let the public see the choices de-
pendency court judges are too frequently faced with today. Often there is
a choice between an inadequate parent and an inadequate foster care
354. Sokol, supra note 28, at 920-22.
355. See supra text accompanying note 57; Sokol, supra note 28, at 918.
356. See supra text accompanying note 57. While many states give the court the discretion to
open the proceedings to the public or any interested person, this still requires the court to act
affirmatively to bring accountability to the system. Few willingly hold themselves out to public
scrutiny. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 920; Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14-15.
357. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 567, 572 (1980).
358. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14-15.
359. Gofen, supra note 13, at 876-77.
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system.' 6° "If public court business is conducted in private, it becomes
impossible to expose corruption, incompetence, inefficiency, prejudice,
and favoritism.
'36'
Public action can occur if the public can see for itself the inadequa-
cies of the system, such as the need for better facilities; the need for more
staff, better trained staff, better paid staff, and better qualified staff; the
need for daycare subsidies, more healthcare support, more home support
services, and better support for foster families; and the overall need for
substantially more financial resources. The action may be as pointed and
immediate as voting a judge out of office or applying public pressure to
remove a lawyer from court appointments; it may be as broad as de-
manding more funding to attract better personnel, train better personnel,
and retain better personnel. But knowledge is the prerequisite to action,
361and the public first needs access to the system.
Further, if the public sees a court treating the issues fully and the
parties fairly, and making the best choices under the circumstances, the
public will be less likely to blame the court when tragic events occur. 161
The outrage at a child's death might offend less and motivate more if the
public understood the limited resources with which the court must func-
tion. 6,
It is ongoing daily access and first hand information that is needed
to motivate, and ultimately support a public call for action and reform.
The current limited access to dependency court information lets the pub-
lic hear of cases only when there has been a horrible result - when a
child subject to the jurisdiction of dependency court is found terribly
abused or dead. The community response is often a short-lived outrage
over the "mistake" made in that particular case. Community members
simply do not have enough information for a more constructive and long-
term response. "A result considered untoward may undermine public
confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an
unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has
failed and at worst has been corrupted. 365 If, however, the public could
see the daily inadequacies of the system - the daily mistakes, and the
daily tragic circumstances of smaller cases needing a day care voucher,
360. "Dependency court factual questions are among the most difficult, and most sensitive
[questions] litigated in American courtrooms." Sokol, supra note 28, at 913. See also In re the
Welfare of R.L.K., 269 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Minn. 1978) ("'The public has a right to know how this
Court conducts its business, especially in a Court having as much power as this one."').
361. Estate of Hearst v. Lubinski, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
362. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 35-40 (Alaska 1971); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 597 (La.
1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Fernandez, 712 So.2d 485 (La. 1998)). See also
Gofen, supra note 13, at 875-78; Trasen, supra note 348, at 381.
363. Sanchez, supra note 343, at 225-26, 226 n.49.
364. Sokol, supra note 28, at 926.
365. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555,571 (1980).
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public transportation vouchers to obtain medical care, weekly home
nurse visits, or good and accessible counseling services - perhaps the
public could respond in a more meaningful and lasting way.
A trial court judge in Oregon recognized the difference between the
public knowing about one case with a horrific ending and the public un-
derstanding the repeated nature of the daily shortcomings of the system.
The trial court ordered specific treatment for a troubled thirteen-year-old
girl over the objection of the state, which argued that the Children's
Services Division did not have the funds to pay for the court-ordered
treatment. The trial court judge explained why he admitted the press
(with some restrictions) to a trial involving an adolescent girl with a sen-
sitive history of sexual abuse and other troubles:
[Tihe Court knows from its own experience this [case] is not an iso-
lated incident where this particular issue has been involved, and the
Court feels that one of the reasons we have this problem is because
the people of the State of Oregon and, specifically, members of the
Legislature, are not really aware of the magnitude of the problem; and
I believe it is the function of the press as well as the function of all of
us to see that the people of this state, and, particularly, members of
the Legislature, are confronted with the grave reality and stark reality
of children in need in this state whose needs are not being met now;
and I can't do that, and I think that the press can. Exercising my dis-
cretion under the statute, I have allowed the press to be present.
366
Finally, public access can also facilitate research and scholarly in-
put.367 The problems dependency court must deal with are difficult and
challenging. The easier access to dependency court is, the easier it will
be for others to amass the information and knowledge needed to offer
informed views and proposed solutions.
If, with knowledge, the public judges dependency proceedings to be
fair and effective, then the discussion and debate will end there and the
public will support the institution. If the public judges dependency pro-
ceedings to be less than desired, however, and the resources too limited,
perhaps instead of an outrage defined by anger at and blame on the court,
the public outrage will instead be defined by public debate about how the
system can better protect our children.
366. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. of Multnomah Co. v. L., 546 P.2d 153, 155 n. I(Or. 1976).
[The 13 year old girl] was removed from her parental home when she was 11 years old
after a long and disturbing history of sexual abuse by her stepfather and the child's
rejection by her mother. She was first sexually assaulted when she was five years old.
Since [the Children's Services Division] took custody of the child, she has been placed in
a number of institutional and foster homes and has spent a considerable amount of time in
juvenile detention. During the year and a half preceding the hearing [she] ran away from
these homes at least 15 times and was often picked up in various parts of the state in the
company of older boys and young men.
Id. at 155. See also Hendrickson, supra note 338, at 41.
367. See Sokol, supra note 28, at 927.
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[Plublic disclosure might assist in drawing attention to the terrible
plight of children in this country and to the ever shrinking resources
allocated to both them and the system which is designed to protect
them .... [T]he press can assist juvenile courts .. by providing the
public with greater knowledge of the child welfare system and the
adequacy, or lack thereof, in (child protective) service delivery sys-
368tems.
With full information over a sustained period of time, the public369 may
well make meaningful contributions to what seems now like a hopeless
task.37°
IV. FUNCTION: IS PUBLIC ACCESS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY COURT TODAY?
The ultimate function test for dependency court access is whether it
is in the best interest of the children whose futures are decided daily by
the dependency court system. Indeed, best interests of the children are at
the heart of mandatory or presumptive closure of juvenile court, includ-
ing dependency proceedings. Unfortunately, an analytical framework
that pits public access to dependency court against the best interest of
children assumes that, on balance, an open courtroom hurts the interest
of children. This is a false premise. A particular child might benefit from
his or her case being closed to the public, but a standard of closure does
not benefit the system that decides that same child's future. If access is
presumed, however, individual assessment of cases in which closure is
requested can continue to respond to the particular privacy needs of any
child. At the same time, the standard of presumed access will continue to
benefit the judicial system, and thus benefit the children the system
serves. In this way, the best interests of the children are served.
The fatal flaw behind mandatory or presumptive closure in depend-
ency cases is the assumption that closure is generally in the best interest
of all children. 7' Court decisions taking this position correctly review the
history of access, emphasizing the juvenile court's practice of closure
368. Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14.
369. Gofen, supra note 13, at 878. Just as important as the public at large are the parents,
children, foster parents and others who are subject to the juvenile court institution. If the public is
barred from observing the proceedings, when members of that public are called before the court,
they do not know what they are called before. They are less likely to know what the process is, what
goes on, how it functions, and what is expected of the subject. The disadvantage is all the more
apparent because everyone else - the judges, lawyers, social services, and other court personnel - do
know what is going on. But the public, the parent and the child, whose lives will be greatly affected
by decisions made, are barred from information about the system until they are subject to it. Further,
publicity also gives notice - it lets parents, foster parents and others understand what their
responsibility is to the children they care for.
370. See generally Brelsford & Myers, supra note 3, at 14-17; See also Dienes, supra note 3, at
1, 3-4; Gofen, supra note 13, at 875-76.
371. E.g., Edward A. Sherman Pub. Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1258 (R.I. 1982).
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and therefore its historical judgment that closure is best, but the courts
generally ignore the relatively brief history of juvenile court.' Courts
also appropriately look at the purpose and function of closed juvenile
proceedings, but their analysis too often sounds like a mantra, e.g., "[t]he
interests of the juvenile ... are most often best served by anonymity and
confidentiality." ' The result is that courts too often conclude the best
interests of children require mandatory or presumptive closure in all pro-
ceedings without fully considering the cost such closure brings to the
system of justice that must serve those same children. Thus in Florida,
the supreme court upheld mandatory closure of termination of parental
rights hearings,374 simply noting the historical "overriding interest in,
among other things, protecting the child from stigma, publicity, and em-
barrassment and promoting rehabilitation. 375 In Natural Parents of J.B.,
it was the dissenting opinion that provided a discussion of the "strong
376
policy concerns" supporting open hearings, not the majority .
Certainly there are situations where public access might interfere
with a child's best interest, and where testifying in open court might
traumatize children, or where the fairness of the trial might otherwise be
prejudiced.377 But these situations can be dealt with by closure in any
given case; closure should not be deemed as being in the best interest of
all children at all times. The Supreme Court recognized this in Globe,
when holding a statute unconstitutional because it excluded the public
from trials of specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age
of eighteen:
[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor
is a compelling one. But as compelling as that interest is, it does not
justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances
of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest .... In
short, [the statute] cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of
accommodating the State's asserted interest: That interest could be
served just as well by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-
being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Among the factors to
be weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and
372. E.g., San Bernardino County Dept. of Pub. Soc. Serv. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332,
338-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
373. Edward A. Sherman Pub. Co., 443 A.2d at 1258. See also In the Matter of M.C., 527
N.W.2d 290, 293 (S.D. 1995) (quoting Edward A. Sherman Pub. Co., 443 A.2d at 1258).
374. Natural Parents of J.13. v. Fla. Dept. of Children & Soc. Servs., 780 So.2d 6, 9-11 (Fl.
2001).
375. Natural Parents of J.B. 780 So.2d at 6, 9.
376. Id. at 14-15 (Anstead, J., dissenting, with Pariente, J., concurring in the dissent).
377. In addition to keeping a child from suffering the additional stigma and embarrassment that
can occur with open hearings, closed hearings can better accommodate the informality and social
work approach proponents of juvenile court have traditionally favored, and perhaps the rehabilitation
that must occur afterwards. While the informality and social work aspects of dependency court
produce mixed results, see supra text accompanying notes 208-10, 327-33, there may be reasons
besides stigma, embarrassment and trauma that justify partial or full closure of a hearing.
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1
understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and
the interests of parents and relatives .
Similarly, Globe also rejected the other rationale offered for ex-
cluding the press and public from sex-offense trials - "the encourage-
ment of minor victims of sex crimes to come forward and provide accu-
rate testimony.,,3' 9 That assertion, according to Globe, was "speculative
in empirical terms" and "open to serious question as a matter of logic and
common sense."
38 °
Consistent with the Court's opinion in Globe, many courts have
recognized the heavy burden closure bears when weighing these issues in
the context of the First Amendment analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the presumption of open public proceedings (for proceed-
ings pertaining to criminal trials) can only be overcome by an "overrid-
ing interest"38' - a "compelling interest,
'3 2 "articulated in findings" 383
"specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the clo-
sure order was properly entered.,,38 The Court further held that the clo-
sure must be "narrowly tailored to serve that interest., 383 Federal circuit
courts considering the issue in civil proceedings have held similarly, 386 as
has the California Supreme Court.3 8 7 The Ohio Supreme Court considered
378. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 (1982).
379. Globe, 457 U.S. at 609.
380. Id. at 609-10. Kathe Aschenbrenner Pate, Restricting Electronic Media Coverage of Child-
Witnesses: A Proposed Rule, 1993 U. CHL. LEGAL FORUM 347 (1993) (discussing the trauma that
can occur to child witnesses testifying in a public forum and stating that portions of a dependency
proceeding can be closed if circumstances warrant). Further, there is a distinction between a child
being a witness and a child being the subject of the proceeding. Pate, as do many authors, focuses on
child witnesses. Either being a witness or being the subject of a legal proceeding can cause trauma -
trauma that may be exacerbated if the proceeding is subject to public access - but neither warrant a
standard of closure, either mandatory or presumed, of all child dependency proceedings.
381. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
382. Globe, 457 U.S. at 607.
383. Richmond, 448 U.S. at 581.
384. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
385. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
386. Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1983) ("to limit the public's
access to civil trials there must be a showing that the denial serves an important governmental
interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve that governmental interest"); Newman v.
Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1983) ("closure is proper only if necessary to achieve a
legitimate purpose"; "less intrusive alternatives must be considered"; and "if closure is warranted,
the restriction on access must be narrowly drawn with only that part of the proceeding as is
necessary closed"). See also Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23
(2d Cir. 1984); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983).
387. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super. Ct., 980 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1999). The California
Court held that the court ordering closure must find that there is an overriding interest supporting
closure and that there is a substantial probability that absent closure, that interest will be prejudiced.
The closure must be narrowly tailored to serve the interest and it must be the least restrictive means
of achieving the overriding interest. NBC Subsidiary, 980 P.2d at 365. The court's holding applied to
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the issue specifically as it relates to dependency court and ruled that the
person seeking closure of a dependency hearing bears the burden of es-
tablishing "(1) there exists a reasonable and substantial basis for believ-
ing that public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness of
the proceeding, and (2) the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of
public access.""3 '
Mandatory or presumptive closure is still the norm in dependency
proceedings,389 however, and "protection of the children" by closure usu-
ally trumps access in cases challenging the constitutionality of closed
juvenile hearings,39 whether they are mandatory or presumptive closure
provisions.
In California, the Court of Appeal was faced with deciding whether
the public had a constitutional right of access to child dependency pro-
ceedings3 9' The court fully discussed the important policy concerns sup-
porting open proceedings. The court found itself "at the crossroad,
3 92
deciding that the function of access (e.g., encouraging accurate fact-
finding, checking judicial abuse) favored opening the proceedings, but
that the historical judgment of America's juvenile court would not grant
access to dependency proceedings.3 93 In the end, the court worried that
finding a constitutional right of access would "mean that the proceeding
constitutionally could not be closed unless the judicially created strict
test for closure is met. . . .With the welfare of minors at stake, we are
reluctant to impose the strict standard for closure required for a First
Amendment right.,
394
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court, even when holding invalid
mandatory closure of juvenile hearings (on delinquency, deprivation and
unruliness matters), 39' ruled that it was permissible to legislate a pre-
396sumption of closure. Thus, the public or press requesting access must
show that the "state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is overrid-
den by the public's interest in a public hearing., 397 Unfortunately with
such a presumption, most courts will likely agree with the Supreme
"ordinary civil proceedings in general, and not any ... particular proceedings governed by specific
statutes." Id. at 361 n.30. The court thus did not include dependency hearings within its holding. Id.
388. In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990) (ruling, however, that dependency hearings
had neither a presumption of closure nor access). See also State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co. v.
Geauga Co. Ct., 734 N.E.2d 1214 (Ohio 2000); and State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Lias, 628
N.E.2d 1368 (Ohio 1994) for helpful dicta interpreting In re T.R.
389. See supra note 5.
390. See In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Vt. 1981); San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc.
Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 343 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
391. See San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
392. Id. at 342.
393. See id.
394. Id. at 343.
395. See Fla. Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 322 S.E.2d 233, 238 (Ga. 1984).
396. Fla. Publ'g Co.. 322 S.E.2d at 238.
397. Id.
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Court of New Jersey in New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Serv-
ices v. J.B. ,9 that "[t]he factual settings presented in the vast majority of
[child protection] cases involve allegations that warrant closure."3 99
One of the myths that access to dependency court would correct is
the assumption that most dependency cases involve allegations of sexual
and other severe physical abuse. Sexual and physical abuse cases, while
numerically substantial, still constitute a minority of dependency cases.4°°
After looking at various surveys, studies and reports, Diana English con-
cluded that neglect "apparently affects about twice as many children as
do physical and sexual abuse."" Most dependency cases are neglect
cases, children who lack basic emotional and physical care, °2 and most
401neglect is rooted in poverty. While all such cases are tragic, they do not
necessarily involve allegations that would cause sufficient trauma to a
child such that closure would be appropriate.4t Even assuming most sex-
ual and physical abuse cases should be closed to the public, 4°5 along with
some of the neglect cases, a substantial number of cases would still be
heard in open court.
398. 576 A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990). The court said J.B. involved "the rare situation in which the
public's right to attend judicial proceedings is not outweighed by the state's compelling interest in
conducting a private hearing." N.J. Div. of Youth, 576 A.2d at 270.
399. Id. at 269.
400. See English, supra note 33, at 43.
401. Id.
402. See id. at 41 Box 1.
403. See Robert F. Kelly, Family Preservation and Reunification Programs in Child Protective
Cases: Effectiveness, Best Practices, and Implications for Legal Representation, Judicial Practice,
and Public Policy, 34 FAM. L.Q. 359, 389 (2000).
404. Most of the cases in dependency court are indeed tragic. The tragedy of these cases,
however, is the poverty and ignorance in which they are rooted. Most are not cases that suggest
trauma or stigma as a result of public access. For example,
[iun her recent book, Jane Waldfogel asserts that the current foster care population may
be grouped into three categories. First, the most serious category, constituting about 10%
of current caseloads, includes "serious and criminal cases." The second group
encompasses serious cases that do not require criminal justice intervention. The final
group of cases are those in which a child is at a relatively lower risk of serious harm, and
the parents may be willing to work with an agency to secure needed services. Together,
the latter two groups comprise 90% of the caseload. Typically, these cases involve less
serious physical abuse (for example, a single, minor injury such as a bruise or a scratch)
or less severe neglect (such as parental drug or alcohol abuse with no other apparent
protective issues, dirty clothes or a dirty home, lack of supervision of a school-age child,
or missed school or medical appointments). Many of these lower-risk neglect cases are
poverty-related, resulting from inadequate housing or inappropriate child-care
arrangements while a parent works.
Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1724-25 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S
CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999)
(quoting JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 124 (Harvard University Press
1998)).
405. However, the Supreme Court's caution in Globe applies here: "the measure of the State's
interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are injured by testifying, but rather in the
incremental injury suffered by testifying in the presence of the press and the general public." Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.19 (1982).
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For this to happen, however, the standard of access must incorporate
the value of the open courtroom. Only with a standard that recognizes
this value, and thus assumes access, will dependency proceedings stand
to benefit from that access and thus better serve the interests of the chil-
dren and other litigants before the court.
Trauma, stigma, embarrassment, and similar concerns for children
in dependency court can all be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 16
However, concerns about obtaining reliable and accurate information,
about court decisions being based on evidence, about lawyers and judges
being held accountable for their performances, and about a judicial sys-
tem earning the confidence of the public - these are concerns resulting
from the "particular government process" of dependency court. These
concerns cannot effectively be addressed in a closed courtroom; they
must be addressed systemically by legislating public access back into the
juvenile dependency system. If a party wishes to bar the public from a
particular hearing, and there is a sufficient reason to do so, that party can
request closure. Because the system and thus the children should benefit
substantially from public access, however, the reason offered for closure
must also be substantial. "Closed proceedings ... must be rare and only
for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness.''°7
The type of harm that must be established and the probability of its
occurrence with an open trial needs to be that which can overshadow the
value open proceedings bring. It could be the Supreme Court's standard
in criminal proceedings: "an overriding interest based on findings that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and ... narrowly tailored to
serve that interest."' 8 It could be "reasonable likelihood of substantial
prejudice;"409 "substantial probability " of substantial prejudice;4 10 or a
"realistic likelihood of prejudice to a fair trial."" It could meet the Ohio
Supreme Court's "reasonable and substantial basis" that the child could
be harmed or the fairness of the proceeding endangered.4 2 In any event,
the harm and the probability of it occurring must outweigh the benefits of
public access,413 "one of the essential qualities of a court of justice.,
14
V. CONCLUSION
"[T]he paramount question," said Judge Elaine Slobod in her Or-
ange County, New York Family courtroom in 1988, "is whether the par-
406. See Globe, 457 U.S. at 607-09.
407. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984).
408. Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510.
409. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986).
410. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 14.
411. State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641,654 (N.J. 1983).
412. See In re T.R, 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990).
413. SeelnreT.R., 556N.E.2dat451.
414. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980) (quoting Daubney v.
Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829)).
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ties and children are better served by retaining the veil of confidentiality
that covered the Family Court from its inception or by lifting that veil
and laying bare the breadth of society's ills which lie beneath. 4 5 Access
will lay bare the state of dependency court and access can bring reform
to the court. Presumptive access can better serve the children and others
in dependency court than can closure. It may be, as the New Jersey Su-
preme Court posited, that "[i]t will be the unusual case in which a factual
context that poses no danger of trauma or embarrassment to the child
coincides with the general public's interest in following the proceed-
ings."' 6 But I believe otherwise. With daily access presumed in depend-
ency courts across the nation, I believe the public will follow the pro-
ceedings. I believe access will work as it was intended to work and as it
has worked in courts for centuries. I believe it will - perhaps slowly -
bring reform to dependency court.
For some time now, legislatures and courts have "retain[ed] the
veil ' 417 of closure. Their answer to the paramount question Judge Slobod
presented has left us with a dependency system that is in crisis and fail-
ing many of our children.48 My argument is that public access can help;
only access and time will tell us if I am correct. But "[t]he only way one
can fully comprehend the realities with which the Family Court deals is
to be here to see what is presented on a daily basis. 41 9 I have sat in de-
pendency court as an observer, and I have participated in dependency
court as a CASA. I have seen judges and lawyers and others do excep-
tional jobs with the resources they had, but the resources were not suffi-
cient. I have also seen judges and lawyers who needed to do more than
they were doing, even with the inadequate resources they had. Access
gives hope for reform, whereas now there is little. I believe the children
who will be in dependency court tomorrow should have that hope.
415. In re: S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d 192, 198 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
416. J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261, 269 (N.J. 1990).
417. In re: S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
418. See supra text accompanying footnotes 14-29.
419. In re: S Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
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The debate over selecting and retaining judges is long standing and
reflects a fundamental disagreement regarding a judge's political and
social role.' There exists a tension between a judge's dual role as a law-
maker and interpreter of existing law.2
One view, functionalism, maintains that the courts serve as an in-
stitutional check on the legislative and executive branches3 and that judi-
cial independence is essential for the judiciary to protect the rule of law.4
To function effectively, judges must be free from the influence of the
electorate, the executive, and the legislature.5
In tension with the idea of judicial independence is the need for
judicial accountability.6 Judges must be aware of the majority's political,
social, economic and ethical views when interpreting and applying the
law. Furthermore, accountability advances democratic principles by
legitimizing popular vote.'
The second part of this paper outlines various ideologies regarding a
judge's proper political and social role when exercising power and en-
gaging in decision making. The third part discusses the three primary
selection and retention methods currently used and the effects of Political
Action Committees ("PACs") on campaign expenditures. The final sec-
* Graduate of University of Minnesota Law School, May 2000. Bachelors of Arts, Suffolk
University, 1996. Admitted to the Minnesota Bar 2000. Staff member of the Journal of Law and
Inequality, 1998-99. Who's Who American Law Students, 2000. Elizabeth Larkin is currently
employed as a law clerk for the Honorable R.A. Randall, Minnesota Court of Appeals.
1. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995). See also Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and
the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 34 (1986) (stating that
the selection and retention of judges reflects contradictory ideas of the role of the courts).
2. See Webster, supra note 2, at 2.
3. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 34.
4. See Harold See, Comment: Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142 (1998).
5. See Dubois, supra note I, at 34.
6. See Webster, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 34.
8. See Webster, supra note 2, at 11.
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tion of the paper asserts that an election system better serves democratic
principles.
Rather than replacing election systems with either appointment or
merit systems, meaningful reforms must be instituted. Lengthening judi-
cial terms, reforming campaign financing, eliminating constraints on
judicial speech, and increasing voter education are a few reforms that
will increase voter participation, add legitimacy to the institution, and
decrease the negative effects that are associated with current elections.
II. JUDICIAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL SELECTION AND RETENTION:
DIFFERING VIEWS REGARDING THE COURT'S ROLE IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY
The debate over the judiciary's proper role dates to the nation's
founding. 9 The argument about whether a selection method should serve
judicial accountability or independence is limited to the state arena and
does not extend into the federal sphere.'0 Judicial independence is inter-
preted to mean that judicial decisions will be decided fairly, impartially,
and in good faith without outside considerations" and without judicial
accountability to the electorate for judicial conduct.
Central to the debate on whether a selection system should preserve
judicial independence 2 or accountability'3 is what political and social
role a judge should play. If it is believed that a judge applies a well-
established body of legal rules and principles, then accountability to the
electorate is of secondary concern.' 4 A judge is better able to make fair
and impartial judicial decisions in the absence of outside influences and
I5
pressures.
A particular candidate's training and legal knowledge is the key in
the selection process with professional peers or other judges considered
to be the most qualified to assess and recognize a particular judicial can-
9. See id. at 2
10. Federal judges are appointed to a life tenure with removal for cause. Therefore, popular
criticism will not affect the judge's independence. See Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and
Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 59 (1998).
11. See id. at 61.
12. There are two aspects to judicial independence: (1) institutional independence: judicial
independence from executive and legislative branch control; and (2) decisional independence: the
theory that judges should decide a case on the merits free from outside pressures and influences.
Webster, supra note 1, at 4. See also, Erwin Chemerinsky et al., What is Judicial Independence?
Views from the Public, the Press, the Profession, and the Politicians, 80 JUDICATURE 73, 74 (1996)
(defining judicial independence similarly).
13. Accountability is used to denote accountability to the majority of the electorate.
14. Judicial accountability is seen as less of a concern if a judge exercises no discretion or
independent power but is viewed as society's conscience. See Dubois, supra note I, at 36-37.
15. A judge should be free from public pressure but should also be free from his or her own
personal, social, political, or economic views. See id. at 36.
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didate's qualifications. 6 Under this system, judicial peers select and re-
tain judges and conduct periodic performance reviews. 7 Essential to true
independence are life tenure, salary protection, and removal for cause
subject to a constitutionally adequate procedure. Institutional appellate
review and peer pressure serve as a check on judicial discretion and erro-
neous decisions.' 9
Other commentaries believe that a judge's social and political role is
expansive and that there are no institutional constraints on judicial dis-
cretion and decision-making. Because judges are, in fact, vested with
partisan political authority and judicial acts and decisions are influenced
in a politically partisan manner, then judges should be democratically
accountable to the electorate. 20 Direct political accountability to an elec-
torate is a check on unlimited judicial discretion.2'
A third view in determining a judge's political and social role fo-
cuses on the jurisdictional level of the court.22 Because a trial and inter-
mediate appellate court judge is engaged in applying a well-established
body of legal rules and principles, judicial discretion and decision-
making is limited and constrained by the job's intrinsic nature.23 Judicial
discretion is inherently limited because creating new law is a very small
part of what a judge actually does.24 A judge will be acting in a legisla-
tive capacity only when engaging in statutory interpretation. 2' Greater
independence is allowed and direct political accountability to the elector-
ate is unnecessary because statutory interpretation is a minute part of the
judge's judicial duties.26 Institutional appellate review, constitutional
amendment, or legislative action are checks on unpopular judicial deci-
sions and the development of new law.27
A fourth view of a judge's political and social role is a formalism
approach. The belief is that a judge's purpose is to protect individual
16. See Webster, supra note 1, at 5.
17. See, e.g., Harold J. Laski, The Techniques of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REV. 529,
538 (1926).
18. See Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, in THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO LECTURE 17-18 (The Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York. 1979).
19. Seeid. at31.
20. See Ray M. Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162, 1163
(1969).
21. See id.
22. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on
Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1974-76 (1988).
23. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 36-37.
24. Under this view there are two types of judiciary created law. The first is modifying,
extending or contracting the common law. The second type is statutory interpretation as a gap filler
where a statute is ambiguous or silent regarding the case before the court. See Webster, supra note 1,
at 6.
25. See id. at 6-7.
26. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Legal Theory and Judicial Accountability: A Comment on
Seidman, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1605 (1988).
27. See Grodin, supra note 22, at 1976.
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liberties and minority rights from encroachment by the electorate major-
ity.2" Judicial independence and discretion are essential when minority
and individual rights conflict with the majority's will. 29 Accordingly,
judges are seen as activists and are expected to change the law in order to
protect individual and minority rights.9 Because of tension between the
majority and minority, changes in the law may be unpopular with the
electorate or other government branches.' Judicial independence and
freedom from majority retaliation is critical in order for a judge to per-
form effectively. As Alexander Hamilton stated, "Periodical appoint-
ments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way
or other, be fatal to their [judge's] necessary independence." 32 The court
in Chisom v. Roemer,33 echoes this view:
public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the
judge is often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sen-
timent. The Framers of the Constitution had a similar understanding
of the judicial role, and as a consequence, they established that Arti-
cle III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and would be
sheltered from public opinion by receiving life tenure and salary pro-
tection. 34
However, judicial independence from accountability to other gov-
ernment branches or the electorate may not be practically or factually
accurate. First, judicial independence does not guarantee that judges will,
in fact, protect individual liberties or minorities' rights.35 Second, state
judges may not require the same degree of independence as federal
judges because most civil rights cases are brought in federal court not
state court.36 Third, the judicial independence argument assumes that the
28. As Hamilton put it:
This independence of judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men or the
influence of particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). Additionally,
Hamilton expressed a structuralist view of judicial independence. Judges need to be free from
influence and encroachment by the legislative and executive branch. Id.
29. See Grodin, supra note 22, at 1979.
30. See Webster, supra note 2, at 7.
31. See Kaufman, supra note 18, at 9.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 29, at 232.
33. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
34. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400.
35. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 39.
36. As a result, state courts will rarely decide cases involving minority fights or individual
liberties, thus decreasing the need for judicial independence. See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial
Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of
1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2055-56 (1988).
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democratic electoral process inherently corrupts judges. 7 This author
believes that an individual possesses a corrupt nature and it is the indi-
vidual, not the system, which guides individual choice.
A judicial independence argument also contains the correlated ar-
gument that a perception of judicial independence and propriety must be
maintained." Judicial authority, judicial legitimacy, and judicial effec-
tiveness are products of public support and respect for the judiciary.
Public respect for the institution is produced by the belief that judicial
decisions are made fairly and impartially based on the merits of a par-
ticular case, and not from outside influences.39 Therefore, even if judges
remain free from outside pressure, there may be a perception that a judi-
cial decision was influenced by political considerations"° and the institu-
tion as a whole is devalued. 4' Respect for the institution and the rule of
law is needed for voluntary compliance with the law. If people believe
that judges are deciding cases because of outside influences then people
will fail to voluntarily comply with the law or use the courts to solve
problems.42 Additionally, public perception of a biased and unfair system
is prevalent among minorities holding a belief that there is unequal
treatment in the justice system.43 Furthermore, the lack of confidence in
the legal system is evidenced by an increase of pro se litigants particu-
larly in the area of family law. 4
Independence supporters argue that election systems are more likely
41to produce perceptions of influence and corruption. Political cam-
paigning and fundraising create the impression that judicial decisions are
exchanged for votes.46 As a result, public confidence in the institution is
diminished and judicial decisional independence is constrained.
Additionally, it is claimed that judges should remain independent
and unaccountable to the electorate because judges are unique and do not
37. See id. at 2056-57.
38. See Webster, supra note 1, at 9-10.
39. Outside influences can include special interest groups or popular opinion. See Abner J.
Mikva, How Should We Select Judges In a Free Society?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 547, 555 (1992).
40. Political is used in the sense that the decision will most likely result in the judge
continuing to hold office. A judge will be more concerned in making a decision that will keep him
employed.
41. See Webster, supra note 1. at 9-10.
42. See Wood R. Foster Jr., The MSBA and the Courts, Bench and Bar of Minn. (Mar. 2000),
available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/mar00/prezpage-3-00.htm.
43. See id.
44. Id. However, the increase of pro se litigation may be the result of more than the erosion of
public confidence in judges and may be the result of a lack of confidence in attorneys, the increased
ease of pro se divorces, and attorney fees.
45. See id.
46. See Robert Moog, Campaign Financing for North Carolina's Appellate Courts, 76
JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1992).
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act in a legislative capacity . Judicial accountability to the electorate is
unnecessary because judges apply but do not make law.8 The need for
representation and democratic accountability is lessened because courts
do not act in a representative capacity and are legally prohibited from
having constituents.49
Accountability addresses a number of practical concerns. First,
judges function in a legislative capacity and make policy when engaging
in statutory interpretation or departing from prior case law.5° Judicial
policy decision-making is in opposition to the democratic principles
upon which the nation was founded.5 Second, judges are human and can
make mistakes. Therefore, they should be accountable to the electorate
for erroneous decisions.52 Third, elections contribute to judicial account-
ability, increase voter awareness and interest, and produce better judges.
5
1
III. METHODS OF SELECTION AND RETENTION
A. Appointment
In the majority of states, regardless of the selection system used, ini-
tial judicial selection is made by gubernatorial appointment to fill unex-
pired terms.54 Six states and the federal government use appointments as
the exclusive selection method 5  Selection procedures vary among the
516states. Current methods are appointment by the legislature, the gover-nor, and merit selection through nominating committees.57
47. See Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Representiveness,
31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 420-25 (1981) (discussing differences between judges and legislators
concerning accountability).
48. Id. at 420-22.
49. See John L. Hill, Jr., Comments on Thompson and Observations Concerning Impartiality,
61 S. CAL. REV. 2065 (1988). See also, Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of The 50' Anniversary of
Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990) (reviewing Missouri's merit system).
50. See Webster, supra note 2, at 6.
51. See Edward Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988
(1988).
52. See Webster, supra note 1, at 11.
53. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, The Taint of Big Money in Judicial Elections is
Moving Reformers to Find a Middle Ground Between Free-Spending Campaigns and Merit
Selection, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 70.
54. See Philip L. Dubois, State Trial Court Appointments, Does the Governor Make a
Difference?, 69 JUDICATURE 20, 20 (1985). In Minnesota, almost ninety percent of the judges
obtained their seats through appointment. See Barbara L. Jones, High Court Races are off to a
Running Start, 2000 MINN. LAW., 2-3 (2000), available at http://www.minnlawyer.constory.
asp?storyid+ 1045.
55. See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 177 (1990) (explaining that Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia use appointments); U.S CONST. art H, § 2, cl. 2.
56. In Maine, the governor appoints, subject to legislative confirmation, supreme and superior
court judges for a 7-year term with re-appointment for 7-year terms. McFadden, supra note 56, at
181. The New Hampshire governor, with the approval of a five member executive council, appoints
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Proponents of the appointment system to select and retain judges
argue that judicial independence is guaranteed because judges are insu-
lated from criticism and threats of removal and do not have to rely on
popular approval for their decisions. Democratic principles are served by
indirect accountability to the public through the elected appointing
authority.58
Appointment advocates are concerned with the negative effects that
campaign financing, fundraising, and conduct has on judicial perform-
ance.59 Fundraising and election contests by judicial candidates create
public distrust of judicial fairness, independence and competence.60
Candidates not having to compete in contested, contentious, and raucous
elections maintain the appearance of judicial propriety and independ-
ence.6' In order to maintain independence, judges must be appointed to
long or life terms of office, 62 be ensured salary protection, and must be
removed only for cause.63
Supporters also contend that the appointment process results in bet-
ter-qualified judges.6 First, because negative campaigning costs are not
supreme and superior court judges. Id. at 183. The judges hold office until age 70. Id. In New Jersey,
the governor, with advice and consent of the senate, appoints supreme court, appeals court and
superior court judges for 7-year terms. Id. The governor, with advice and consent, may re-appoint
until age 70. Id. Rhode Island's Supreme Court justices and superior court judges are appointed for
life. Id. at 185. South Carolina's legislature appoints supreme court justices for a 10-year term and
court of appeals and circuit court judges for a 6-year term. Id. The legislature can re-appoint for
additional terms. Id. Virginia Supreme Court justices are appointed by the legislature for 12-year
terms, and the court of appeals and circuit court judges for 8-year terms. Id. at 187. The legislature
can reappoint for the same terms. Id.
57. See William M. Pearson & David S. Castle, Alternative Judicial Selection Devices: An
Analysis of Texas Judges' Attitudes, 73 JUDICATURE 34, 34 (1989).
58. See Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53,
58 (1986); see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (6' ed. 1993) (arguing that
executive appointment is better than a system where judges are in politics and the electorate has to
become familiar with judges' adjudicatory history).
59. See Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in Michigan's Supreme Court
Elections: Should We Throw The Baby Out With the Bathwater?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 367, 369
(1998). Advocates are also concerned with the real and perceived negative effects on judicial
functioning. See Maura A. Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary:
An A rgumentfor Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 842-43 (1994).
60. See Schoshinski, supra note 60, at 839-40.
61. See Laski, supra note 18, at 531-32.
62. "As to the tenure by which judges are to hold their places... all judges who may be
appointed by the United States are to hold their offices during good behavior..." THE FEDERALIST,
No. 78, at 226 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). See also, ABRAHAM, supra note
59, at 21-22 (arguing that judges are ideally impartial and must be given independence, security and
tenure).
63. See Webster, supra note 2, at 9.
64. It should be noted that there is also disagreement on the training and experience needed to
produce the most qualified candidates. Some believe that judges should be those who possess a great
deal of trial experience. Others argue that judicial candidates should include a broad base of
experiences such as academicians, government and corporate attorneys, and those without litigation
experience. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.. Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit
Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LIrTLE ROCK L. REV. 281,319 (1995).
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present in the appointment system, the most qualified lawyers will seek
judicial posts. Second, the electorate is incapable of making an informed
decision on judicial qualifications 6 and is more likely to be influenced by
political or personal considerations. As a result, the populace elects
judges who are not the most qualified but rather the easiest to elect.
Third, a committee or individual possessing a greater knowledge of judi-
cial qualifications and responsibilities is responsible for selecting judicial
candidates.&6 Therefore, judges will be selected on merit and not from
emotional or political considerations.
Appointment methods may also promote diversity in the judiciary's
composition. Commentators argue that the judicial independence from
the electorate results in more women and minority judges than elective
systems. 67
The appointive system's greatest strength is also its greatest weak-
ness. There is no guarantee that judicial decisions will be decided fairly
and impartially even though judges are free from all limits on their deci-
sion-making. There is no substantive check on judicial decision-making
and discretion after the initial appointment.68 The trade off for judicial
independence is the risk that judges will pursue personal agendas that are
in conflict with their judicial responsibilities.69
Furthermore, political considerations are not absent in the appoint-
ment system. Gubernatorial and legislative appointments are often based
on political considerations 7° rather than on judicial qualifications. 7' Gen-
erally, judicial appointments are more likely to embrace the same politi-
cal principles as the appointing authority.72 Additionally, former legisla-
tors are more likely to be judicial appointments in systems where the
legislature is the appointing agency.73 As a result, the appointment
65. "Given the nature of the judicial elections, voters lack clues to gage [sic] the merits of
individual candidates, such as party affiliations, committee assignments, voting records, press
releases or policy positions." The Price of Justice: A Los Angeles Area Case Study in Judicial
Campaign Financing, Frontline, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/que/
studies.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (discussing the findings of a survey conducted by the 1995
California Commission on Campaign Financing).
66. See, ABRAHAM, supra note 59, at 25-27.
67. See Nicholas Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of Judicial
Selection Methods, 71 SOC. SC. Q. 315, 315 (1990).
68. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 58.
69. See Webster, supra note 2, at 42 n.67.
70. The appointing authority may be concerned with ideology, party loyalty, and friendship.
See Champagne, supra note 59, at 58.
71. See Dubois, supra note 55, at 25.
72. See id. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS, STANDARDS ON STATE
JUDICIAL SELECTION 16 (July 2001) (asserting that executive branch officials choose candidates
with similar political leanings).
73. See John J. Korzen, Comment, Changing North Carolina's Method Of Judicial Selection,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 253, 274 (1990).
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method may not lessen partisan politics, but instead may play a signifi-
cant role in appointing judges.74
Also, appointment methods do not guarantee that money will not
play a factor in influencing a candidate's selection.75 Large amounts of
money were spent to defeat Judge Bork's nomination to the United
States Supreme Court76 and to support Clarence Thomas during the con-
firmation hearings.77
B. The Merit selection system and Missouri Plan7
The Missouri Plan is a combination of appointment and election
systems. There are three elements to the Missouri Plan:
1. A nonpartisan commission nominates qualified individuals.
2. The governor or executive appoints a nominee to a judicial post.
3. Retention elections follow the initial term.79
The Missouri plan is the archetype for reforming state judicial elec-
tion processes. 0 Approximately 34 states and the District of Columbia
use a form of merit selection. Six states use a combination of commis-
sions and retention elections." Ten other states use merit selection for
some judges 3 In Missouri, merit selection is used for appellate court
judges and some of the circuit courts,8 which resulted from a distrust of
the elective and appointment systems." The goal of the merit selection
system is to obtain an "intelligent and impartial" judiciary, eliminate the
74. "If the power of making them [periodic appointments] was committed either to the
Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which
possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either..." THE
FEDERALIST, No. 78, supra note 29, at 232.
75. See Harold See, supra note 5, at 146.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 146-47.
78. Although there is a difference between merit systems and the Missouri plan, commentators
also use the designations interchangeably. See e.g., id. at 143-144.
79. See James E. Lozier, The Missouri Plan A/K/A Merit Selection is the Best Solution for
Selecting Michigan Judges, 75 MIcH. Bus. L.J. 918, 920 (1996).
80. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
81. See Lozier, supra note 80 at 918-920.
82. Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming. See id.
83. Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Tennessee. See id.
84. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 920. The plan is used in 5 out of the 45 metropolitan circuit
courts. Id. These circuit courts include the most populated counties of St. Louis and Jackson County.
85. See id.
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chaotic results of the election system, and alleviate judicial candidates
86from campaign pressures.
The distinguishing feature of the merit system is nonpartisan nomi-
nating committees.8 ' Nonpartisan nomination committees insulate guber-
natorial political influences from an initial selection committee.88 Attor-
neys, judges, and lay people serve on the committee for a six-year stag-
gered term. 89 The staggered six-year terms were designed to keep the
commission free from domination by the appointing executive.' The
governor must select from a list of three candidates that the committee
92recommends.9 The candidate is initially appointed to a one-year term.
After the initial term, the judge runs in an uncontested retention election
for a six-year term if a trial judge or a twelve-year term if an appellate
judge.93 Voters cast a yes or no ballot when asked if the judge should
remain in office.' If the majority votes not to retain the judge in office
then another candidate is selected and the process begins anew.95
Merit selection advocates argue that the system assures a competent
judiciary free from political affiliation,96 while allowing popular account-
ability in a retention election.97 Proponents argue that choosing judges
according to professional standards will produce a better-qualified candi-
98date. The problem with the claim that a merit system produces a more
professional judge is that it is difficult to define and evaluate the qualities
that make a good judge.99 Also, other factors beside the method of selec-
tion and retention affect the quality of the judiciary.' °°
Advocates argue that judicial stability is advanced because there is
little turnover in retention elections.'0 ' Stability is increased because
86. See John M. Scheb, H, State Appellate Judge's Attitudes Toward Judicial Merit Selection
and Retention: Results of a National Survey, 72 JUDICATURE 170, 170 (1988).






93. See Honorable Jay A. Dougherty, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on
the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 Mo. L. REV. 315,
318 (1997). The judge must receive at least 50% of the votes cast. Id.
94. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 920.
95. See id.
96. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
97. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
98. See Scheb, supra note 87, at 170.
99. See Dubois, supra note 2, at 33.
100. Formal qualifications such as age and length of practice, salaries and benefits, pension
plans, retirement laws, length of terms, judicial discipline procedures, and the court's physical
environment are all factors that affect the makeup and quality of judicial candidates. See id.
101. See Dougherty, supra note 94, at 317, 320.
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judges are less likely to be disciplined or removed. '°3 Supporters also
argue that retention elections lessen the appearance of judicial
corruption' 3 because retention election costs are low, reducing the risk
that judges are selling decisions for votes. '°4 In addition, judges are freed
from the campaigning distractions of contested elections.
However, the reality is that large sums of money are spent in reten-
tion elections in order to influence the outcome of particular elections.
'06
In California, opponents raised over seven million dollars to defeat Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Justice Rose Bird.'0 7 Furthermore, Justice Bird and
two incumbent California Supreme Court justices spent over four million
dollars in the same election.'00
Some supporters argue that judges selected from this system are less
political than judges from other selection systems.' °9 However, in reality,
the retention system is not devoid of political influences."0 "The political
aspects of the process are transferred from an elected and accountable
official to a committee that is not elected by the people.''''.. There is also
a greater chance for political patronage because a committee recom-
mends to the Governor who then appoints the candidate." 2
Additionally, "the organized bar asserts too great an influence in the
selection process."' 3 In the federal selection process the American Bar
Association's influence in selecting federal judges was perceived as too
great and as a result there is discussion of removing the ABA from the
initial screening process."'4 Commentary surrounding the President's
decision highlighted the political aspects of the selection process."'
Appointed officials can be influenced by threats of removal, im-
peachment, or requests for resignation in cases where a judge rendereddecision.16 Judge Harold Baer's pro-defendant suppressionan unpopular s. •a l e's - sp e o
102. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 923.
103. See Scheb, supra note 87. at 170.
104. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
105. See id.
106. See Harold See, supra note 4, at 146.
107. Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 83 (1998).
108. Id. at 83.
109. See Scheb, supra note 87, at 174 (defining the term "political" as holding elective public
office before joining the appellate courts).
110. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
1I1. Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
112. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 379.
113. Scheb, supra note 87, at 172.
114. See Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY
L.J. 527 (1998).
115. See Michael J. Slinger et al., The Senate Power of Advice and Consent on Judicial
Appointments: An Annotated Research Bibliography, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1989).
116. Jerome B. Meites et al., Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment and the Assault on
Judicial Independence, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 741 (1998).
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ruling in United States v. Bayless"7 led to Senator Dole threatening im-
peachment if Judge Baer did not reverse his ruling."8 President Clinton
intimated that he might request Judge Baer's resignation if the ruling
remained the same."9 In a Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Baer sub-
sequently ruled for the government stating that the search was justified as
a result of additional evidence produced by the government.'
20
The merit selection system is also undemocratic. Merit selection
insulates judges from the electorate and decreases accountability. 2'
Judges are selected from a small group of candidates, and the nomination
process is done in secret. 1 2 Voter apathy and ignorance about qualifica-
tions is demonstrated by low voter turnout in retention elections.12' Fur-
thermore, retention elections allow for lifetime tenure since few candi-




Approximately 82% of state appellate courtjudges and 87% of state
trial court judges run in some type of election. 16 Thirty percent of trial
judges have initial terms of four years or less.127 Initial terms for 28% of
appellate judges are two years or less.
128
Although the majority of judicial elections are uncontested, elec-
tions are becoming more contentious and malicious. 29 Single issues such
as the "death penalty, criminal law enforcement, and reproduction
choices have assured controversial elections.', 30 The dominant issues in
elections systems are the effect of judicial accountability to the elector-
117. 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated on reconsideration by 921 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ruling that under the Fourth Amendment police officers did not have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity for an investigative stop of the defendant's automobile and as a result
suppression of the videotaped confession and $4 million in drugs was warranted).
118. Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Defanged and Other Institutional Ramifications of the
Clinton Scandals, 60 MD. L. REV. 59, 74 (2001).
119. Id.
120. United States v. Bayless, 921 F.Supp. 211, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121. See Dougherty, supra note 94, at 322.
122. Id. at 319.
123. See id. at 322.
124. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 62. Only one percent of judges were defeated in
retention elections. Id.
125. See Harold See, supra note 4, at 142 (defining popular elections as the direct and contested
election by the populace).
126. See Report and Recommendation of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Lawyer's Political Contributions, Part 111, at 3 n.] (July 1998), at http://www.abanet.org/scripts.asp.
127. Id. at 4 (increasing to 44% when mid-term vacancies are included).
128. Id. (increasing to 69% when judges are appointed to mid-term vacancies are included).
129. See id.
130. See Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electorism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign
Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 512 (1999).
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ate, the appearance of judicial impropriety, and corruption resulting from
skyrocketing campaign costs and fundraising.
1. Partisan Elections
3'
Partisan elections resulted from the popular democracy period dur-
ing Andrew Jackson's presidency and were a reaction to appointment
methods. 32 "Wealthy landowners needed to control the judiciary because
they were constantly engaged in landlord-tenant disputes."' 33 Elections
were instituted to promote "Jacksonian Democracy" and break land-
owner judicial control.'3
The popular sentiment was that the appointment method produced
corrupt, elitist, and arrogant judges because judicial discretion was un-
constrained by the majority's will. 35 Popular opinion was that appointed
judges "invalidated laws enacted by democratically elected
legislatures."'36 As a result, "elections allowed the judiciary to unite
popular support to counter legislative and executive power."'37 Currently,
eight states use partisan elections as a judicial selection method'3 8 "with
33.9% of state judges running in contested partisan elections.' 39 Partisan
elections serve democratic and constitutional principles and promote
participation'4 by ensuring judicial accountability. 4 ' There is a public
expectation that judges should be answerable for misconduct.'4 2 Incom-
petent judges can be removed by facing the electorate for periodic elec-
tions. Since judges, through interpreting statutes, act like legislators and
131. See Harold See, supra note 5, at 142 (defining partisan election as a judicial candidate
being identified with a political party).
132. See Webster, supra note 1, at 16. The original 13 colonies had 3 appointment systems:
appointment by the legislature, by the governor and a council, and appointment by the governor with
council approval. Id. at 13.
133. Lozier, supra note 80, at 918. But see Dubois, supra note 1, at 35 (explaining that partisan
elections were influenced by moderate Whig, Republican and Democratic lawyers and judges).
134. See Berkson, supra note 82, at 71.
135. Seeid. at71 n.78.
136. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 918.
137. Dubois, supra note 1. at 35.
138. Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 134 (1998). Alabama
judges are reelected every 6 years. MCFADDEN, supra note 55, at 178. Illinois appellate court judges
are elected for an initial 10-year term and retention elections every 10 years thereafter. Id. at 180.
Circuit court judges are elected to an initial 6-year term and then retention elections every 6 years.
Id. All North Carolina judges are elected for 8-year terms of office. Id. at 184. In Pennsylvania, all
judges are elected for 10-year terms and then subject to retention elections every 10 years. Id. at 185.
In Texas, appellate judges are elected for 6-year terms and district court judges for 4-year terms. Id.
at 186. West Virginia appellate judges are elected every 12 years and circuit court judges for 8-year
terms. Id. at 187.
139. Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 136.
140. See Hansen, supra note 54, at 70.
141. Id.
142. See Lubet, supra note 11, at 60.
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make new law and public policy, they should be responsible to the elec-
torate for their decisions.'43
Party identity simplifies fund raising efforts and increases judicial
campaign contributions.' Identity with a particular party may aid a can-
didate in garnishing votes for those who vote by party identification.
145
However, party identity can also hurt particular candidates and result in
party candidates being defeated if voters are reacting against a specific
party, particularly in off-year elections.
46
Opponents argue that current campaign elections and "fundraising
practices are a serious threat to judicial independence. '4 7 Elections create
concerns about judicial corruption and impartiality.4 8 The view is that
current elections and campaign financing create an impression of impro-
priety, bringing into question a judge's ability to impartially interpret and
apply laws and administer justice.'4 9 "There is also a concern that if
judges can be influenced by campaign contributions then they will be
unable to resist the difficulties that a judge faces through friendships and
associations that come before the court.
'' 50
One reason for the high costs of judicial campaigns is the use of
television and radio to educate the public about judicial elections.'5 '
"Commercial slate mailers have also increased the costs of election cam-
paigns because positions are often sold to the candidate who can pay the
most.
,,' 52
It is further argued that "judicial decision-making will be influenced
by the fear that the electorate will retaliate for unpopular decisions. '
Judicial decisions protecting constitutional rights, the environment, and
consumer interests are producing visible and controversial judicial ac-
tions resulting in more contentious and costly judicial elections l 4 It is
argued that the fear of removal by the electorate pressures a judge to
"neutralize or avoid criticism" by tempering judicial decisions and re-
143. See Harding, supra note 20, at 1163.
144. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 372. Currently, Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 5, forbids party endorsement. However, there is a case currently pending in the Eighth Circuit
to allow endorsements. Id.
145. See Harold See, supra note 5, at 142-43.
146. See id.
147. Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 134.
148. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 374.
149. See id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 138.
150. Thomas R. Phillips, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 136-37 (1998).
151. Abrams, supra note 130, at 525.
152. Id.
153. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 540
(1999).
154. See Roy A. Schotland, Statement of Roy A. Schotland Before the Joint Select Committee
on the Judiciary of the Texas Legislature, 72 JUDICATURE 154, 155 (1988).
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ducing the judge's willingness to protect minority rights and individual
liberties.'55
However, judicial activism should rarely occur in state trial courts.
Trial court decisions generally apply legal rules to facts. Rarely does a
trial court engage in constitutional issues or statutory interpretation,
which are the two largest areas that produce judicial activism and con-
troversial decisions. Additionally, appellate courts serve as an institu-
tional check on judicial activism in trial courts.
One commentator argues that since popular sentiment plays no role
in judicial decision-making or function it is inappropriate "to hold judges
accountable to the will of the people."'' 16 However, this view is dependent
on a belief that a judge simply applies law to a particular case and does
not engage in policy making. 57 This argument is weakened when judicial
decisions affect the greater populace. Furthermore, this argument does
not take into account that a positive image of the judiciary is needed for
the people to voluntarily obey the rule of law and not resort to self-help
techniques.
Election rivals argue that judicial neutrality or the appearance of
neutrality is threatened because contributors are attorneys, special inter-
est groups, or litigants who appear before the judge. 58 It is feared that
judges will not be able to render a decision in a case against those who
are past or future contributors. 59 There is an additional concern that liti-
gants, lawyers or others will actively campaign against a judge in retalia-
tion for an unpopular decision. 6'
Attorney contributions are not as sinister as election rivals argue.
First, attorneys rarely comprise greater than 50% of the contributors of a
particular campaign. 6' Second, lawyers who are more frequently exposed
to judges should know which judges are worthy of support and which are
not. 162
Opponents argue that the appearance of impropriety resulting from
elections will erode public confidence in the judicial system. 63 The alarm
is sounded that "no matter what, the appearance inevitably will be that
the judges' rulings were bought and paid for."'6' High cost campaign
fundraising and contentious elections discourage qualified judicial can-
155. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 76.
156. Krivosha, supra note 49, at 132.
157. See id. (defining "judging" as the act of deciding on the merits of a matter).
158. See Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 138.
159. Id. at 134, 138.
160. See id.
161. See Schotland, supra note 155, at 155.
162. See id.
163. "[L]itigants and the public will perceive that decisions were influenced by money."
Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 138.
164. Id.
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didates from running or seeking re-election."" Few competent lawyers
are willing to surrender a successful legal career to engage in rigorous
and expensive political campaigning.'6 Election antagonists further argue
that judges are distracted from their jobs and instead focus on cam-
paigning. 167 It is believed that voter apathy and ignorance results in vot-
ing along party lines and name recognition, and not on qualifications.
168
However, it should be noted that opponents offer no empirical evi-
dence that campaign fundraising actually affects judicial decision-
making 69 or the existence of actual widespread judicial corruption.' 71 In
fact, a judge may have decided in a particular manner, regardless of a
donation's source and size.' 7' Additionally, judges are guided by a judi-
cial code of conduct that limits improper behavior 72 by requiring recusal
when a judge has a possible monetary outcome in a particular case.1
73
However, one commentary cites evidence that questions a judge's im-
partiality in particular cases where a litigant is also a contributor.'
74
In Minnesota, judicial election behavior is limited by Canon 5 of the
Judicial Code of Conduct, as well as the Fair Campaign Practices Act.
17 5
Canon 5 prohibits a candidate from personally soliciting campaign con-
tributions. 76 Additionally, judicial candidates are expected to maintain a
barrier between themselves and contributors by not knowing who con-
tributed to their campaigns. '77 Furthermore, the Minnesota Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act' 8 requires disclosure of campaign contributions.'79
Elections also serve as a check on judicial discretion. Where there is
a clear rule of law, a judge should apply the rule of law regardless of the
165. See Webster, supra note 1, at 22.
166. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 921.
167. See Hill, supra note 49, at 2065-67.
168. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 45; See also Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas,
in JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 93, 97 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993)
(explaining how voters with limited knowledge rely on party labels to cast their votes).
169. See Chemerinsky, supra note 139, at 134, 138.
170. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 540.
171. See id.
172. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1-5 (1999).
173. See id. at Canon 3E(1)(c); see also Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. §§ 144,
455(b)(4) (1994) (applying to federal judges).
174. See Phillips, supra note 151, at 137.
175. See MODEL CODE, supra note 154, at Canon 5; See also Fair Campaign Practices, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21 1B.01-.21 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (creating a criminal statute that restricts the
written activity of elections; requires a county attorney to investigate any violations; and forbids
campaign activities by public employees, undue influence, corporate contributions or bribery).
176. See MODEL CODE, supra note 154, at Canon 5C(2).
177. See id.
178. Ethics in Government, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.01-37 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
179. Id. at § 10A.20(3)(c). For example, a contribution of $2,000 or more from one source to an
appellate court candidate or greater than $400 to a trial court judge must be reported within 48 hours,
as well as disclosure of contributions of $100 or more. Id. at § 10A.20(5).
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popularity of the law or the litigant. '80 Also, voter retaliation should be
minimal or non-existent when judicial decisions are decided according to
the unambiguous rule of law.'8' However, the electorate should be able to
remove a judge when there is no clear rule of law and judicial discretion
is at a maximum.'
82
Texas is the most frequently cited example of the evil of judicial
elections. Candidates for Texas Supreme Court elections are spending
millions of dollars.'83 In 1986, attorneys accounted for 80 to 90 percent of
the total campaign funds, in three out of four campaigns, for three Texas
Supreme Court seats.i 4 In another case, one individual contributed more
than 90% of the funds to an unsuccessful Texas Supreme Court candi-
date's campaign.'85
Jack Hampton, a Texas District Court Judge, demonstrates the vi-
ability of the election system. Judge Hampton imposed a 30-year sen-
tence, rather than life imprisonment, to a murderer of two gay men. '"
Hampton publicly justified the sentence with homophobic remarks.'
87
The State Commission on Judicial Conduct censured Hampton, but did
not remove him from office..8 In 1992, gay rights groups organized to
defeat his election for the Texas Court of Appeals. 89 This demonstrates
that the election system and voter accountability is a viable selection
method when the political apparatus fails to adequately address judicial
misconduct.
There is little electorate interference with judicial independence'90
Individual decisions are generally not known or examined by the elector-
ate. '9' Lengthy terms of office ensure that unpopular decisions will lose
their negative impact by the next election term.'92 Furthermore, most ju-
dicial incumbents are re-elected without opposition.' 93
180. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 541.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. For example, in 1994 and 1996, over $9 million was raised between seven candidates
seeking Texas Supreme Court positions. See Hansen, supra note 53, at 70.
184. See Schotland, supra note 155, at 155.
185. See Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146, 149 (1988).
186. Lisa Belkin, Report Clears Judge of Bias in Remarks About Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1989, at A25.
187. "1 don't care much for queers cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys." Id.
188. See Judge Is Censured Over Remark On Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1989, at
A28.
189. See Gay Rights Groups Hail Defeat of Judge in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at B20.
190. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 543.
191. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 12, at 76.
192. See Karlan, supra note 154, at 543.
193. See id. But see Webster, supra note 1, at 18 (arguing that contested judicial elections have
increased, are more heated, and are generating more voter interest).
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2. Political Action Committee ("PAC") 194 Contributions and Judi-
cial Elections
North Carolina is an example of PACs' influence on judicial elec-
tions.195 North Carolina judges are elected in partisan elections with
PACs having great influence.' 96 Thus, PACs are considered the major
reason for escalating judicial election costs in North Carolina.' 97
There is a difference between PACs' influence in general political
elections versus judicial elections. In general elections, PAC contributors
expect to impact political decisions; however they do not expect to influ-
ence judicial decision-making.' 98 Judicial codes of ethics governing cam-
paign activities are responsible for the different expectations by insulat-
ing judicial candidates.' 99 For example, Codes of Conduct often prohibit
judicial candidates from making campaign promises other than faithfully
executing their duties.2 °
Although the reality is that PACs have limited impact on judicial
decision-making, there is a perception that judicial quid pro quo is occur-
ring in secret between judicial candidates and PACs.2 ' However, this
perception is less significant in states where there are non-partisan elec-
tions, such as Michigan. 202
D. Non-Partisan Elections
Currently, twelve states use non-partisan elections for judicial selec-
tion and retention.23 Terms vary among the states from four to ten
years.2 4 Non-partisan judicial elections remove partisan political conse-
quences while ensuring judicial accountability.05 Such elections are more
likely to produce a higher number of qualified judicial candidates than
194. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (7th ed. 1999); see also Political Action Committee
(PAC), MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2001 (Sept. 6, 2001), at
http://encarta.msn.com (defining PACS and their role of soliciting campaign contributions).
195. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 381.
196. See Traciel V. Reid, PAC Participation in North Carolina Supreme Court Elections, 80
JUDICATURE 21, 29 (1996).
197. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 381.
198. See Reid, supra note 197, at 24.
199. See id.
200. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 381.
201. See id. at 382.
202. See id.
203. Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK
OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 142 (American Judicature Society ed., 1990).
204. See MCFADDEN, supra note 56, at 180-87.
205. See Webster, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining that candidates do not have to be loyal to
party ideology or party factions); See also Champagne, supra note 59, at 63 (discussing how
candidate merit, not party affiliation, drives non-partisan elections).
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partisan elections.2°6 The non-partisan election system allows for demo-
cratic participation while reducing judicial turnover, which ensures sta-
bility.20'
Non-partisan election opponents argue that voter ignorance is
prevalent in non-partisan elections. 2m Because of the absence of party
identity it is believed that in non-partisan elections, voters are more
likely to vote based on name recognition and ballot position than based
on information. 2°9 However, one study suggests that voter awareness dif-
fers according to the type of election.2 0 Voters in primary elections are
211more civic minded and knowledgeable than general election voters.
It is believed that attorneys will have a greater influence over non-
212partisan elections . Voters being less aware of judicial qualifications
will rely more on expert advice from the legal community in electing
candidates.1 3
As in partisan elections, opponents argue that increased non-partisan
elections have eroded public confidence in the impartiality, dignity and
independence of judges.2"4 First, non-partisan elections are often cited for
exorbitant campaign costs. 25- Second, opponents argue that candidate's
are becoming more aggressive in elections by attacking their opponents,
stating their personal views on legal and political issues, and soliciting
216support from PACs and special interest groups.
Ohio judicial elections are a combination of partisan and non-
partisan elements. Partisan committees nominate candidates, candidates
compete in partisan primaries and are elected in non-partisan elections.
2' 7
The Ohio Supreme Court in 1995 enacted campaign financing and fund-
raising rules to fight the negative perception of partisan influences.2"8
These regulations limit contributions by individuals, PACs, and political
206. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 63 (explaining that votes in a non-partisan election are
cast on a candidate's qualifications, rather than party association).
207. See Thomas E. Brennan, Nonpartisan Election of Judges: The Michigan Case, 40 Sw. L.J.
23, 26 (1986) (discussing how judicial stability is aided because incumbents in non-partisan
elections are often unopposed in reelection campaigns).
208. See Champagne, supra note 59, at 64.
209. See Lozier, supra note 80, at 920.
210. Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich Jr., Voter Knowledge, Behavior and Attitudes




214. See Initial Report on Judicial Elections and Ethics, 83 MARQ. L. R. 129 app.d at 131
(1999).
215. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 368, 376.
216. See Initial Report, supra note 214, at 131.
217. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 380.
218. See Nicole C. Allbritain, One Step Closer to Merit-Based Judicial Selection: Ohio's New
Limitations on Judicial Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1323, 1324
(1996).
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parties."9 Additionally, non-uniform expenditure limits were imposed
depending on the court and the size of the population in the court's dis-
trict."O Regulations were also adopted limiting the time frame for which
campaign contributions could be raised.22' The campaign finance re-
form's goal was to strengthen the judiciary's legitimacy by enhancing
judicial independence and accountability.222
Whether campaign reforms will have an impact remains to be seen.
Current election rhetoric still focuses on whether elections serve demo-
cratic principles and if judges are impartial.
Although it is still too early to measure the practical effects of
Ohio's reform laws, the courts are testing the law's constitutionality.
223
Ohio state court judges sought an injunction, alleging the expenditure
limits violated their First Amendment rights of free speech.224 Relying on
Buckley v. Valeo,225 the District Court stated that "a statute may constitu-
tionally restrict campaign finances to prevent corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption. 226 The court rejected the argument that judicial elec-
tion is different from legislative election speech because of the unique-
ness of judicial office. 227 The Court upheld the constitutionality of cam-
paign contributions, but enjoined the imposition of the expenditures.228
Suster's ruling is important when trying to draft reform proposals to curb
the negative effects of large campaign expenditures. Unless the court
allows limits on expenditures, expensive elections will continue.
However, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court
in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Committee,229 recently held that coordinated party expenditure lim-
its were not unduly burdensome to political parties and as a result passed
First Amendment constitutional scrutiny.230 The Court relied on the ar-
gument that party expenditures will result in influence and corruption of
candidates.23 The Court reasoned that coordinated party expenditures"perform functions more complex than simply electing candidates... they
219. See OHIO JUDICIAL CODE OF CONDUCT CANON 7(C)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2001).
220. See id. at Canon 7(C)(6)(d) and 7(C)(8). Canon 7(C)(6)(d) limits expenditures for a
candidate for the court of common pleas to $75,000.
221. See id. at Canon 7(4)(a)-(c).
222. See Allbritian, supra note 218, at 1341.
223. See Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1996), aff'd, 1998 FED App. 0228P
(6th Cir.).
224. Suster, 951 F. Supp. at 696.
225. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that campaign expenditures burdened core political speech and
therefore must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
226. See Suster, 951 F. Supp. at 697.
227. See id. at 698-99.
228. See id. at 695.
229. 2001 WL 703912 (June 25, 2001).
230. Federal Election Commission, 2001 WL 703912, at * 10.
231. See id. at*12.
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act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce obli-
gated officeholders." 2 It should be noted that Federal Election Com-
mittee applies to coordinated party expenditures to political candidates
and does not apply to individual candidate expenditures. 23' As a result, in
judicial elections candidates receiving money from political parties will
be affected, but candidates will still be allowed to expend large amounts
of money in elections.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN ELECTION SYSTEMS
In order to adequately satisfy the competing concerns of judicial
accountability and independence there must be reforms in all systems.
Rather than replacing elective systems with appointment or merit sys-
tems, reforms should be instituted that increase voter participation, and
eliminate concerns of judicial corruption.
Elections provide an aspect of judicial accountability and popular
democracy that is absent in lifetime appointment systems. However,
concerns of judicial impropriety and corruption need to be addressed.
Term length, campaign financing, and campaign conduct are three areas
where reforms must be instituted.
To address these concerns and allow for greater independence, judi-
cial terms should be lengthened.3  One recommendation is a minimum
eight-year term for all judges. 21 Longer terms add to the attractiveness of
a judicial position by enhancing job security and decreasing competition
for judicial seats.36 Longer terms also allow a judge to focus more on
applying the law rather than on fundraising and campaign efforts.237 Ad-
ditionally, longer terms will decrease the influence that campaign costs
have on judicial elections. Furthermore, longer terms promote judicial
accountability and aid voter awareness. Voters will better be able to
evaluate a candidate's judicial record and professional behavior.238 How-
239ever, longer terms can also isolate judges from community sentiments.
In order to prevent judicial isolation, terms should be limited to no longer
than 6 to 8 years.
Short terms subject judges to the political pressures of the electorate
or the appointing authority more often. The problem associated with
shorter terms is the need for judges to run more often and increasing the
appearance of impropriety and corruptibility associated with campaign
232, Id.
233. See id. at*17.
234. Report and Recommendation of the American Bar Association, supra note 127 at 4.
235. See id. These minimum terms apply to all judges whether they are elected or appointed.
236. See id. at 5.
237. See id.
238. See id. However, this is dependent on voters having access to disciplinary procedures that
may have been instituted against a judge.
239. See id.
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financing. 2" Additionally, shorter terms discourage qualified candidates
from initially running and promote instability since incumbents will not
run for re-election.24' Electorate participation is thereby promoted.242
Campaign financing concerns also need to be addressed. Another
recommendation for improving the elective system is to provide public
funding for political candidates.2 43 However, there is a debate on the
scope of public funding to political candidates. Some argue that there
should be modest public funding while another view is there should be
complete funding thereby assuring impartiality.24 One method would be
for state legislatures to fund campaigns. 24 The legislature would establish
a fund to be split among all candidates or guarantee a particular dollar
amount per candidate.246 This second alternative would allow a candidate
to better plan campaign expenditures. It would be difficult for a candi-
date to effectively budget in a pool arrangement since the ultimate dollar
amount would vary according to the number of candidates and legislative
expenditures which could not be known before budgeting and spending.
Another reform measure is to provide equal funding among all can-
247didates. However this raises constitutional concerns. The United States
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo248 held that limits on campaign ex-
penditures violated a candidate's First Amendment rights.2 49 A reform
measure that provides for equal funding to all candidates is simply an
expenditure limit in disguise. However, given the Court's Federal Elec-
tion Commission decision, expenditures by a group could be limited and
as a result reduce the perception of influence and corruption produced by
elections.
Rather than limiting expenditures, there should be reasonable limits
on campaign contributions and establishment of mandatory disclosure.
Campaign contribution limits and full disclosure requirements will
eliminate public perception that judicial decisions are being bought and
paid for. Full disclosure will allow the electorate to determine who is
giving what amounts to which judges, and adjust their political philoso-
phy accordingly.
Furthermore, less expensive advertising means must be employed to
210educate the public. One alternative is for candidates to use free voter
240. See id. at 4.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See Phillips, supra note 151, at 135.
244. See id. at 135-136.
245. See Brauer, supra note 60, at 388.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 389-390.
248. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
249. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
250. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 79:1
JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
pamphlets if they agree not to use slate mailers.5 ' Internet access to voter
pamphlets could also provide low cost alternatives. 2
Additionally, eliminating limits on judicial speech during elections
will provide for alternative methods of communication. The elimination
of constraints on judicial speech will serve First Amendment values,
democratic principles, and allow for a more informed body politic. The
United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan.3 stated that
there is "a profound national commitment to a principal that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." Judges should not be im-
mune from criticism simply because reputations may be injured.25 Rather
than limiting speech, the Court recognized that the counter to negative or
damaging speech is to allow more speech. 6 In this context, judges
should be allowed to counter negative campaign rhetoric by engaging in
more speech.
However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld restrictions on
judicial candidate speech determining that the restrictions do not violate
the First Amendment.57 The court reasoned that there is an inherent dif-
ference between the legislative and executive branches and the
judiciary.28 The court determined that in executive and legislative elec-
tions "the public has the right to know the details of the programs that
candidates propose to enact into law and administer. '' 59 However, the
court stated that the judicial system is different as it is "based on the con-
cept of individualized decisions on challenged conduct and interpreta-
tions of law enacted by the other branches of government. '' 60 The court
further reasoned that states may regulate judicial speech because a "judi-
cial candidate simply does not have a First Amendment right to abuse his
office." 26'
The argument that judges may be buying votes by promising to de-
cide a certain way in particular matters is unlikely. First, appellate review
serves as a check on judicial abuse of discretion. Second, the true value
of campaign speech will allow a candidate to counter rhetoric that attacks
a judge's particular decision. A candidate, through the allowing of
greater speech will be able to explain the basis for a particular decision.
251. See Abrams, supra note 131, at 526.
252. See id.
253. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
254. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
255. See id. at 273.
256. See id. at 304.
257. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001).
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Judicial candidates will be able to respond and neutralize single issue
groups attacking and defeating judicial candidates.
Additionally, eliminating restrictions on speech educate the body
politic. 262 Through campaign speeches, candidates can inform the public
as to the functions of a judge and the system.263 Candidates need to be
able to tell the public why an issue is important, resulting in institutional
respect and legitimacy. Finally, in order to create a more informed voting
public, voting guides should be printed and distributed.2 6
Reforming the election system will not address all the concerns with
the perception of impropriety that is inherent in the debate. The lack of
respect for the legal profession lends to the decreased respect for judges.
Popular culture is currently replete with shows about attorneys' and
judges' misconduct. 26 The People's Court, Judge Judy, Judge Mills Lane
to mention a few come into people's homes on a daily basis. As popular
culture, these shows reflect current popular beliefs and attitudes.
These shows may be an individual's only contact with the judicial
system and therefore, the only information that serves as a basis for an
individual's beliefs. In order to gain viewers and increase ratings the
Judges on these shows must create drama and controversy. The judges on
these shows frequently fail to maintain decorum through lecturing the
litigants and refusal to hear all the evidence. This negative perception of
the judicial system is perhaps the most difficult perception to neutralize
when attempting to influence voters and win elections. However, this is
not a failure of the election system but rather a failure of the institution as
a whole to win the people's respect and confidence.2 6
V. CONCLUSION
The tension between judicial accountability and independence is an
ongoing debate that encompasses concerns of a judge's social and politi-
cal role and democratic principles. Furthermore, judges must maintain an
appearance of fairness and impartiality in order to foster respect for the
institution that legitimizes the judiciary in the public's eye. The founding
262. See Harold See, supra note 5 at 141-42.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. Inside the Law Specials on Lawyers and Democracy: The Legal Profession, available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/programs/inside.html (last visited June 27, 2001). One survey
showed that one out of every five Americans have no respect for the legal profession. Id.
266. See 1999-2000 Public Opinion of the Courts Study Final Report, available at
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/docs/public-opinion.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2001). It should be
noted that a survey in Minnesota showed that seventy-eight percent of respondents had either "a
great deal or some confidence in the Minnesota State Courts." Id. While thirteen percent had "only a
little or no confidence at all in the Minnesota State Courts and twelve percent had little or no
confidence in the United States Supreme Court. Id.
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fathers recognized that states had election systems for state judges and
did not suggest that states abandon the established system.
Although campaign costs have increased significantly in recent
years, the solution is not to abandon elections. Instead election systems
must address concerns and make substantive reforms. Campaign contri-
butions must be limited, and candidates need to engage in greater speech
in order to educate the electorate.

THE LAW OF THE SACRED COW: SACRIFICING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT TO DEFEND ABORTION ON DEMAND
CHARLES LuGosI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Frank Easterbrook reminded the legal community that focus-
ing on a single strand of law was "doomed to be shallow" and would
"miss [the] unifying principles" that bring integrity and consistency to
legal doctrine.' His metaphor was the "Law of the Horse," and his con-
cern was about the development of a law unique to cyberspace.2 In this
essay, I have identified a different kind of animal that has escaped its
enclosure and has run amok in the field of constitutional law, depositing
its manure all over First Amendment jurisprudence, leaving it a mess.
What I am referring to is the "sacred cow" of abortion.'
Roe v. Wade4 and its progeny5 has had in the field of constitutional
law the same kind of effect as yeast working its way through a batch of
dough. Ordinarily that might be of no concern, unless we are talking
about unleavened bread fit for Passover. Intellectual integrity has been
sacrificed to defend the "sacred cow" of abortion by claiming the First
Amendment as its latest victim,6 subordinating the constitutional right of
* Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada; LL.M.
University of Pennsylvania, 2001; LL.B. The University of Western Ontario, 1979; Admitted to Bars
of Ontario (1981) and British Columbia (1982); The author dedicates this article in memory of his
beloved mother, Magdalene Lugosi, and her parents, George and Maria Kozma, who chose personal
liberty over communism, and escaped Hungary in 1945 in the hope of finding a new home that
cherished freedom. The author also wishes to acknowledge with thanks Professor Seth Kreimer,
Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania who inspired the writing of this article.
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
207 (1996).
2. Id. at 207-8.
3. This descriptive term is in no way intended to offend any Hindus or to bear any
resemblance to any established religion that in fact worships cows. In this essay, "sacred cow"
means the veneration of the right to an abortion and the elevated status of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), in the hierarchy of values defended emotionally and passionately by members of the
Supreme Court.
4. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Maher v, Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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free speech to the lesser interest or right to be let alone.7 This essay as-
serts that the right to be let alone is not constitutionally equal to the pre-
ferred position of free speech8 and must give way in the contest between
these two values in order to preserve democracy.! The purity of constitu-
tional law has been contaminated by grafting into the tree of life and
liberty the right to be let alone, which does not fit within a democratic
society treasuring the free exchange of ideas based upon the constitu-
tional right that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech . . . ."" It is my contention that the engrafted branch of law
supporting the right to be let alone from other people in the public forum
is unnatural and incompatible with its host, and will one day be rejected,
die, whither and drop off the constitutional tree.
7. Judge Thomas Cooley, in his treatise on the law of torts, used the phrase, "[tihe fight...
to be let alone" in the context of an individual's right to be free from physical trespass. THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888). Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren have generally been credited with
popularizing the phrase, "the right to be let alone," in their article, Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which dealt with the tort liability and
intrusiveness of yellow journalists, who behaved like the modem day paparazzi who chased Princess
Diana to her death. After his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead v.
United States, elevated the right to be let alone to constitutional status. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) Justice Brandeis was deeply troubled
by the use of wiretaps by police to gather evidence against individuals who sought to profit during
Prohibition by importing liquor from British Columbia, Canada. See id. He believed citizens had a
constitutional right to privacy from the prying surveillance techniques of the government, declaring:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life
are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government,
the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts
ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Specifically, Justice Douglas wrote:
The First Amendment is couched in absolute terms -- freedom of speech shall not be
abridged. Speech has therefore a preferred position as contrasted to some other civil
rights. For example, privacy, equally sacred to some, is protected by the Fourth
Amendment only against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is room for
regulation of the ways and means of invading privacy. No such leeway is granted the
invasion of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment."
Id.
9. In this essay, democracy is not defined as simple majority rule, but includes a society
where collective decisions are made by political institutions whose structure, composition and
practices treat all members of the community as individuals, with equal concern and respect.
Essential to this concept of democracy is "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means ... " Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Invoking the right to be let alone has choked the right of the citizen
from engaging in the core value of debating on a personal and intimate
level the moral choice of women whether or not to kill their own unborn
sons and daughters. However, since 1973, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly resorted to a "whatever-it-takes"" approach to stifle the flow of in-
formation to a pregnant woman, whether as part of a legislative scheme
to ensure informed consent,'" or from private citizens, compelled by their
conscience and moral convictions to save the lives of unborn children."P
No legal rule or doctrine has been safe from "ad hoc nullification"'" in
defense of the "sacred cow" of abortion. The most recent example of this
has been the case of Hill v. Colorado.'"
A new form of Iron Curtain called a "bubble zone,"' 6 has invaded
the traditional public forum of city sidewalks, insulating any unwilling
listener from any speaker who might prick another's conscience by say-
ing in ordinary civil conversation that abortion is a moral evil and the
unjust killing of innocent human life. According to Justice Scalia, "There
is apparently no end to the distortion of our First Amendment law that
the Court is willing to endure in order to sustain this restriction upon the
free speech of abortion opponents."'" The suppression of one-to-one con-
versations on the topic of persuading women contemplating abortion that
killing unborn babies is wrong is the core speech made illegal by a Su-
preme Court bent on preserving the "sacred cow" of abortion, even if the
Court's reasoning flies in the face of traditional First Amendment princi-
ples and values.
The right to be let alone is meaningless unless put into context.
There are different species of the right to be let alone.'" In this essay,
11. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 762 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760
(1986). "[T]he State may not require the delivery of information designed 'to influence the woman's
informed choice between abortion or childbirth."' City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380 (1997) (upholding the provisions
of the district court's injunction imposing 15-foot "fixed buffer zones around the doorways,
driveways, and driveway entrances" of abortion facilities); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994) (holding "that the establishment of a 36-foot buffer zone on a public street
from which demonstrators are excluded passes muster under the First Amendment").
14. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision goes further,
and makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this
Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion.");
see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 785 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
15. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
16. Also known as buffer zones. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 361.
17. Hill, 530 U.S. at 753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1434 (1992).
Gormley summarized the types of privacy as follows:
Species #1: The right to be let alone, with respect to the acquisition and dissemination of
information concerning the person, particularly through unauthorized publication,
photography or other media. (Warren & Brandeis's original privacy tort).
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freedom from speech is assumed to be the value cherished by the un-
willing listener. Silence is golden. What the unwilling listener wants to
be free from is hearing moral messages when walking on a public side-
walk on the way into a place where abortions take place.
Since there is a legal right to an abortion, I assume a woman who
plans to exercise this option may feel entitled to a portable zone of per-
sonal autonomy and a sealed conscience that may not be disturbed. Such
an island of tranquility is vital to any woman who is unwilling to venture
into the hurricane of controversy swirling about her decision to abort.
Being in the eye of the hurricane brings only temporary respite, as the
societal issue of abortion is bigger than any one individual, and eventu-
ally engulfs any woman who is contemplating or has undergone an abor-
tion.
Another underlying premise in the right to be let alone is the "me"
generation's freedom to choose to "tune in" or to "tune out."" The desire
to control one's environment from incoming communications requires
the suppression of unwelcome communications that make one feel un-
comfortable or annoyed. The solution is an invisible portable cone of
silence, similar in theory to the silly visible one Secret Agent Maxwell
Smart put over his head to isolate himself in conversations with
"Chief."2°
Another benefit from the right to be let alone is freedom from in-
convenient interruptions of planned activities.' People are in a hurry, and
taking the time to talk is an old fashioned practice from an earlier time
known to the generation of old timers who used to watcti on black and
Species #2: The right to be let alone, with respect to governmental searches and seizures
which invade a sphere of individual solitude deemed reasonable by society. (Fourth
Amendment privacy).
Species #3: The right to be let alone, when one individbal's freedom of speech threatens
to disrupt another citizen's liberty of thought and repose. (First Amendment privacy).
Species #4: The right to be let alone, with respect to fundamental (often unanticipated)
decisions concerning the individual's own person, which are explicitly or implicitly
reserved to the citizen (rather than ceded to the government) by the terms of the social
contract. (Fourteenth Amendment privacy).
Species #5: The right to be let alone, with respect to a variety of private and
governmental intrusions generally overlapping with species number one through number
four above, yet often extending greater protections to the citizen by virtue of independent
state constitutional provisions. (State constitutional privacy).
Id.
19. "Tune in, tune out," were typical attitudes adopted by the Hippies of the 1960's, who
advocated casual promiscuous sex outside of marriage.
20. The name of this comedy TV series was Get Smart (NBC 1965-69, CBS 1969-70).
21. I have "miles to go before I sleep," writes poet Robert Frost. ROBERT FROST, Stopping by
Woods on a Snowy Evening, in SELECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 140, 140 (1963). The last thing
some people want is to be interrupted with a message they do not want to receive.
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white televisions, Andy, Opie, Aunt Bee and Barney - those lovable
characters who inhabited the make-believe Southern town of Mayberry."
I further assume that freedom from ideas that deeply offend fixed
positions on moral and spiritual issues influencing personal choice is yet
another reason why the content of a message disapproving of abortion is
so vigorously resisted.
Fear and insecurity is at the heart of the unwilling listener, whose
hardened resolve to go through with an abortion may melt in response to
a message of love, support and concern from a stranger who has nothing
to gain. The easiest way to overcome vulnerability is to hear only mes-
sages that say what you want to hear, and to block those messages that
you fear will change your mind. When a prominent leader of the abortion
cause like Dr. Bernard Nathanson,23 and a poster-child, like Norma
McCorvey, ' the Jane Roe of Roe v. Wade fame, repent of their pro-
choice actions and beliefs, and become ardent pro-lifers, there is good
reason to fear the "sacred cow" of abortion will soon be slaughtered.
This essay will examine the tension between the law of privacy and
First Amendment jurisprudence. The public forum will be defined. What
Hill decided will be discussed. The question of freedom from speech and
the legal limits to free speech will be examined. I will then discuss the
principles and values at the core of the First Amendment and the essen-
tial role it serves to make democracy function. Next, the impact of Hill
on the First Amendment will be discussed. I will then review the rise of
the right to be let alone in First Amendment jurisprudence. The law es-
tablishing that there is no right to be let alone in the public forum will be
reviewed. The question of protected and unprotected speech, and the
content of those messages, will be discussed. I will then evaluate whether
there is a constitutional right to be let alone. The First Amendment abor-
tion line of cases' will then be evaluated to see if there is indeed a "dis-
tortion" in the constitutional jurisprudence that requires fixing, and what
damage, if any, was done to the First Amendment by those cases. The
22. The Andy Griffith Show (CBS 1960-68), is known for the moral values it imparted to
viewers.
23. Co-founder in 1969 of the organization that became known as the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League (NARRAL), and a physician who personally presided over
60,000 abortions, Dr. Nathanson converted from Judaism to Roman Catholicism. BERNARD
NATHANSON, M.D., THE HAND OF GOD: A JOURNEY FROM DEATH TO LIFE BY THE ABORTION
DOCTOR WHO CHANGED His MIND (1996) (describing his journey from abortion provider to pro-life
advocate).
24. McCorvey, who had been a hard-core supporter of abortion rights, worked at a Dallas
abortion clinic and engaged in personal conversations with Rev. Phillip Benson, leader of the
Operation Rescue office next door to the clinic. Eventually she accepted an invitation to attend
church and was later baptized by Benson. She is now a pro-life activist and has started her own
ministry called "Roe No More." She now prays for pro-choice leaders to repent. Her story is
available at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998roe.wadestoiesroe.profile.
25. See cases cited supra notes 4-5.
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issue of supremacy between privacy and free speech will be then as-
sessed in my conclusion.
I conclude that more free speech is the answer, not less, on the issue
of abortion. I agree with Justices Scalia and Thomas that there is no con-
stitutional principle shielding an unwilling listener from moral or other
messages in the public forum.26 I further agree with Professor Haiman
that the law should not protect the unwilling listener from the initial im-
pact of any kind of communication in the public forum.27 I also conclude
that Roe v. Wade' is bad constitutional law, and must be overruled to
prevent further injury to First Amendment jurisprudence. 29 If the Court
remains faithful to current abortion law precedents, the ripple effect from
cases like Hill will turn into a tidal wave, destroying the free speech
rights of unionists, environmentalists, political activists, conscientious
objectors and evangelists.
The solution is to place the burden of tolerating free speech in the
public forum upon the listener as a reasonable price to pay to live in a
free and democratic society. There are enough civil and criminal sanc-
tions already in the law to deal with zealots who refuse to cease and de-
sist. Creating the law of the "sacred cow" was unnecessary and a huge
mistake. A legal system that worked was already in place. Perpetuating
the law of the "sacred cow" will aggravate the errors of Roe and make a
bad case like Lochner v. New York"5 look good to future law students.
II. THE PUBLIC FORUM
The focus of this discussion is the collision between the constitu-
tional right to freedom of speech and the desire to be left alone in the
26. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 752 (2000).
27. See Franklyn Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To? 67 Nw.
U. L. REV. 153, 193 (1972) (theorizing that "the law should not attempt to insulate any persons in
our society, no matter how willing or unwilling an audience they may be, from the initial impact of
any kind of communication, but that the law should protect their right to escape from a continued
bombardment by that communication if they wish to be free from it."); but see Alan Brownstein,
Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected
Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1163, 1172-73 (1996) (arguing that
speech targeted at the unwilling listener is blatant harassment).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See Thomburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793-94
(1986) (White, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the values animating the Constitution
do not compel recognition of the abortion liberty as fundamental. In so denominating that liberty, the
Court engages not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unrestrained imposition of its own,
extraconstitutional value preferences."); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 787-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(linking the destruction of free speech to the Court's self-serving defense of illegitimate abortion
rights: "Laws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or the morality of the government's
own policy are the essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment guards against ... Absent
the ability to ask the government to intervene, citizens who oppose abortion must seek to convince
their fellow citizens of the moral imperative of their cause ... What the statute restricts is one person
trying to communicate to another, which ought to be the heart of civilized discourse.").
30. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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traditional public forum." The specific public forums discussed in this
essay are public streets and sidewalks. "Streets" were referred to by Jus-
tice Roberts in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization:
32
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privi-
lege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exer-
cised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied."
In Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,' Justice
Marshall included "sidewalks" when he referred to Hague and other
cases in support of the general proposition that "streets, sidewalks, parks,
and other similar public places are so historically associated with the
exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of
exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and ab-
solutely."" It is beyond dispute that a public sidewalk, even in front of
the Supreme Court building itself, is a public forum where any person
has a general First Amendment right to speak.36
I11. WHAT HILL DECIDED
Abortion is unquestionably a public issue debated with vigor and
passion between individuals who hold differing views. It is the classic
exercise of freedom of speech. Communicating thoughts by opening
conversations with strangers on the public sidewalks heading toward
entrances. to abortion clinics has now been outlawed by Hill unless the
intended recipient is willing to listen. Without deciding that there exists
a constitutional right to be free from unpopular speech in a public forum,
Justice Stevens balanced the interests of unwilling listeners against the
constitutional right of free speech, and upheld the legality of an eight-
31. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37. 45-46 (1983)
(identifying three types of public forum: the traditional public forum; the public forum created by
public designation; and the non-public forum).
32. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
33. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 (emphasis added).
34. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
35. Amalgamated Food 391 U.S. at 315.
36. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983).
37. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703. 728 (2000).
20011
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
foot bubble zone." In so doing, he severed personal speech from de-
tached speech.39
As a result, some types of personal conduct, such as the arm's
length handing out of pamphlets, were eliminated. Equally devastating
was the end of personal speech and the loss of meaningful opportunities
for quiet interpersonal conversations that once facilitated the creation of
rapport between the sidewalk counselor (the initiator of the conversa-
tion), and the pregnant mother, the recipient.
What Justice Stevens left intact was detached speech, conducted
outside the bubble zone, in the form of picket signs and bullhorns. De-
tached speech functions well as a demonstration of belief, but it is an
ineffective and counterproductive means of persuading individuals that
abortion is a moral evil for which viable alternatives exist. Shouts of
"baby killer" from outside a bubble zone will only relieve the frustration
of insensitive fanatics, who might otherwise use a gun or bomb against
abortionists. Unfortunately, these remarks only increase the desire of
pregnant women to be left alone from such idiotic (and counterproduc-
tive) behavior.
Predictably, the next legal weapon against anti-abortion demon-
strators will be a law against excessive noise originating outside the pe-
rimeter of a bubble zone. Patients at medical facilities are entitled to
peace and quiet, to alleviate health risks and promote psychological
health.' However, a prior restraint on First Amendment rights, which
attempts to lessen the psychological harm that might be inflicted on an
intended class of persons, may be unlawful, especially where a means of
escaping the anticipated harm is available by notice and location.'
IV. REASONABLE LIMITS TO FREE SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
The Supreme Court has been willing to sanction state and municipal
laws creating reasonable time, place and manner regulations that limit
free speech irrespective of content.2 The Court has prohibited blaring
38. See Hill 530 U.S. at 729-30.
39. See Darrin Alan Hostetler, Face-to-Face with the First Amendment: Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network and the Right to "Approach and Offer" in Abortion Clinic Protests, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 179, 204 (1997) (defining personal and detached speech).
40. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 437 U.S. 483, 509 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)
Hospitals, after all, are not factories or mines or assembly plants. They are hospitals,
where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under
emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets
of the day's activity, and where the patient and his family irrespective of whether that
patient and that family are labor or management oriented -- need a restful, uncluttered,
relaxing, and helpful atmosphere, rather than one remindful of the tensions of the
marketplace in addition to the tensions of the sickbed.
41. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
42. See Erznosnik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
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sound from loudspeakers mounted on trucks roaming city streets at
night,"3 upheld an anti-noise ordinance silencing civil rights demonstra-
tions on a public sidewalk outside a senior high school," and affirmed the
right of the City of New York to control the amplified volume of raucous
rock concerts in Central Park. 5 When the Court in Public Utilities Com-
mission v. Pollak"6 permitted a street railroad company to broadcast mu-
sic and commercials from radio programs, which enhanced the public
transit experience for a majority of its riders, 7 Justice Black drew the line
at the broadcasting of news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of
any kind.48 Justice Douglas delivered a powerful dissent, basing his
opinion on the right to be let alone. He stated:
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in the Fifth
Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include pri-
vacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom. Part of our claim to pri-
vacy is in the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against unreason-
able searches and seizures. It gives the guarantee that a man's home is
his castle beyond invasion either by inquisitive or by officious peo-
ple. A man loses that privacy of course when he goes upon the streets
or enters public places. But even in his activities outside the home he
has immunities from controls bearing on privacy. He may not be
compelled against his will to attend a religious service; he may not be
forced to make an affirmation or observe a ritual that violates his
scruples; he may not be made to accept one religious, political, or
philosophical creed as against another. Freedom of religion and free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than
the privilege to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give
freedom not to do nor to act as the government chooses. The First
Amendment in its respect for the conscience of the individual honors
the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe
what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to
be let alone. If we remembered this lesson taught by the First
Amendment, I do not believe we would construe "liberty" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment as narrowly as the Court does. The
present case involves a form of coercion to make people listen. The
listeners are of course in a public place; they are on streetcars trav-
eling to and from home. In one sense it can be said that those who
ride the streetcars do so voluntarily. Yet in a practical sense they are
forced to ride, since this mode of transportation is today essential for
many thousands. Compulsion which comes from circumstances can
be as real as compulsion which comes from a command. The streetcar
audience is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not
43. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949).
44. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972).
45. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989).
46. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
47. See Pub. Uril. Comm'n, 343 U.S. at 465-66.
48. See id. at 469 (Black, J.. dissenting).
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of choice. One who is in a public vehicle may not of course complain
of the noise of the crowd and the babble of tongues. One who enters
any public place sacrifices some of his privacy. My protest is against
the invasion of his privacy over and beyond the risks of travel. One
who tunes in on an offensive program at home can turn it off or tune
in another station, as he wishes. One who hears disquieting or un-
pleasant programs in public places, such as restaurants, can get up
and leave. But the man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit and
listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen. When we force people
to listen to another's ideas, we give the propagandist a powerful
weapon. Today it is a business enterprise working out a radio pro-
gram under the auspices of government. Tomorrow it may be a domi-
nant political or religious group. Today the purpose is benign; there is
no invidious cast to the programs. But the vice is inherent in the sys-
tem. Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone. Once a man is forced
to submit to one type of radio program, he can be forced to submit to
another. It may be but a short step from a cultural program to a politi-
cal program. If liberty is to flourish, government should never be al-
lowed to force people to listen to any radio program. The right of pri-
vacy should include the right to pick and choose from competing en-
tertainments, competing propaganda, competing political philoso-
phies. If people are let alone in those choices, the right of privacy will
pay dividends in character and integrity. The strength of our system is
in the dignity, the resourcefulness, and the independence of our peo-
ple. Our confidence is in their ability as individuals to make the wis-
est choice. That system cannot flourish if regimentation takes hold.
The right of privacy, today violated, is a powerful deterrent to anyone
who would control men's minds.49
Justice Douglas' ideas of captivity and the right to be let alone have
taken root, and on the surface, lend themselves well to the bubble zone
issue, as pregnant women seeking an abortion may have to travel on a
public sidewalk to enter a clinic and inevitably face the prospect of con-
frontation with shouting pro-lifers exercising their lungs and their con-
stitutional free speech rights. During the height of the Operation Rescue
movement in the early 1990's,' getting into an abortion clinic was the
49. Id. at 467-69 (emphasis added).
50. See http://www.altculture.com.index/aentries/o/operationx.html.
(describing the rise and fall of Operation Rescue):
Antiabortion group that radicalized the pro-life movement of the late '80s and early '90s through
mammoth clinic blockades and rhetoric equating abortion with murder and the Holocaust. Randall
Terry (b. 1959), who founded OR [Operation Rescue] in 1987 while working as a used-car salesman
in upstate New York, is credited with originating anti-abortion civil disobedience and militancy. The
group's protests first came to the country's attention at the 1988 Democratic National Convention in
Atlanta and peaked with the 46-day shutdown of Wichita, Kansas, in 1991. Three years later, OR
was in splinters. In a single month (May 1994), RU-486 was licensed for U.S. production, the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act was signed into law, and a Houston jury ordered OR
members to pay $1 million in punitive damages for a 1992 blockade of a local Planned Parenthood
clinic. The Catholic Church also began to grow wary of the sidewalk counseling, surveillance,
blockade, and harassment tactics taught at the group's Melbourne, Florida, training center. After
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modem day equivalent of running the gauntlet in medieval times. How-
ever, those days are long over, and the faithful few who continue to
maintain lonely vigils outside abortion clinics typically have different
credentials. Leila Hill, the petitioner in Hill, is one of these faithful few.
Ms. Hill, a paralegal and former obstetrics nurse, joined with others to
form a group which provided education about the risks of abortion to
pregnant women.' They called themselves "Sidewalk Counselors For
Life."52 Their behavior was impeccable, leading Justice Stevens to con-
clude that the sidewalk counseling conducted by Leila Hill and her fel-
low petitioners was neither abusive nor confrontational.53
It may be helpful to put Justice Douglas' dissent in Pollak into per-
spective.' Justice Douglas wrote this dissent during the Cold War when
the threat of communism spawned McCarthyism. Americans were wary
of mind control, and movies such as The Manchurian Candidate5 exem-
plified the paranoia of the day. Radio broadcasts from Moscow and from
the Voice of American fought ideological warfare on the short-wave
band. To import Justice Douglas' reasoning now into the abortion debate
takes it out of the context for which it was authored.
Minneapolis was selected by OR in 1993 as one of seven 'cities of refuge,' the archbishop there
explicitly asked OR to stay away. The March 1993 murder of Florida doctor David Gunn led to a
split between those condoning and condemning the violence--Terry left OR for the militia-affiliated
United States Taxpayers Party, while some of the group's most strident leaders formed the American
Coalition of Life Activists, a group that in 1995 published a 'Deadly Dozen' list targeting 12
American abortion doctors for harassment. By the mid-'90s, the internally divided OR had lost
considerable visibility.
51. See Brian W. Oberst, Buffering Free Speech: An Examination of the Impact of Colorado's
Buffer Zone Law on Protected Speech after Hill v. Colorado, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 89, 90 (2000)
(discussing Leila Hill and her "Sidewalk Counselors For Life" group).
52. Id.
53. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 752 (2000).
54. See Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1952).
55. Roger Ebert wrote a glowing review of the movie, giving it the maximum rating of four
stars. Here is part of the review:
Here is a movie that was made in 1962, and it feels as if it were made yesterday. Not a
moment of THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE lacks edge and tension and a cynical
spin-and what's even more surprising is how the film now plays as a political comedy, as
well as a thriller. After being suppressed for a quarter of a century, after becoming an
unseen legend that never turned up on TV or on home video, John Frankenheimer's 1962
,.masterpiece now re-emerges as one of the best and brightest of modem American films.
The story is a matter of many levels, some of them frightening, some pointed with
satirical barbs. In a riveting opening sequence, a group of American combat infantrymen
are shown being brainwashed by a confident Chinese communist hypnotist, who has
them so surely under his control that one man is ordered to strangle one of his buddies
and shoot another in the head, and cheerfully complies. Two members of the group get
our special attention: the characters played by Frank Sinatra and Laurence Harvey.
Harvey seems to be the main target of the Chinese scheme, which is to return him to
American society as a war hero, and then allow him to lead a normal life until he is
triggered by a buried hypnotic suggestion, and turned into an assassin completely
brainwashed to take orders from his enemy controller.
See http://www.sharf.com/jennie/lansbury/manchur/ebert.html.
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Justice Black observed the need for limits to free speech to combat
noisy demonstrations in his opinion in Gregory v. Chicago:6
No mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units
powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boister-
ous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots se-
lected by the people either for homes, wherein they can escape the
hurly-burly of the outside business and political world, or for public
and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their
functions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals.57
The alternative to control, feared Justice Black, was to sow the seeds of
anarchy:
Were the authority of government so trifling as to permit anyone with
a complaint to have the vast power to do anything he pleased, wher-
ever he pleased, and whenever he pleased, our customs and our habits
of conduct, social, political, economic, ethical, and religious, would
all be wiped out, and become no more than relics of a gone but not
forgotten past. Churches would be compelled to welcome into their
buildings invaders who came but to scoff and jeer; streets and high-
ways and public buildings would cease to be available for the pur-
poses for which they were constructed and dedicated whenever dem-
onstrators and picketers wanted to use them for their own purposes.
And perhaps worse than all other changes, homes, the sacred retreat
to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of liv-
ing, would have to have their doors thrown open to all who desired to
convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new way of
life. Men and women who hold public office would be compelled,
simply because they did hold public office, to lose the comforts and
privacy of an unpicketed home. I believe that our Constitution, writ-
ten for the ages, to endure except as changed in the manner it pro-
vides, did not create a government with such monumental weak-
nesses. Speech and press are, of course, to be free, so that public
matters can be discussed with impunity. But picketing and demon-
strating can be regulated like other conduct of men. I believe that the
homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and
the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, marching,
tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the
minds of men, women, and children with fears of the unknown. "
It is a small incremental step to arrest anti-abortionists clamoring
too loudly outside of a bubble zone. For example, in the first six months
after its enactment, Baptist evangelists in Beaufort, South Carolina, were
the only persons prosecuted for violating a local anti-noise ordinance for
56. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
57. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
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raising their voices above the ordinary din of road and sidewalk traffic. 9
Dozens of seminary students have been arrested for the crime of preach-
ing the gospel too loudly with their unaided voices outside the businesses
of local merchants.' The content of the offending speech expressed
moral views against abortion, immorality, homosexuality, and alcohol
abuse.' Such restrictions on sidewalk and street corner preaching are not
isolated events. 2
The right to be let alone from detached speech will thus be easily
accomplished by the application of existing jurisprudence.
All of this may be a pyrrhic victory, now that the availability of the
abortion pill RU-486"3 has potentially changed the location of most abor-
tions from the clinic to the privacy of the home.
The price for all this is has been the evisceration of the First
Amendment. It is worth re-visiting the basic values and principles of
First Amendment jurisprudence just to see how high that price has been.
V. THE VALUES AND PRINCIPLES AT THE CORE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Debate on public issues as a matter of general principle should be
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open."' In public debate, people "must
tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'ade-
quate breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment." The idea is that the "the best test of truth is the power of the
59. See Patrick J. Flynn, Street Preachers Versus Merchants: Will the First Amendment be
Held Captive in the Balance?, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 613, 649 (1995).
60. See id. at 613.
61. See id. at 642.
62. See e.g., Eanes v. State, 569 A.2d 604 (Md. 1992); Marks v. Florida, No. 91-1989 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992); City of Beaufort v. Baker, 432 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1993).
63. The following summary explaining RU-486 was taken from a Canadian web site:
The medication "mifepristone" was invented in France by Dr. Etienne-Emile Baulieu in
1980. It is widely know as "RU-486" throughout North America. The letters are taken
from the initials of the pharmaceutical company Roussel-Uclaf. The "486" is an arbitrary
lab serial number. It was first introduced in France, where it is called Mifegyne. It has
been used, in combination with prostaglandin medication, to induce abortions in about
500,000 women over almost 2 decades.
Danco Laboratories, the U.S., distributor expected to be selling the pill in the U.S. by the
end of 1999. That did not happen. The FDA finally approved the pill for U.S. distribution
on September 28, 2000. It will be distributed under the name "Early Option Pill." In the
U.S. RU-486 is to be taken within 49 days after the start of the last menstrual period. It is
an antiprogestin. It binds itself to progesterone receptors on the wall of the uterus thus
blocking the effect of the woman's natural progesterone. This triggers the shedding of the
uterine wall, much like a normal period. RU-486 also opens the cervix, and causes mild
contractions which help expel the embryo. The initial dose often causes some nausea,
headache, weakness, diarrhea and/or fatigue. It may be taken at home up to the end of the
first seven weeks of pregnancy.
http://www.religioustolerance.org/aboru486.htm.
64. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270(1964).
65. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (citing Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
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thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . ."' Fur-
ther, "[s]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it
is the essence of self-government. '6 7 The Supreme Court has stated,
"[t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment." 8 The Court has also added, "[s]peech does not lose its
protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action." 9 Unpopular views peacefully communicated in
a public forum may not be criminalized. Provided the means of com-
munication are peaceful, the message itself need not meet standards of
public acceptability.71 Democracy requires the personal communication
of diverse ideas without fear of repression and criminal sanctions:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to in-
vite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces
a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
That is why freedom of speech ... is ... protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present dan-
ger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconven-
ience, annoyance, or unrest. . . . There is no room under our Constitu-
tion for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups.2
A total ban on conversational speech on a public sidewalk within a
bubble zone on the perimeter of an abortion clinic is outright unconstitu-
tional censorship discriminating against opponents of abortion.7 3 This
kind of suppression is not just a facial violation of the First Amendment;
it cuts out the core of what it means to be an American. Justices Brandeis
and Holmes, concurring in Whitney v. California,7 ' believed that free
speech was the foundation of liberty:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
66. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
67. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
68. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940).
69. NAACP v. Clairbome Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
70. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963).
71. See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
72. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4-5 (1949).
73. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J. concurring) (stating that picking
and choosing which views may be discussed in a public forum is "censorship of the most odious
form.").
74. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
[Vol. 79:1
THE LAW OF THE SACRED COW
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed lib-
erty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of lib-
erty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of po-
litical truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate pro-
tection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a po-
litical duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. They recognized the risks to which all human
institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds re-
pression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable gov-
ernment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fit-
ting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law -- the argument of force in its worst form. Recogniz-
ing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended
the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaran-
teed. "
Suppression of freedom of speech inevitably sets off a chain reac-
tion of events that culminates in growing social unrest until violence
erupts. Sidewalk counselors view their moral imperative as a mission to
expose the fallacies and falsehoods of abortion and to overcome its evil
by education and compassion through intimate personal conversation.
More speech is the answer, not enforced silence. Laws that silence the
voices of quiet conversationalists is evidence of the cowardice of those
who fear judicial reversal of Roe and the influence of the sidewalk coun-
selors. Repression of sidewalk counselors can never be justified in a truly
democratic society:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.
They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost
of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of
popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed
clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discus-
sion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emer-
gency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to
75. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
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be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of
the Constitution.76
Whether or not bubble zone laws purport to be neutral, in reality
these laws impact only pro-life advocates. The net result is that judges
and governments control what ideas can be publicly debated, where,
when, how, and by what means. This practice offends not only the First
Amendment, but the Fourteenth as well:
... under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing
to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not
select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facili-
ties. There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and govern-
ment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups,
government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on
the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a pub-
lic forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified
by reference to content alone. "
Bubble zone laws, created by judicial injunction or by legislative
ordinance are the latest tools to take away the constitutional right of a
person to approach another in the public forum and offer an idea that
may or may not be welcomed. This is an attack on democracy itself:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the
end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and
that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essen-
tial to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system. "
VI. IMPACT OF HILL ON ESTABLISHED FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND
FREEDOMS
If Hill was correctly decided, then Martin v. Struthers79 is in grave
jeopardy. In Martin, the Supreme Court weighed the competing interests
between members of the Jehovah Witnesses' faith who exercised their
faith by residential door-to-door canvassing, and the privacy rights of the
occupants of residential dwellings to be left alone from the nuisance of
the moral message.
The relevance of Martin is immediately apparent. It is trite to say
that until the door was opened to the visitor, it was generally impossible
to know in advance whether the offer to engage in conversation about
76. Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
77. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (emphasis added).
78. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
79. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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religion would result in a willing listener, who might accept a leaflet or
an invitation to attend church. This situation is no different in principle
from the dilemma faced by the sidewalk counselor, who has no idea how
to identify a willing listener, without first risking a violation of a bubble
zone law which prohibits the approach of an offer to talk to an unwilling
listener.
In Martin, a divided Court struck down the municipal ordinance that
protected residents from religious proselytizing. Justice Frankfurter dis-
sented, recognizing that homes are sanctuaries from intrusions upon pri-
vacy and a place of rest from the stress of modem urban life." Justices
Roberts and Jackson joined Justice Reed in his dissent. He stated:
No ideas are being suppressed. No censorship is involved. The free-
dom to teach or preach by word or book is unabridged, save only the
right to call a householder to the door of his house to receive the
summoner's message. I cannot expand this regulation to a violation of
the First Amendment.'
This argument is hauntingly familiar to that of the majority in Hill.
Justice Reed further suggested that the mere passage of time can
result in the loss of a constitutional freedom that has fallen into disuse:
The antiquity and prevalence of colportage are relied on to support
the Court's decision. But the practice has persisted because the
householder was acquiescent. It can hardly be thought, however, that
long indulgence of a practice which many or all citizens have wel-
comed or tolerated creates a constitutional right to its continuance.
Changing conditions have begotten modification by law of many
practices once deemed a part of the individual's liberty.82
Assuming that the householder no longer was acquiescent to col-
portage, Justice Reed thought it was appropriate for the municipality to
regulate its practice.
Of significance is a line in the dissent that refutes any attempt by
Justice Stevens in Hill to characterize the unwilling recipient of commu-
nication as a "captive audience." Justice Reed wrote, "[t]he First
Amendment does not compel a pedestrian to pause on the street to listen
to the argument supporting another's views of religion or politics."83 In
other words, the pregnant woman who is unwilling to listen can simply
walk away. It's as simple as that. The burden is light on the unwilling
listener, who in Martin, had only to shut the door or refuse to open it, and
the pedestrian in Hill, who could just keep on walking without a response
and be in the clinic in a matter of seconds.
80. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 152-53.
81. Id. at 154-55.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 157.
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What Martin represents is that freedom and democracy demands
nothing less than the right to exercise freedom of speech and the free
exercise of religion. In a collision between the notion that a man's home
is his castle, and religious freedom, there must be an accommodation of
both privacy and freedom of speech."' A blanket law forbidding all at-
tempts to initiate a conversation will affect both the willing and the un-
willing listener. It is not for the Court or for the legislature or city hall to
decide this issue on a uniform basis. It is the province of the person who
receives the invitation to converse to decide for himself or herself
whether or not to be a willing listener. In Martin, Justice Black framed
the issue in the same manner:
We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing the
conflicting interests of the appellant in the civil rights she claims, as
well as the right of the individual householder to determine whether
he is willing to receive her message, against the interest of the com-
munity which by this ordinance offers to protect the interests of all of
its citizens, whether particular citizens want that protection or not.
The ordinance does not control anything but the distribution of lit-
erature, and in that respect it substitutes the judgment of the commu-
nity for the judgment of the individual householder. It submits the
distributer to criminal punishment for annoying the person on whom
he calls, even though the recipient of the literature distributed is in
fact glad to receive it. 5
The First Amendment is rooted in the dissemination of ideas. Tak-
ing away the choice of the potential listener by silencing the potential
speaker is the aborting of free speech. A free society cannot tolerate a
bubble zone muzzling conversations, just as it would not take away the
right of homeowners in Martin of their responsibility to think for them-
selves and to make their own decision to communicate with the visitor at
their door." The Martin Court stated:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he de-
sires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free soci-
ety that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time
and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. The dangers of
distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods,
leaving to each householder the full right to decide whether he will
receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can serve no
purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked restriction
of the dissemination of ideas.'7
84. See id. at 150.
85. See id. at 143-44 (emphasis added).
86. See id. at 146-47.
87. Id.
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In the aftermath of Hill, an inevitable challenge will be mounted at
some point to reverse Martin. When that happens, there will be a great
outcry from angry civil libertarians who will regret the judgment in Hill.
The future validity of Marsh v. Alabama88 is also in doubt. In Hill,
the Court used property law zoning as a model to create a bubble zone in
a public forum, in essence forbidding trespassing into a zoned territory to
offer a moral message. A property rights approach89 not only elevates an
abortion clinic, a commercial business, to the status of a private resi-
dence, it intrudes into the public forum. An apt comparison is the com-
pany town that was the subject of First Amendment litigation in Marsh
by a member of the Jehovah Witnesses, who was convicted of distribut-
ing religious literature without company permission on the public side-
walk near the post office.' When a legal permit to distribute religious
literature had been sought earlier, the company rejected the request.9'
Justice Black's view of freedom prevailed, reversing the conviction.
The right to freedom of religion outweighed the property rights at issue.92
To be good citizens, people needed to be informed. To be properly in-
formed, the information must be uncensored.9
The analogy to sidewalk counseling is obvious. The choice to abort
requires full and informed consent. Censorship of views against abortion
eliminate the possibility of making a fully informed decision. Abortion
clinic owners are hostile to the message of pro-life supporters, and it
would be bad for business to allow clients of a clinic to receive this mes-
sage prior to an abortion. The absence of pro-life counselors invited in-
side abortion clinics for the purpose of dissuading pregnant mothers from
having an abortion makes the point.
In his dissent in Marsh, Justice Reed suggested the proper course
was to remove the speaker off the sidewalk freely used by the public,
which was on company "property" and onto the public highway," which
was 30 feet away95 from the contested location. The effect of this form of
a "bubble zone" is to prohibit a close encounter with anyone entering or
exiting the post office. The parallel with Justice Souter's reasoning in
Hill is remarkable.96
The Court's historical defense of the communication of moral mes-
sages on public sidewalks was a result of the First Amendment being
88. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
89. See Mark Cordes, Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1997);
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood. 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
90. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
91. See id. at 503.
92. See id. at 509.
93. See id. at 508.
94. Id. at 517.
95. Id. at 514.
96. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 738-40 (2000).
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regarded as a preferred constitutional right. Religious freedom and free
speech were presumed to have a superior position over privacy, which at
that time was not granted the present constitutional status it now enjoys.
VII. THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
Things began to change in a series of First Amendment cases in
which the Court ruled against door-to-door magazine salesmen,97 the ad-
vertisement of tobacco products,98 the advertisement of election cam-
paign propaganda on a public transit system," the broadcasting of a vul-
gar social satire on commercial radio,"'" the delivery to private homes of
junk mail tending to corrupt public morals,'"' the curtailment of the ac-
tions of members of a religious cult which aggressively solicited money
and converts at limited public forums,' 2 and a state fair."' This line of
cases is distinguishable from Martin and Marsh, insofar as these other
cases did not involve the communication of a moral message in a tradi-
tional public forum.
In Rowan v. United States Post Office,"'4 the right of every person to
be let alone from unwanted mail was placed on the scales with the right
of others to communicate."' Every advertiser had the opportunity to
communicate once with a homeowner, but thereafter the recipient could
ask the Post Office to block further unwanted communications."'6 The
Court upheld this freedom to be let alone, holding that "no one has a
right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient.""'7 A person
was permitted to erect a wall on the outer boundary of his residential
domain so that no repeat advertiser might further penetrate without the
prior consent of the intended recipient.'"'
In Frisby v. Schultz,"'° the home of an abortion provider was given
protection from anti-abortion demonstrators."' To Justice O'Connor, the
97. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
98. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). Justice Brandeis did his best to use his
position on the Supreme Court to push his concept of the right to be let alone. In 1932, a Utah statute
banning tobacco ads from billboards throughout the state was upheld as a legitimate limitation on
commercial free speech. The unwilling observer, claimed Brandeis, was unable to avert his eyes
from unwelcome ads on public signs, which, unlike a radio, could not be turned off. See id.
99. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
100. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
101. See Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
102. See Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Board of Airport
Comm'rs. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
103. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
104. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
105. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
106. See id. at 729.
107. Id. at 738.
108. See id.
109. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
110. See Frisby, 487 U.S. 474.
[Vol. 79:1
THE LAW OF THE SACRED COW
home was a refuge from intrusive offensive speech."' The privacy of the
unwilling residential listener who was trapped or was hiding in his or her
home prevailed over the constitutional free speech rights of demonstra-
tors on the public sidewalks and streets in front of private residences."
2
Justice Brennan dissented in Frisby, noting that as long as the speech
remained outside the home and did not unduly coerce the occupant, the
government's interest in protecting residential privacy was not impli-
cated."3
VIII. No RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
Going outside the home was another matter, for then the individual
was subject to whatever assaulted his or her senses. "[W]e are often
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech and other sound ... .""' In a free society, "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric.""' 5 Where a political message is communicated, even its
vulgar character is to be tolerated as the price for living in a free
society.' 6 Justice Harlan held:
While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in
many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of
unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the
public dialogue. The ability of government, consonant with the Con-
stitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it
is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any
broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority
to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections. In
this regard, persons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emissions
of sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those in the Los An-
geles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. "'
Anticipating criticism of his opinion, Justice Harlan added:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often ap-
pear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance.
These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side
effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open de-
111. See id. at 484-85.
112. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980).
113. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 492-93 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
114. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
115. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
116. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (discussing that Paul Cohen's jacket displayed the words, "Fuck
the Draft," to express his feelings about conscription and the Vietnam War. While he wore the
garment in the presence of the public in the corridor outside a courtroom, he respectfully removed it
during the time he sat in the courtroom).
117. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
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bate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with
verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of
strength. We cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise
might seem a trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful
abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly im-
plicated."8
The constitutional principle at the root of not just Paul Cohen's
freedom of speech, but of our freedom of speech, was the right to be let
alone from government control so that democracy could function as it
was intended. There was no alternative if we hoped to live in a free soci-
ety:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ulti-
mately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise
of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests."9
The right to be let alone, assuming it exists, is from the reach of
government, not the reach of our fellow citizens who desire to impart an
idea for us to consider and debate. We are not to fear new ideas that may
actually benefit us, but fear the evil of government censorship that sup-
presses independent thought in favor of conformity to the party line.
In venturing outside the home onto a city sidewalk, the burden is on
the unwilling viewer to avert his or her eyes, to say "no" and refuse the
offering of unwanted handbills and leaflets, or to physically remove him-
self or herself from the earshot of unwelcome verbal messages.'"
Until Hill v. Colorado,'2 ' the leading case on the tension between the
First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy rights of the un-
willing recipient who wished to be let alone, was generally thought to be
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville.12 An "R" rated movie, the "Class of '74," was
shown at a drive-in theater, where scenes of female nudity were exposed
to any member of the public who might chance or desire to catch a scene
of the movie from adjacent property which included two public streets
and a church parking lot.' 3 This resulted in a prosecution under a mu-
nicipal ordinance prohibiting a drive-in theater from showing a movie
118. Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
120. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, RALPH S. TYLER, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 948
(2d ed. 1988).
121. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
122. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
123. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 207.
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with scenes of nudity that was visible from a public place or street." The
underlying assumption behind the ordinance was the right of people to be
let alone in the public forum." Churchgoers might be offended by be-
coming unwilling viewers of an "R" rated movie. It was solely the con-
tent of the movie's message that triggered prosecution under the law.' 26 In
striking down the ordinance, the Supreme Court concluded "the limited
privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this cen-
sorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.'1 '" The
burden was on the unwilling viewer to avert his or her eyes.' 28 It was still
open to a municipality to enact reasonable time, place and manner regu-
lations applicable to all speech regardless of content.'29 In a pluralistic
society, outside of the home, people will encounter politically and mor-
ally offensive forms of free speech.'3" This results in inescapable captivity
in many circumstances. 3' It is the First Amendment that gives priority to
the speaker, leaving the recipient of the communication with the choice
to respond. "The Constitution does not permit [the] government to decide
which types of otherwise protected speech is sufficiently offensive to
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer."'32 The Court was
careful to note there was no issue about the privacy of persons in their
homes who needed protection from visual or audible intrusions from
movies shown at drive-in theaters.'
3
1
IX. CONTENT OF THE MESSAGE: PROTECTED OR UNPROTECTED?
The distinction between protected and unprotected speech is im-
portant to understand. Those who support the Hill decision of silencing
sidewalk counselors applaud the banning of what they consider unpro-
tected speech. Their argument is that sidewalk counselors fall outside of
First Amendment protection because they utter "fighting words,"'"4 pro-
voke violence'35 or make defamatory statements,'36 such as labeling those
who are a party to abortions as "murderers," resulting in psychological
124. See id. at 206.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 212.
127. Id.
128. Seeid. at210-11.





134. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942). See Laurence J. Eisenstein
& Steven Semeraro, Abortion Clinic Protest and the First Amendment, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 221, 233 (1993); Amber M. Pang, Speech, Conduct, and Regulation of Abortion Protest by
Court Injunction: From Madsen v. Women's Health Center to Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 34
GONZ. L. REv. 201, 226 (1998). The first article was a product of the co-authors' work representing
various organizations and abortion clinics in lawsuits against Operation Rescue.
135. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
136. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-57 (1952).
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trauma to pregnant mothers who are about to fatally harm their fetuses.'"
Pamphlets containing photos of dismembered fetuses and/or normal fe-
tuses handed out to pregnant mothers are no doubt considered obscene'38
and emotionally upsetting by some recipients. The Constitution permits
restrictions on the content of speech that is "of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."" 9 There is, as a
result, a class of speech that can be regulated because of its "constitu-
tionally proscribable content."'" Yet, even vulgar words may be pro-
tected speech when the words have mixed characteristics, for example,
where the form of the message is offensive but the content has social
value, however slight."
"The First Amendment imposes ... a 'content discrimination' limi-
tation upon [the government's] prohibition of proscribable speech."'42
"The government may not regulate [free speech] based on hostility--or
favoritism--toward the underlying message expressed.""' Content-based
restrictions presumptively violate the First Amendment and courts will
not find them constitutionally valid unless the restrictions meet the strict
scrutiny test.'" This means that in a public forum, any restrictions on free
speech must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ...
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'45 Otherwise, the government may
"effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'"
Let us assume that outside the home, an individual might encounter
on the public sidewalk another person who may approach and hand out
religious or anti-abortion literature. If done within a bubble zone without
prior consent, this would be a crime. This is the effect of Hill.'7 Yet in
Lovell v. City of Griffin,'45 the Supreme Court invalidated a municipal
ordinance requiring prior permission to hand out literature.' 9 The Court
declared street literature in the form of pamphlets and leaflets handed out
137. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 710 nn.7 & 8 (2000).
138. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech). Unlike obscenity, indecency merits First Amendment
protection. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
139. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
140. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (alteration in original).
141. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
142. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387.
143. Id. at 386.
144. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
145. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citation
omitted).
146. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
147. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000).
148. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
149. See Lovell, 303 U.S. at 449.
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by activists constituted "historic weapons in the defense of liberty."'" In
Schneider v. New Jersey,'5' the Court affirmed that while the intended
recipient had a right to refuse the offered literature, the person offering
the literature had a constitutional right to tender it.'52 The Court rejected
the argument people had a right to be let alone on a public street based
on the rationale that the person seeking to communicate an idea could
just go elsewhere.' 3
In the abortion context, the last clear chance to persuade a pregnant
mother not to have a planned abortion is on the sidewalk leading to the
doors of the abortion clinic. So why did the Court in Hill go against its
own First Amendment values and principles, and ban an entire category
of free speech, namely the peaceful and respectful handing out of litera-
ture and conversational speech within eight feet of another person on a
public sidewalk without the prior consent of the intended recipient? Is it
a question of the content of the message? Has the Court created an ex-
ception to the communication of a moral message about a moral choice?
X. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To BE LET ALONE?
To understand the answers to these questions, it is necessary to ap-
preciate the judicial reasoning that led to the elevation of privacy to con-
stitutional status in Griswold v. Connecticut." In the private sanctity of
the bedroom, people found it repulsive that the government could police
the use of the birth control pill.' It was the decade of the 1960s-the
height of the sexual revolution-when, unlike any prior time in Ameri-
can history, the birth control pill invited sexual promiscuity without the
responsibility of parenthood.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold, elevated sex-
ual privacy between married heterosexual couples to constitutional
status, without anchoring privacy to any one particular enumerated con-
stitutional right.'56 He cited academic literature' 7 and case law... to sup-
150. Id. at452.
151. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
152. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162.
153. See id. at 163.
154. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. It is now known that the birth control pill causes chemically induced abortions. See
RANDY ALCORN, DOES THE BIRTH CONTROL PILL CAUSE ABORTIONS? 13 (5th ed. 2000), at
http://www.epm.org/bcp.html.
156. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
157. E.g., William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup. CT. REV. 212 (1963) (discussing the meaning and scope of the right to privacy); Erwin N.
Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 216 (1960) (arguing that the "right to be let
alone," while not explicitly stated in the Constitution, is the underlying theme of the Bill of Rights).
158. E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (the Constitution applies to
invasions of the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment creates a right to privacy that is of equal importance as
compared with all other basic rights in a free society).
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port his theory that privacy was a constitutional right.'59 To get around the
lack of specific text to anchor the constitutional right of privacy, he used
the word picture of a "penumbra""' to stretch the scope of the Constitu-
tion to include on its fringe the right to privacy: "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance."16'
In developing his position, Justice Douglas referred to NAACP v.
Alabama.2 as authority for the idea that freedom of association was a
constitutional right contained within the First Amendment, even if the
text did not make this right apparent. ' He stated, "the First Amendment
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intru-
sion.""' It is worth noting that Justice Douglas limited the right to pri-
vacy under the First Amendment to protection from the government and
not from the private individual."' Justice Douglas made this perfectly
clear in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,"' by explaining that his dissent in
Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia"7 arose out
of his opposition to government-sponsored radio programs."' The sig-
nificance of this was not lost on Justice Scalia in his Hill dissent when he
emphasized that the "right to be let alone," assuming it existed, was
159. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
160. The definition of "penumbra" includes: "a shadow cast (as in an eclipse) where the light is
partially but not wholly cut off by the intervening body" and "a surrounding or adjoining region in
which something exists in a lesser degree." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY
1673 (1986). Critics of this new constitutional right of privacy, upon which was founded the
constitutional right to an abortion, claimed it was created "out of nothing." Justices White and
Rehnquist, dissenting in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 785 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
might well have viewed the Justice Douglas' "Penumbra" as the "Twilight Zone:"
There is a fifth dimension beyond that which is known to man. It is a dimension as vast
as space and as timeless as infinity. It is the middle ground between light and shadow,
between science and superstition, and it lies between the pit of man's fears, and the
summit of his knowledge. This is the dimension of imagination. It is an area which we
call... THE TWILIGHT ZONE.
Rod Serling, http://www.scifi.comtwizone/twilite2.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2001).
161. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
162. 357 U.S. 449 (1964).
163. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
164. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 485.
166. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
167. 343 U.S. 451,467-69 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
168. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 517. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Pollak, defined "liberty," within
the purview of the Fifth Amendment, to include the right of "privacy," a right he thought was
infringed because a member of a "captive audience" was forced to listen to a government-sponsored
radio program. See Pollak, 343 U.S. at 467-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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"conferred, as against the government":" "it is the right of the speaker in
the public forum to be free from government interference."'7
Justice Douglas concluded that penumbras surrounding the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments impliedly created constitu-
tionally guaranteed zones of privacy as against the government.'7 ' In his
earlier dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Douglas sought to graft the right
to privacy onto the branch of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment,'" but
did not pursue that idea in Griswold.'73
Earlier cases involving "privacy and repose" lent legitimacy to the
recognition of a constitutional right to privacy. '74 However, the cases
cited by Justice Douglas all dealt with protecting the individual's right to
be let alone from the government, the solitary exception being Breard v.
City of Alexandria."' In Breard, the Court approved the municipal gov-
ernment's regulation of commercial speech at private residences.'7" Not
one of the cases cited by Justice Douglas in Griswold stood for the
proposition that, as between citizens in the public forum, there existed a
right to be let alone. The constitutional elevation of the right to be let
alone must, therefore, be restricted solely to freedom from government
and arguably also to freedom from commercial peddlers calling at one's
private residence.
The concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg agreed that marital pri-
vacy concerning the use of contraceptives was beyond the reach of gov-
ernment. 7 He rested his argument primarily upon the Ninth Amendment:
"In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view
that the 'liberty' protected by the Fifth [a]nd Fourteenth Amendments
from infringement by the Federal Government or the States is not re-
stricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments."'7 8
Again, the right to be let alone applied against the government. Con-
cluding "the right of privacy is a fundamental personal right,"''7 9 Justice
169. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 751 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
170. Hill, 530 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
171. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
172. See Poe, 367 U.S. at 515-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
173. Justice Harlan's concurrence set forth the view that Connecticut's law violated the
"ordered liberty" guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Justice White also would
have relied on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
174. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
175. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
176. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 644-45.
177. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
178. Id. at493.
179. Id. at 494.
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Goldberg cited with approval this passage from Justice Brandeis' dissent
in Olmstead v. United States'8°:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth A]mendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and sat-
isfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. 8'
None of the Justices in the Griswold majority appeared to contem-
plate a constitutional right to be let alone from fellow citizens in the
public forum. Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented in
Griswold.'82 They argued that no constitutional right to privacy existed
and that the use of the word "privacy" had the potential to both expand
and dilute constitutional freedoms:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though
there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any
law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individu-
als. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain spe-
cific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect
privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities.
Such, for example, is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "un-
reasonable searches and seizures." But I think it belittles that
Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but "pri-
vacy." To treat it that way is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not
the kind of liberal reading I think any Bill of Rights provision should
be given. The average man would very likely not have his feelings
soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by hav-
ing it seized privately and by stealth. He simply wants his property
left alone. And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated,
annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a police-
man as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home.
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of
a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible
and more or less restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the
use of the term "right of privacy" as a comprehensive substitute for the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches and sei-
180. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
181. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
182. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
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zures." "Privacy" is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can
easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the other hand,
easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things other
than searches and seizures. I have expressed the view many times that
First Amendment freedoms, for example, have suffered from a failure of
the courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in con-
struing it, instead of invoking multitudes of words substituted for those
the Framers used.'85
In a footnote, Justice Black observed the Court had no jurisdiction
to elevate the right of privacy to constitutional status:
Observing that "the right of privacy .. presses for recognition here,"
today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a
court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which
Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the
level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from
passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with "privacy.
' '
14
Justice Black warned of the potential adverse consequences of
shifting power to the judiciary implicit in the elevation of the right to be
let alone to constitutional status:
I repeat so as not to be misunderstood that this Court does have
power, which it should exercise, to hold laws unconstitutional where
they are forbidden by the Federal Constitution. My point is that there
is no provision of the Constitution which either expressly or im-
pliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over
acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws be-
cause of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are un-
reasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption of
such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws uncon-
stitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great uncon-
stitutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am con-
strained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country.
Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unre-
strainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments
would, I fear, jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that
the Framers set up and at the same time threaten to take away much
of the power of States to govern themselves which the Constitution
plainly intended them to have.'85
Substantive due process loomed once again on the horizon, and Jus-
tice Black pleaded in vain with his colleagues on the Court to let the
183. Id. at 508-09 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
184. Id. at 510 n.1 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting majority opinion, id. at
485). See generally David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of
Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (1991) (discussing the origin and evolution of the right to
privacy).
185. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
2001]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1
Lochner doctrine' 6 sleep forever in peace. 7 The Court's own subjective
viewpoint and personal predilections concerning personal rights affecting
privacy were "no less dangerous" than earlier reasoning by the Lochner
Court about economic theories.'
Eisenstadt v. Baird"9 represented a turning point in the evolution of
the constitutional right to personal privacy. Justice Brennan constitution-
alized individual autonomy pertaining to reproductive freedom when he
extended the constitutional elevation of marital privacy in Griswold to
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried sexual partners in Eisen-
stadt.9 ° He wrote, "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.".'9' The significance of this pas-
sage is that it extended privacy from its confines of the marital bedroom
to fundamental, decisional, personal reproductive autonomy outside the
vows of marriage and the privacy of one's own home.' 2
Justice Brennan rested his opinion on previous opinions of the Court
establishing the fundamental principle that the government may not in-
trude into an individual's privacy except in very limited circumstances. '
186 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
187. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522-23 (Black, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
189. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
190. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54,
191. Id. at 453.
192. See Nan Hunter et al., Contemporary Challenges to Privacy Rights, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 195, 212 (1999).
193. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54. Brennan likely found the following excerpts from the
referenced previous opinions to be the most helpful:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the fight to receive information
and ideas.. . . This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth, is fundamental to our free society. . . . [I]n the privacy of a person's own home--
that right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy ...
V ..Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (Marshall, J.) (citations omitted).
"There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct
biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers
of a minority--even those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes."
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching [sic] and devastating
effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom
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As in Griswold, the majority did not attempt to establish a right to be let
alone from fellow citizens in the public forum.
Griswold inevitably linked the constitutional right to bear or beget
children to the constitutional decision of whether or not to terminate the
life of one's own unborn child through abortion.'' This set the stage for
Roe v. Wade,'95 which followed a year later.
Writing for the majority in Roe, Justice Blackmun concluded, "the
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but ... this right
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state inter-
ests in regulation."'" The Court candidly acknowledged, "[t]he Constitu-
tion does not explicitly mention any right of privacy."'97 Citing a line of
authority to justify creating a constitutional right of privacy from the
government,'98 the Roe Court included Katz v. United States,'99 which
explicitly rejected a general constitutional right to be let alone from other
people:
The petitioner had phrased those questions as follows:
Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area
so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening record-
ing device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the
right to privacy of the user of the booth.
Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is
necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place
the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily
the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He
is forever deprived of a basic liberty.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (Douglas, J.).
There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his
own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of any
free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of
that will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of
conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty
may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be
enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. An
American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage,
there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although apparently free from
disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on
board of such vessel or in a quarantine station, until it be ascertained by inspection,
conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the
community at large has disappeared.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (Harlan, J.).
194. See Hunter, supra note 192 at 212-14.
195. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
196. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
197. Id. at 152.
198. Id.
199. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected
area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a
general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with pri-
vacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal pri-
vacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection
of a person's general right to privacy--his right to be let alone by
other people--is, like the protection of his property and of his very
life, left largely to the law of the individual States."
Similarly, the First Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional right to be let alone from the free speech of other people.
Constitutionally protected areas, like bubble zones, have no place in
protecting individual privacy from governmental intrusions, as their
function has nothing to do with preventing the intrusion of the govern-
ment but with silencing the free speech rights of other people. Just as
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"'" so must the First
Amendment protect people who exercise freedom of speech, and not the
place (whether bubble zone or not) where that speech is tendered.
Justice Blackmun felt that the "concept of personal liberty and re-
strictions upon state action" in the Fourteenth Amendment served as the
constitutional home of a pregnant mother's right to decide "whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy."' The right to be let alone from gov-
ernment had now been reconstituted as a "new form of privacy" termed
"liberty of choice.""°
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist concluded there existed a limited right
of privacy to be free from government intrusion, that Roe marked a re-
turn to substantive due process and a revival of Lochner, and that no con-
stitutional right to personal privacy existed in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
If the Court means by the term "privacy" no more than that the claim
of a person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual
transactions may be a form of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no doubt that similar claims have been upheld in
our earlier decisions on the basis of that liberty....
While the Court's opinion quotes from the dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lochner v. New York, the result it reaches is more closely
attuned to the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case. As
in Lochner and similar cases applying substantive due process standards
to economic and social welfare legislation, the adoption of the compel-
200. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted).
201. Id.at 351.
202. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
203. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1395-96.
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ling state interest standard will inevitably require this Court to examine
the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies in the
very process of deciding whether a particular state interest put forward
may or may not be "compelling." The decision here to break pregnancy
into three distinct terms and to outline the permissible restrictions the
State may impose in each one, for example, partakes more of judicial
legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment. To reach its result, the Court necessarily has
had to find within the Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that
was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment.'
In Doe v. Bolton,'° the companion case to Roe, Justice White also
strongly opposed the newly minted constitutional right to an abortion,
finding "nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support
the Court's judgment.' 2 Prominent scholars, including John Hart Ely,
soon chastised the Court for its decision in Roe."5'
Freedom of choice to terminate a pregnancy soon became en-
trenched in American feminist culture as intrinsic to a woman's individ-
ual dignity and personal autonomy." The Supreme Court struck down
various legislative attempts by different states to confine, restrict, or cre-
ate an informed choice.' The law endowed a woman with the choice of
abortion on demand, and the government had no power to influence that
choice by raising "moral and spiritual questions."2'
Chief Justice Burger, who had earlier concurred in Roe and Doe,
expressed in Thornburgh his sense of betrayal and astonishment in ad-
204. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-74 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
205. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
206. Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-28 (Yale University
Press, Ltd. 1975) (questioning the Roe Court's justification for imposing its own model statute
regulating abortion); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 947-49 (1973) (concluding Roe is "bad constitutional law" because it is not connected to
"any value the Constitution marks as special"); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 311 (1973)
(concluding the Roe Court exceeded its legitimate authority by going beyond the bounds of
"conventional morality").
208. See, e.g., the web site for the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League at
http://www.naral.orgLabout/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001) ("a right to privacy includes
having access to safe and legal abortion, effective contraceptive options, and quality reproductive
health care").
209. "The States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to
intimidate women into continuing pregnancies." Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 443-44 (1983) (arguing that State statutes cannot go beyond permissible limits to ensure
informed consent because the information works not to inform the patient but to persuade her to
forego the procedure).
210. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 771-72.
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mitting the concerns predicted by the dissenters in Roe and Doe had been
right all along:
Yet today the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say that the State
may not even require that a woman contemplating an abortion be
provided with accurate medical information concerning the risks in-
herent in the medical procedure which she is about to undergo and the
availability of state-funded alternatives if she elects not to run those
risks. Can anyone doubt that the State could impose a similar re-
quirement with respect to other medical procedures? Can anyone
doubt that doctors routinely give similar information concerning risks
in countless procedures having far less impact on life and health, both
physical and emotional than an abortion, and risk a malpractice law-
suit if they fail to do so?
Yet the Court concludes that the State cannot impose this simple in-
formation-dispensing requirement in the abortion context where the
decision is fraught with serious physical, psychological, and moral
concerns of the highest order. Can it possibly be that the Court is
saying that the Constitution forbids the communication of such criti-
cal information to a woman? We have apparently already passed the
point at which abortion is available merely on demand. If the statute
at issue here is to be invalidated, the "demand" will not even have to
be the result of an informed choice.2
Into this legislative void identified by Chief Justice Burger stepped
Christian activists who assumed the role of sidewalk counselors,2 2 free of
any tie to government authority. "The constitutional right to an abortion"
was, after all, "a right against the state, not private individuals..2.. Many
people had assumed that private influence to provide educational infor-
mational and alternative choices to abortion that might dissuade a woman
from choosing an abortion would not violate any constitutional right to
an abortion.2 " Activists did not confine this activism to sidewalk coun-
seling, but often accompanied it with blockades of clinic entrances and
large-scale demonstrations. 5 Courts issued injunctions to quell the anti-
abortion protests, 26 and state ordinances followed.22 The creation of bub-
211. Id. at 783-84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
212. See generally J.C. Wilkie, A Protective Ring or Violence? at
http://www.priestsforlife.org/articles/protectivering.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2001) (explaining the
role of sidewalk counselors who provide a "protective ring" outside abortion clinics to prevent
violence and to witness to women before and after the abortion).
213. See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial
Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 471, 502 (1996).
214. "'Sidewalk counseling' consists of efforts 'to educate, counsel, persuade, or inform
passersby about abortion and abortion alternatives by means of verbal or written speech, including
conversation and/or display of signs and/or distribution of literature."' Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 708 (2000) (quoting petitioner's appeal brief).
215. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 758-59 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1997).
216. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757; Schenck, 519 U.S. at 366.
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ble zones provided a zone of privacy for those unwilling to hear the anti-
abortion message.28 Violent acts ensued.29
Does the government have the legal right to prevent private indi-
viduals, like sidewalk counselors, from talking women out of exercising
their constitutional right to an abortion, by exercising their constitutional
right to free speech? In the court battles that resulted, judges had the op-
portunity to insert their viewpoints into the abortion controversy.22
XI. ASSESSING THE DAMAGE TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Now that Hill has settled the lawfulness of the bubble zone, the
sidewalk counselor has the burden to identify and retreat from the un-
willing listener. Practically, this task is impossible and puts an end not
only to a class of free speech, sidewalk counseling, but also to the sub-
stance of that speech. Of greater significance has been the damage done
to the First Amendment. The casualty list begins with Madsen, continues
with Schenck, and concludes for now with Hill.
In Madsen, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of
an injunction and its establishment of a thirty-six-foot bubble zone on a
public street outside of an abortion clinic in Melbourne, Florida.2' In
doing so, the Court prohibited numerous individuals, united by their op-
position to abortion, and who had broken no law, from exercising their
constitutional rights of assembly, free speech, and association within the
judicially created bubble zone.2 The evidence did not include a hint of
violence, and visitors freely entered and exited the abortion clinic. 223 The
Court relaxed the strict scrutiny standard established by precedent, which
courts had to apply whenever they imposed a content-based or view-
point-based limitation on First Amendment rights in a public forum.224
Instead, the Court created for the law of the sacred cow, the new right of
abortion, a lesser standard, which falls between strict scrutiny and inter-
mediate scrutiny.2' This new "intermediate-intermediate" scrutiny test is
as follows: "Whereas intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction
be 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,' the new
standard requires that the restriction 'burden no more speech than neces-
sary to serve a significant government interest.'
22 6
217. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (upholding a Colorado statute banning sidewalk counseling
within an eight-foot bubble zone with respect to an unwilling listener).
218. See Weinstein, supra note 213, at 472.
219. See, e.g., A Brief History of Anti-Abortion Violence Patterns,
at http://www.feministcampus.org/sam3-historysub.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2001).
220. See Weinstein, supra note 213, at 506.
221. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-58.
222. See id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 790-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion, id. at 765).
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The second attack on the First Amendment was the nature of the
injunction itself. By definition, the injunction constituted a prior restraint
of free speech, and as such, presented the "greatest threat '227 to First
Amendment values. To allow the injunction to continue directly con-
flicted with a long history of striking down speech-restricting
injunctions.. that had, by their nature, a heavy presumption against con-
stitutional validity. 9 The majority's reliance on NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.3° and Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess
Anne,23' was misplaced and contradictory. The court did not achieve
pin-pointed, narrowly couched tailoring to meet government interests.
The bubble zone constituted a blanket ban on an entire species of free
speech - the normal conversation.
By giving its imprimatur to the bubble zone, the Supreme Court
legitimized viewpoint discrimination against anti-abortionists exercising
their free speech rights, signaling its implied approval of future laws to
silence pro-life speech. This discrimination served another purpose, as it
also defended the Court's illegitimate creation of a constitutional right to
an abortion by silencing its critics. Like a loaded gun,' the injunction
became an available weapon to be used as a prior restraint against pro-
life speech before an activist ever uttered a word.
In Schenck, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutionally valid a
fixed, fifteen-foot bubble zone, established by judicial injunction, against
anti-abortion demonstrators in Rochester and Buffalo, New York.- The
injunction's original terms permitted the presence of two sidewalk coun-
selors inside the zone, provided their conduct conformed to the terms of
a cease and desist order.236
The cease and desist provision forced sidewalk counselors located
inside the buffer zones to retreat fifteen feet from the person being coun-
seled once the person indicated a desire not to be counseled. 7 This
227. Id. at 797 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1957); Org. for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964); Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43,
44 (1977); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980); CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510
U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994).
229. See Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419.
230. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
231. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
232. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 798 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. See, e.g., Carroll, 393 U.S. at 183-84 ("An order issued in the area of First Amendment
rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective
permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the order.")
234. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
235. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357,361,364, 380 (1997).
236. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 381 n.l 1.
237. See id. at 369-70.
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clause facilitated a recipient's escape from hearing any moral message."
It was triggered just by saying "no" to the communication offered by the
counselor, or "don't talk to me," before the counselor initiated any con-
versation. 9 The constitutionality of the cease and desist clause was ap-
pealed and held by the Court to be a proper restriction of the appellant's
First Amendment rights.2'
Unlike the facts in Madsen, which emphasized the need of abortion
clinic patients for peace and quiet conducive to rest and repose,' the
facts in Schenck did not turn on noise but on a history of "peaceful con-
versations ... devolv[ing] into aggressive and sometimes violent con-
duct." 2 In these circumstances, the Court decided, "a record of abusive
conduct makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public
sidewalk permissible." 4'
Chief Justice Rehnquist considered and rejected a "right" to be let
alone in the public forum:
Petitioners also contend that the "cease and desist" provision which
limits the exception for sidewalk counselors in connection with the
fixed buffer zone is contrary to the First Amendment. We doubt that
the District Court's reason for including that provision--"to protect the
right of the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left
alone"--accurately reflects our First Amendment jurisprudence in this
area. Madsen sustained an injunction designed to secure physical ac-
cess to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right "to be
left alone" on a public street or sidewalk.2
In dissent, Justice Scalia deplored the Court's unwillingness to
strike down the fixed bubble zone since the court created the zone based
on the invalid theory of a "right to be let alone" in the public forum and
not on the right of unobstructed access to the abortion clinic.:
Justice Scalia was appalled at the gratuitous language chosen by the
majority to accommodate free speech rights, when the Court could have
adopted a more assertive protective stance to enhance free speech
rights. 2' He was further alarmed by the Court's unprecedented expansion
of jurisdiction and power on its own motion to protect the public
interest.247 This move, feared Justice Scalia, intruded the function of the
238. See id.
239. See id. at 369.
240. See id. at 384-85.
241. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994).
242. Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 383 (emphases added).
245. Id. at 387-88 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
246. See id. at 390-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. Specifically, Scalia stated:
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executive branch of government, thereby upsetting the constitutional
balance of powers.24 8
Also disturbing was the Court's departure from settled practice in
the way in which the Court approached its review of lower court injunc-
tions. Instead of validating the Schenck injunction on the basis of the
facts actually found by the District Court, the Supreme Court reviewed
the injunction based on of what the court below "might have" found."9
These aberrations from established general legal doctrines amounted
to more evidence that the law of the sacred cow was making a "destruc-
tive inroad upon First Amendment law."25
Left undecided in Schenck was "whether the governmental interests
involved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation between
individuals entering the clinics and protesters, measured by the distance
between the two."2 ' The affirmative answer to this question came in
Hill.
252
In 1993, the Colorado state legislature enacted a law making it ille-
gal to "'knowingly approach' within eight feet of another person, without
that person's consent, 'for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling
The Court proceeds from there to make a much more significant point: An injunction on
speech may be upheld even if not justified on the basis of the interests asserted by the
plaintiff, as long as it serves "public safety." "[I]n assessing a First Amendment
challenge, a court ... inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the
injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and order.... Here, the District
Court cited public safety as one of the interests justifying the injunction. ... [T]he fact
that 'threat to public safety' is not listed anywhere in respondents' complaint as a claim
does not preclude a court from relying on the significant governmental interest in public
safety in assessing petitioners' First Amendment argument."
This is a wonderful expansion of judicial power. Rather than courts' being limited to
according relief justified by the complaints brought before them, the Court today
announces that a complaint gives them, in addition, ancillary power to decree what may
be necessary to protect--not the plaintiff, but the public interest! Every private suit makes
the district judge a sort of one-man Committee of Public Safety. There is no precedent for
this novel and dangerous proposition.
Id. at 392-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
248. See id. at 393-94 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Scalia expressed disagreement with the majority's departure from established practice:
We are not in the business (or never used to be) of making up conclusions that the trial
court could permissibly have reached on questions involving assessments of fact,
credibility, and future conduct--and then affirming on the basis of those posited
conclusions, whether the trial court in fact arrived at them or not. That is so even in
ordinary cases, but it is doubly true when we review a trial court's order imposing a prior
restraint upon speech.
Id. at 389 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alterations in original) (footnote
omitted).
250. Id. at 394 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Id. at 377.
252. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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with such other person."' 3 This law had the effect of banning sidewalk
counseling on public sidewalks within 100 feet of abortion clinic en-
trances.25 The state's declared purpose in creating this law was to enable
women to have unimpeded access to abortion clinics." s In Hill, oppo-
nents unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of this eight-foot
bubble zone. 6
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the First
Amendment rights of the speaker were subordinate to the privacy rights
of the unwilling listener. 7 This was so even though, unlike in Schenck,
the sidewalk counselors acted politely and respectfully. " It made no dif-
ference that speech occurred in a public forum. 9 This result was un-
precedented and contrary to the Court's First Amendment teachings.
Despite all this, the Court's decision was predictable due to the necessity
to distort the law to shield the law of the sacred cow - abortion. The de-
cision constituted a simian response of: "[h]ear no evil, see no evil, speak
no evil."26'
To save the Colorado law, the Court elevated a common law right of
privacy to a constitutional "interest" that outweighed, on the scales of
justice, the preferred constitutional right of free speech."' The Court
ruled in a bold and unabashed manner that revived old case law sup-
pressing the free speech rights of trade unionists.263 In championing the
253. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
254. See id. at 708-09.
255. See id at 708 n. I (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (1999)).
256. See id. at 707, 712, 735.
257. See id. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736
(1970)).
258. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 710.
259. Seeid. at 718.
260. See id. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. You can order your own monkey trio in the now famous poses at
http://www.mentomerc.com/mentomerc/hear.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001)
or http://www.amerasiaimports.com/26k-29k/29586-30130.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2001).
262. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
263. See id. at 717 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 204 (1921)). Not referred to in Hill was another passage from American Steel Foundries that
the court could have used to justify its categorization of sidewalk counselors located inside the
bubble zone as "missionaries":
Each case must turn on its own circumstances. It is a case for the flexible remedial power
of a court of equity which may try one mode of restraint, and if it fails or proves to be too
drastic, may change it. We think that the strikers and their sympathizers engaged in the
economic struggle should be limited to one representative for each point of ingress and
egress in the plant or place of business and that all others be enjoined from congregating
or loitering at the plant or in the neighboring streets by which access is had to the plant,
that such representatives should have the right of observation, communication and
persuasion but with special admonition that their communication, arguments and appeals
shall not be abusive, libelous or threatening, and that they shall not approach individuals
together but singly, and shall not in their single efforts at communication or persuasion,
obstruct an unwilling listener by importunate following or dogging his steps. This is not
laid down as a rigid rule, but only as one which should apply to this case under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence and which may be varied in other cases. It
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right of the unwilling recipient to be let alone, the Court offered no guid-
ance on how a sidewalk counselor, intending to exercise his or her free
speech rights,.could possibly know in advance of tendering a communi-
cation, whether the intended recipient was willing or unwilling to hear a
moral message about abortion. A wrong guess would result in a violation
of the criminal law.2M
Justice Scalia did not disappoint in delivering a scathing analysis of
the damage caused by Hill to the First Amendment.265 If the subject mat-
ter were not abortion, Justice Scalia predicted the Court would have in-
stantly found Colorado's law to be content-based2" and viewpoint dis-
criminatory.267 Justice Scalia viewed the abandonment of the strict scru-
tiny standard as a contrived fabrication intended to permit the survival of
the bubble zone under the less onerous standard for content-neutral
speech regulations.'
The Court's characterization of the law as one that regulated places,
not speech, 9 was just as convincing to Justice Scalia, as the Emperor
was to the child who could not be fooled in Hans Christian Andersen's
children's fable, The Emperor's New Clothes.27° To Justice Scalia, the
becomes a question for the judgment of the chancellor who has heard the witnesses,
familiarized himself with the locus in quo and observed the tendencies to disturbance and
conflict. The purpose should be to prevent the inevitable intimidation of the presence of
groups of pickets, but to allow missionaries.
Am. Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 206-07 (emphases added).
264. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3).
265. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 741-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scholarly articles published in
response to Hill have also been critical of its damage to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Martin H.
Belsky, Privacy: The Rehnquist Court's Unmentionable "Right," 36 TULSA L.J. 43, 47-48 (2000)
("privacy is not a fundamental right, and therefore there is no special need to protect access as part
of the right"); Brian W. Oberst, Casenote, Buffering Free Speech: An Examinatibn of the Impact of
Colorado's Buffer Zone Law on Protected Speech After Hill v. Colorado, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (2000), 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 89, 92 (2000) ("the Hill [sic] Court erroneously concluded that Subsection (3) was
a constitutional time, place, and manner restriction on protection [sic] speech"); Christy E. Wilhelm,
Notes, If You Can't Say Something Nice, Don't Say Anything at All: Hill v. Colorado and the
Antiabortion Protest Controversy, 23 CAMPBELL L. REV. 117, 141 (2000) ("one can only hope the
creation of this new 'right' [to be let alone] does not symbolize the end of a traditional freedom").
266. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. See id. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 719).
270. The fable reads, in part:
Everyone said, loud enough for the others to hear: "Look at the Emperor's new clothes.
They're beautiful!"
"What a marvelous train!"
"And the colors! The colors of that beautiful fabric! I have never seen anything like it in
my life." They all tried to conceal their disappointment at not being able to see the
clothes, and since nobody was willing to admit his own stupidity and incompetence, they
all behaved as the two scoundrels had predicted.
A child, however, who had no important job and could only see things as his eyes showed
them to him, went up to the carriage.
"The Emperor is naked," he said. "Fool!" his father reprimanded, running after him.
"Don't talk nonsense!" He grabbed his child and took him away. But the boy's remark,
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naked truth was that "if protecting people from unwelcome communica-
tions (the governmental interest the Court posits) is a compelling state
interest, the First Amendment is a dead letter.
'27'
The ultimate irony was that in Hill, the State repudiated any interest
in protecting its citizens' rights to be let alone from unwanted speech,
and yet the Court fictitiously attributed this purpose to the impugned
legislation.2 72 The Court flip-flopped from its holding in Schenck, where it
had disavowed the right to be let alone.273 Instead, in Hill, the Court "re-
package[d] ... the 'right'[to be let alone] as an 'interest"' deserving of
protection," and created a new right to be let alone, not from the gov-
ernment, where such a principle existed, 75 but from a private individual
in the public forum, where no such principle existed.7
The opinion elevated the abortion clinic, a commercial business, to
the constitutional status of a private residence.7 No longer did the recipi-
ent of an unwanted message have the burden to avert one's eyes or toler-
ate unwelcome speech.275 The burden had shifted to the speaker.279
In upholding Colorado's bubble zone, the Court approved the ap-
proach of prophylaxis, "the antithesis of narrow tailoring.' '  Speech op-
posing abortion was unwelcome. The list of wounds to the First Amend-
ment grew: "So one can add to the casualties of our whatever-it-takes
pro-abortion jurisprudence the First Amendment doctrine of narrow tai-
loring and over-breadth. R.I.P.,"
2 '
XII. CONCLUSION
A new era has begun. A corresponding right to be free from speech
now matches speech rights. Every individual, in the public forum, now
which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over and over again until everyone
cried:
"The boy is right! The Emperor is naked! It's true!" The Emperor realized that the people
were right but could not admit to that. He thought it better to continue the procession
under the illusion that anyone who couldn't see his clothes was either stupid or
incompetent.
The entire fable may be read at http://www.geocities.com/Athens/2424/clothes.html (last visited
Sept. 8, 2001).
271. Hill, 530 U.S. at 748-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. See id. at 750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997).
274. Id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 717 n.24).
275. See id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210
(1975).
276. See id. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 716).
277. See id. at 753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. See id. at 752-53 (Scalia. J., dissenting) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 948 (2d ed. 1988).
279. See id. at 752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 762 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 729).
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has a right to veto another individual's First Amendment rights.2 ' The
inevitable result, silence, will replace the cacophony of a free society
engaged in robust debate. The government is our "Father Knows Best," 3
deciding not just what can be said, but where, when, and in what manner.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has enacted legislation imitating
Colorado's buffer zone law and has relied on Hill to justify its restric-
tions against free speech.2" Once upon a time, Justice Stevens wrote,
"The First Amendment mandates that we presume that speakers, not the




Speech opposing abortion has lost its First Amendment status.
2 6
Only time will reveal whether the damage caused by the Court to its First
Amendment jurisprudence will remain confined to the abortion context
or spread like an out-of-control virus throughout the entire body of First
Amendment law. The implications for environmentalists, trade unionists,
evangelists, politicians, and others are enormous and serious. The Court
has opened a Pandora's box87 that it can only close by killing the sacred
cow of abortion.
The root cause of the distortion to First Amendment jurisprudence is
the line of reasoning that began in Griswold and flowered in Roe. The
true nature of the beast was revealed in Thornburgh and manifested in
Stenberg. At a minimum, the Court must reverse Roe to stem the bleed-
ing of the First Amendment before it becomes fatal. How the Court will
eventually handle the free speech issues in the Nuremberg Files case"
will serve as a predictor of the future of the First Amendment.
As long as the law of the sacred cow of abortion exists, courts will
suspend general First Amendment principles and values when it comes to
the First Amendment rights of those who oppose abortion and wish to
persuade others that a moral choice deserves consideration. The right or
interest to be let alone in the public forum from moral or other messages
is an invention created specifically for the law of the sacred cow. It has
no basis in history or precedent, and is an embarrassment to the intellect
of those who sit on the Supreme Court. The Court's "imposition of its
282. See Flynn, supra note 59, at 648.
283. See Tim's TV Showcase, Father Knows Best, at http://www.timvp.com/father.html (last
modified June 2001) (explaining that Father Knows Best was a situation comedy aired on television
from 1954 to 1962, where the father of the household dealt with the routine problems of his family).
284. See McGuire v. Reilly, 122 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D. Mass. 2000), rev'd, 260 F.3d 36 (1st
Cir. 2001); Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 430 Mass. 1205, 1211 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
285. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790-791 (1988).
286. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 760.
287. See Olympus Productions,The Enduring Appeal of Myths,
at http://www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/me/pandora.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2001) (explaining the origin
of this myth).
288. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244
F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 79:1
THE LAW OF THE SACRED COW
own, extraconstitutional value preferences" " is obvious, and more than
that, is a classic illustration of prescribing what shall be orthodox in
matters of opinion.2' In defending the dubious right to an abortion, the
Court has perpetuated the law of the sacred cow.
The right to an abortion has become a cultural and religious symbol
to feminists and secular humanists who have figuratively wrapped
around this icon of personal autonomy the American flag. Those who
would have the temerity to attack this sacred right to an abortion by per-
suading others there is another choice have been vilified as traitors.
Consider the scorn heaped upon Gregory Lee Johnson, who was
convicted of desecrating an American flag in Dallas, Texas.29' The Su-
preme Court freed Johnson, holding, "If there is a bedrock principle un-
derlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself of-
fensive or disagreeable. 292 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan ex-
plicitly refused to create "the law of the American flag":
There is, moreover, no indication--either in the text of the Constitu-
tion or in our cases interpreting it--that a separate juridical category
exists for the American flag alone. Indeed, we would not be surprised
to learn that the persons who framed our Constitution and wrote the
Amendment that we now construe were not known for their reverence
for the Union Jack. The First Amendment does not guarantee that
other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole--such as the
principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and de-
structive--will go unquestioned in the market-place of ideas. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio.... We decline, therefore, to create for the flag
an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amend-
ment.'9'
Just as the Court would have been gravely mistaken to create the
"law of the Stars and Stripes," it caused a serious and damaging error by
creating a separate juridical category for abortion, the law of the sacred
cow.
Opponents of abortion do not present a "clear and present danger""
to American society. Law must not be used as a means to criminalize the
conduct of sidewalk counselors who act on their moral imperative to
289. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
290. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in ... matters of opinion).
291. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
292. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
293. Id. at 417-18 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
294. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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persuade others abortion is wrong. The better approach is to facilitate
opportunities for free and fearless reasoning in full discussions.9
"[F]ree speech is the rule, not the exception. ' It is unconstitutional
to suppress speech just because of "fear, . . . passionate opposition
against the speech, . . . [or] a revolted dislike for its contents."297 Would
immediate injury to society occur if speech by sidewalk counselors were
allowed within a bubble zone? The answer is an emphatic "no." Argua-
bly, society would benefit from less abortions, as the state has an interest
in the birth of new and potentially useful citizens.299 If so, the remedy is
"more speech, not enforced silence."2
Justice Jackson's words in Barnette ring true today, just as strongly
as when he penned these words for the ages:
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard....
... [T]he First Amendment ... was designed to avoid these ends by
avoiding these beginnings .... Authority here is to be controlled by
public opinion, not public opinion by authority....
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its sub-
stance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the ex-
isting order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act there faith therein.3°°
Not since the issue of slavery tore apart this nation has an issue been
more divisive than abortion. Differing on the moral question of abortion
touches the heart of the nation. Close-mindedness, bubble zones, and
coerced silence in the public forum have no place in a democratic soci-
ety. "Without open minds there can be no open society. And if society be
not open the spirit of man is mutilated and becomes enslaved."3 ' No de-
bate can ever be won "by shutting one's ears or ... silencing
295. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
296. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 585.
297. Id.
298. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
299. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring), overruled in
part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
300. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (emphasis added).
301. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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opponents."' As long as there is personal freedom and the courage to
speak out, one thing is known for certain: the truth will go marching
on.
303
302. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 553 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Sir William Haley, What
Standards for Broadcasting?, MEASURE, Summer 1950, at 211-12).
303 See Julia Ward Howe, Battle Hymn of the Republic, at
www.ukans.edu/carfie/docs/texts/battle/htm (last visited December 3, 2001 ).
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LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION V. VELAZQUEZ: THE
COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAM RESTRICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment's free speech clause is one of the most widely
cherished and debated constitutional rights in America. Today, discus-
sions involving the First Amendment take center stage in our newspa-
pers, on our televisions and over the Internet. Racists and white su-
premacists join hands with journalists and politicians alike to proclaim
the virtues of the right to free speech. One topic of this debate receiving
little publicity is the relationship between the legal profession and the
First Amendment. Our society rarely rallies around lawyers. Yet, the
recent Supreme Court decision of Legal Services Corporation v. Velaz-
quez' provides a rare opportunity for free speech supporters to rally
around litigators. Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") supporters
achieved a rare victory against staunch conservatives in Congress who
continue chipping away at their program. This comment examines the
circumstances surrounding the case and it's legal issues.
This comment first outlines a factual context of the Legal Services
Corporation, and the details that laid the foundation for the instant law-
suit. Second, this comment explores the relevant legal background, and
articulates the pertinent legal issues surrounding this case. Third, this
comment examines the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opin-
ions. Next, this comment analyzes the case from a public policy perspec-
tive and attempts to predict the effect the Court's decision may have on
the Legal Services Corporation. Lastly, this comment expresses discon-
tent for the current state of the law in this area, proposes a clearer legal
framework for determining the constitutionality of government program
restrictions, and challenges the Supreme Court to clarify the befuddled
state of the law so lawyers, Congress and judges can more accurately
predict the outcome of such constitutional legal disputes.
II. BACKGROUND OF LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION
The Legal Services Corporation's roots can be traced back to Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty.2 As part of this program,
1. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
2. See William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid:
Congress and the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REV. 241, 245 (1998); see also J. Dwight Yoder, Justice or Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827,
833 (1998) (discussing the establishment of the Legal Services Program in 1966).
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Congress created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to operate
programs to assist with poverty in the United States, including legal
services to the poor.' Immediately, conservative political opposition
strove to eliminate this legal services program. Because of the contro-
versy surrounding the OEO's program, Congress and the Nixon admini-
stration "focused on establishing a congressionally funded, but politically
independent, legal services program."5
In 1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) as
a program that would provide legal services to those who would be "oth-
erwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel. 6 Congress declared that
the LSC "must be kept free from the influence of or use by it of political
pressures."' In accomplishing this goal, LSC attorneys were provided
with "full freedom to protect the best interests of their clients. 8
Since its inception, LSC funds, in the form of grants, have been
distributed to recipients who provide legal services to low-income indi-
viduals. 9 These grantees generally rely on LSC funding as well as monies
from a variety of other private and public sources.'0 LSC funds have been
described as "the primary vehicle for insuring that the poor are included
in this nation's legal system.""
Even with this public interest background, controversy has shrouded
the workings of LSC because of the increasing number of restrictions
placed on the "permissible uses of federal funds by recipient organiza-
tions."'2 In 1996, Congress restricted the allocation of LSC funds to pro-
hibit legal assistance for: lobbying activities, class action suits, aliens,
activism, attorney profits, abortion, criminals, and welfare reform.'3 Ad-
ditionally, LSC legislation prohibited grantees from providing legal as-
sistance for a restricted purpose even when the funds were generated
from other sources.14
The most controversial restriction (and at issue in the instant case)
involved welfare reform litigation. This restriction prohibited "LSC re-
cipients from participating in 'litigation challenging laws or regulations
3. See generally Quigley, supra note 2. The program was called the Legal Services Program.
4. Yoder, supra note 2, at 833.
5. Id.
6. 42 USCS § 2996(2).
7. Id. § 2996(5).
8. Id. § 2996(6).
9. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999), aff'd, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
10. Velazque 985 F. Supp. at 327.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504, 110 Stat.
1321-53.
14. See id. § 504(d)(2)(B).
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enacted as part of an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare
system.""' 5 Recipients could provide legal assistance to individuals
seeking relief from a welfare agency; however, the restriction barred
suits involving "an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing" wel-
fare laws. 6 Understandably, LSC funded lawyers found this restriction
particularly prohibitive.
In response to these heightened restrictions, numerous individuals
and organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York against LSC, challenging the constitution-
ality of certain provisions of the Act by asserting that the restrictions
violate the First Amendment. 7 A separate group of plaintiffs filed a
similar suit in the federal District Court for the District of Hawaii in re-
sponse to the same 1996 restrictions.'8
11. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. Government Restriction vis-?i-vis First Amendment Rights
To fully understand the recent decision of Legal Services Corpora-
tion v. Velazquez, 9 one must understand the paradox between First
Amendment rights granted by the Constitution and government subsidies
that the Constitution does not require Congress to allocate. The question
ultimately becomes: if the government is not obligated by the Constitu-
tion to provide certain funding or programs, why should First Amend-
ment rights apply to the restrictions the government chooses to place on
the funding program? ° The government understandably wants to control
how budget dollars are spent; yet, in effectively constraining its budget,
First Amendment rights may be limited.2 ' Therefore, the Supreme Court
15. Megan Elizabeth Lewis, Subsidized Speech and the Legal Services Corporation: The
Constitutionality of Defunding Constitutional Challenges to the Welfare System, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1178, 1179-80 (1999) (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 1639.3(a) (1997)).
16. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.4 (2001). See also Lewis, supra note 15, at 1180 (explaining the
limitations on LSC recipients).
17. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Original plaintiffs
included: Carmen Velazquez, WEP Workers Together!, Community Service Society of New York,
Inc., New York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning, Contro Independiente De Trabajadores
Agricolas, Inc., Greater New York Labor-Religion Coalition, Farmworkers Legal Services of New
York, Inc., Lucy Billings, Peggy Earisman, Olive Karen Stamm, Jeanette Zelbof, Elisabeth
Benjamin, Jill Ann Boskey, Lauren Shapiro, Andrew Connick, Councilmember C. Virginia Fields,
Councilmember Guillermo Linares, Councilmember Stanley Michels, Councilmember Adam
Clayton Powell, IV, Senator Lawrence Seabrook, and Assemblyman Scott M. Stringer.
18. Legal Aid Soc'y of Haw. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997).
19. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
20. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 1181; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)(explaining the debate in terms of the
"government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly" versus "the greater power to deny a
benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt").
21. See Lewis, supra note 15 at 1181.
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has been charged with determining when those government restrictions
have gone so far as to violate the First Amendment.
B. Government Funding Restrictions Constitutional Analysis
In recent Supreme Court opinions, the Court has alluded to numerous
legal inquiries courts can use in examining constitutional challenges to
government restrictions. 2  Two legal issues often discussed in these types
of cases include: first, the relationship between the government and the
grantee of the government's subsidy must be characterized, and second,
the disputed restriction must be classified as viewpoint neutral or view-
point discriminatory.
1. Characterizing the relationship between the government and the
grantee.
The Supreme Court often discusses the relationship between "the
government and the recipient of federal funds upon whom the restrictions
are placed."23 Understanding this relationship can assist in determining
the constitutionality of a particular restriction on the government funded
24program. Grantees can either fall under a limited public forum or non-public forum characterization.25
The Supreme Court has explained that a limited public forum con-
sists of a place or organization that the State "has opened for use" for
expressive activity. 2 6 In essence, in programs that are intended to give a
limited public forum, the government "provides funding to independent
actors.27 Thus, the government retains control over the forum it created
through a specific program, yet the government "does not control the
independent actors participating in the forum. 28
On the other hand, the Court has explained that a nonpublic forum
consists of a place or organization that the government reserved for an
"intended purpose." 29 In this forum, the government funds individuals or
grantees to serve as government agents. 3° In a nonpublic forum, the gov-
ernment may regulate the "time, place, and manner regulations" and may
impose other restrictions reasonably necessary to maintain its intended
22. Often called the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1415.
23. Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
24. See id.
25. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also
Nicole B. Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REv. 501, 521-22 (2000) (discussing viewpoint discrimination in the
limited public forum and nonpublic forum contexts).
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
27. Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
28. Id. at 851.
29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
30. See Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
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purposes.3' Because these grantees are viewed as government agents, the
government is able to organize these programs in order to restrict or
promote certain policies and goals.
3 2
2. Viewpoint discrimination in regards to nonpublic forum and
limited public forum classification.
After determining whether the government program is classified as a
nonpublic forum or limited public forum program, only then does the
concept of viewpoint discrimination become important. Government
program restrictions falling under the nonpublic forum classification can
be both viewpoint discriminatory and constitutional, while those falling
under the limited public forum classification can be deemed unconstitu-
tional if viewpoint discriminatory.
a. Explanation of viewpoint discrimination
While the Supreme Courts' opinions as a whole have resulted in
"uncertainty about the meaning of viewpoint discrimination,"33 some
conclusions have been made to assist in articulating the meaning of
viewpoint discrimination, and its relationship to claims asserting First
Amendment violations. First, it is important to distinguish between
viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination.3' The distinction
between viewpoint and content discrimination proves important because,
historically, the Court has concluded that viewpoint discrimination may
violate the First Amendment, while content discrimination often will
not.35
Several cases provide examples of this distinction.36 Both Perry37 and
Rosenberger 8 observe that content discrimination involves discrimina-
tion against speech because of its subject matter, while viewpoint dis-
crimination involves discrimination because of the speaker's specific
motivating "ideology, opinion, or perspective.
39
Several cases examined the distinction in the context of educational
facilities. 0 For example, in Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that permit-
31. Id. See also Casarez, supra note 25, at 533.
32. See Yoder, supra note 2, at 849.
33. Casarez, supra note 25, at 505.
34. Content discrimination is sometimes referred to as subject matter discrimination. See id. at
508.
35. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
36. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
38. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
39. See id. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (explaining that content based discrimination must
be considered in light of a compelling state interest).
40. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
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ting school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the topic from a
religious standpoint discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.4' Again, in
Rosenberger, the Court concluded that the University did "not exclude
religion as a subject matter" but discriminated against journalistic en-
deavors with "religious editorial viewpoints.4 2 Both opinions found
viewpoint discrimination.
b. Speech within a limited public forum is unconstitutional if
viewpoint discriminatory
In most limited public forum cases,43 the Court consistently has held
any restriction deemed viewpoint discriminatory unconstitutional. 44 For
example, in Widmar, a case involving meeting facilities for student
groups in a university, the Court held that the First Amendment forbids
the government from enforcing exclusions from a limited public forum,
like those of a university, even if it was not required "to create the forum
in the first place."' 5
Further cases articulate the importance of viewpoint neutrality in
limited public forums.46 In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that a school
district authorizing public, after-hours use of school facilities for civic,
social, and entertainment, but not religious purposes constituted uncon-
stitutional viewpoint discrimination.47
The Rosenberger opinion further expanded the limits of this legal is-
sue, concluding that the university's student activity fee fund constituted
a "forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense,
but the same principles" regarding limited public forum applied to this
program.4s This line of cases clarifies that viewpoint discrimination in
limited public forums usually violates the First Amendment's free speech
clause.
41. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393.
42. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
43. Especially those involving public schools and universities. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269
(1981).
44. See Casarez, supra note 25, at 522.
45. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (discussing public property which
the State has determined should be used for expressive activity); Casarez, supra note 25, at 524
(discussing the Widmar holding).
46. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830; Perry, 460 U.S. at
45.
47. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386.
48. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. See Casarez, supra note 25, at 526.
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c. Speech within a nonpublic forum is constitutional even if
viewpoint discriminatory
Speech, however, confined to a nonpublic forum likely will not be
held to the same strict standard as speech in a public forum. In one recent
case, viewpoint discrimination was allowed because the Court found
the government had created a nonpublic forum.5" The Court, in Rust, up-
held the government's Title X prohibition on abortion-related advice,
concluding that the government created a program to convey a particular
policy, not to encourage private speech.' The Rosenberger decision fur-
ther clarified Rust, explaining, "when a government appropriates public
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it
wishes."5 Thus, appropriate forum classification becomes important in
discussing viewpoint discrimination.
C. Litigation is an activity protected by the First Amendment.
In analyzing viewpoint discrimination cases that violate the First
Amendment, the court grants certain trades special consideration. In par-
ticular, the press historically has been given broad First Amendment
protection. 53
The Supreme Court consistently has held that the government cannot
distribute subsidies to the press in a viewpoint discriminatory manner,
regardless of the government's intended purpose of the funding
program.M For instance, the Court asserted that broadcasters under the
First Amendment are entitled to exercise the "widest journalistic freedom
consistent with their public duties."' The Court explained that broadcast-
ers are engaged in a "vital and independent form of communicative ac-
tivity,' '56 and neither the FCC nor Congress can impose restrictions dis-
criminatory in viewpoint.
In subsequent cases, the Court further articulated the press' special
status in First Amendment claims. 7 The Court explained that the "First
Amendment of its own force does not compel public broadcasters to al-
low third parties access to their programming."' Allowing such access
49. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
50. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
51. See id.
52. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
53. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (upholding the free speech
right of newspapers).
54. See Casarez, supra note 25, at 545.
55. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984).
56. FCC, 468 U.S. at 378.
57. Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
58. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675.
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would result in a "further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broad-
casters." 59
The Supreme Court has also classified litigation as a specially pro-
tected First Amendment activity.60 In fact, the Court has concluded that
litigation is entitled to the highest level of protection under the First
Amendment. 6' The Court made special note that litigation was one of the
few avenues available to minorities seeking redress for their grievances,
and full access to the judicial system may be the most effective method
of communicating minority groups' "ideas and beliefs of our society." 62
Numerous decisions since Button have reaffirmed and expanded the
notion that the First Amendment specially protects litigation.63 Most re-
cently, in Polk County v. Dodson,64 the Court held that counsel should be
"free of state control," and the client should receive "the services of an
effective and independent advocate., 65 Thus, like the press, litigation has
been deemed a specially protected activity under the First Amendment.
IV. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION V. VELAZQUEZ
A. Procedural History
The instant case was filed in the District Court, alleging the restric-
tions on the use of LSC funds violated the First and Fifth Amendments.
The court held that the four contentious restrictions 66 were a "permissible
construction" of the Act, as well as appropriately "tailored to the gov-
ernment's legitimate interests., 67 Thus, the court denied Plaintiffs re-
quest for a preliminary injunction.68
On appeal to the Second Circuit,69 the court upheld three restrictions
as constitutional because they all prohibited the LSC grantees' involve-
ment, regardless of the viewpoint. 70 However, the court reversed the de-
59. Id.
60. See Jessica A. Roth, It is Lawyers We are Funding: A Constitutional Challenge to the
1996 Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107, 111 (1998).
61. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
62. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
63. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich.,
401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. I11. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Bhd. of
R.R. Trainmen v. Va., 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
64. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
65. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 312.
66. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 323. See also supra notes 13-16,
71-73 and accompanying text.
67. Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 326-27.
68. See id. at 327.
69. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d at 757, 757 (2nd Cir. 1999) afd, 531 U.S.
533 (2001).
70. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d at 768-73.
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nial of a preliminary injunction with respect to § 504(a)(16), 7' the restric-
tion preventing LSC grantees from challenging existing welfare rules.'
2
The majority opinion held the qualification in the welfare restriction con-
stituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination and, thus, violated the
First Amendment.73 Thereafter, LSC filed a petition for certiorari chal-
lenging the Second Circuit's opinion, and the Supreme Court granted its
request.
B. Supreme Court Oinion
The Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's decision, basing
74their conclusion on several lines of reasoning.
1. Viewpoint based restrictions are improper when the government
program was designed to facilitate private speech.
The Court determined that the LSC program was intended to "fa-
cilitate private speech, not promote a government message., 7- The Court
contrasted the LSC program with the Title X program in Rust, explaining
that Title X was intended as an outlet for the government to promote its
own policies or advance a particular idea, thereby giving the government
a wider latitude to impose restrictions when the "government's own mes-
sage is being delivered. 76
Instead, the Court concluded that the LSC program is more similar
to the Rosenberger program and falls into the limited public forum clas-
sification where viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional. 77 Notwith-
standing, the Court was unable to conclude that the purpose of the LSC
was to "encourage a diversity of views," as the Court determined in Ro-
78senberger.
71. The relevant part of § 504(a)(16) states:
None of the funds appropriated in this Act to the Legal Services Corporation may be used
to provide financial assistance to any person or entity ... that initiates legal representation
or participates in any other way, in litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort
to reform a Federal or State welfare system, except that this paragraph shall not be
construed to preclude a recipient from representing an individual eligible client who is
seeking relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not involve an effort to amend or
otherwise challenge existing law.
(emphasis added).
72. See supra notes 13-16, 66, 71-73 and accompanying text.
73. See Velazquez, 164 F.3d. at 769. See also Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and
Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504(a)(16) (the qualification states that the representation could not
"involve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law.").
74. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
75. Legal Servs. Corp. 121 S. Ct. at 1049 (comparing the LSC program with the student
activity fee fund in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
Cf. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (explaining
that viewpoint based funding decisions are allowed when the government itself is the speaker).
76. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1048-49.
77. See id. at 1049.
78. Id.
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Further, the Court looked at the role of the LSC funded lawyer.79
The Court explained that Congress funded LSC recipients to enable law-
yers to "represent the interests of indigent clients."86 The Court found that
the LSC funded "lawyer is not the government's speaker," but is instead
one who "speaks on the behalf of his or her private, indigent client."8'
Therefore, the Court held that LSC funded a limited public forum and
that restrictions viewpoint discriminatory in nature should be held un-
constitutional.
Next, the Court briefly addressed why this particular restriction was
viewpoint discriminatory.82 The Court explained that the "restriction op-
erates to insulate current welfare laws from constitutional scrutiny and
certain other legal challenges, a condition implicating central First
Amendment concerns. 83 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the "Con-
stitution does not permit the Government to confine litigants and their
attorneys in this manner.'" The Court warned that they "must be vigi-
lant" when our legislature passes laws and restrictions that "insulate its
own laws from legitimate judicial" challenges."
2. Mission of judiciary function
The important role lawyers play in society provided a second reason
for the Court to conclude that the restriction violated the First Amend-
ment. 86 The Court proclaimed that under the "canons of professional re-
sponsibility," a lawyer is mandated to exercise "independent judgment
on behalf of the client," and the lawyer will be "free of state control".87
The Court also explained that interpretation of the law and of the
Constitution is the "primary mission of the judiciary.88 Therefore, if the
restriction were deemed constitutional, the Court reasoned, cases pre-
sented by LSC funded lawyers would be unable to argue before the court









87. Id. (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981)).
88. Id. at 1050 (citing the holding in Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 137, 177 (1803)).
89. Id. at 1051.
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3. Government must first determine the purpose of a particular me-
dium before attempting to impose restrictions.
Here, the Court found that the legal profession might be analogous
to the press, as trades given broad First Amendment protection.90 The
Court paralleled this case with its decisions in two recent broadcasting
cases, which held that prohibitions on broadcasts were impermissible
viewpoint restrictions." The Court concluded that the First Amendment
"forbade" the government from suppressing "speech inherent in the na-
ture" of the broadcast medium.92
Similarly, the Court also compared LSC with limited public forum
cases addressing student publications, concluding that while certain re-
strictions may be necessary, those restrictions cannot be viewpoint dis-
criminatory.93 The Court analogized the broadcast and student publica-
tion cases to LSC by reasoning that this LSC restriction "distorts the le-
gal system by altering the traditional role of lawyers in much the same
way broadcast systems or student publication networks were changed"
when restrictions were imposed. 94
4. No alternative representation is available to client if counsel is
forced to withdraw due to LSC restrictions.
Here, the Court made a public policy argument, claiming that if an
attorney is forced to withdraw from a representation due to this LSC re-
striction, "the client is unlikely to find other counsel." 95 The Court ex-
plained that Congress' intended purpose for the LSC was to make avail-
able legal assistance "to persons financially 'unable to afford"' the serv-
ices.9' Unfortunately, the Court concluded that there exists no "alterna-
tive channel for expression of the advocacy Congress seeks to restrict." 97
The Court distinguished this situation from Rust, arguing that a patient
90. See id. at 1050.
91. See id. at 1049 (discussing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984),
appeal dismissed by 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) and Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998)).
92. Id. at 1051 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 396-97
(1984)).
93. See id. at 1050. See also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
94. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051. Cf Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 666;
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (discussing First Amendment violations of program restrictions in
broadcasting and student newspapers).
95. LegalServs, Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051.
96. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2) (2001)).
97. Id.
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could receive abortion counseling through a different organization not
funded by Title X.9'
5. The argument that restrictions are necessary to define the scope
of the LSC program is unconvincing.
Finally, the Court concluded that the restriction was not necessary to
define the scope of the LSC program.99 It reasoned, "Congress cannot
recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every
case," otherwise, the First Amendment would be reduced to a "simple
semantic exercise."' '
C. Dissenting opinion
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion, '0' claimed that Rust is in-
distinguishable from the instant case, and thus "compels the conclusion
that § 504(a)(16) is constitutional."'0 2 First, Scalia contended that like the
Rust program, the LSC Act does not create a limited public forum en-
couraging a "diversity of views."'' 3 Additionally, he argued that the LSC
restriction does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint because it
funds "neither challenges to nor defenses of existing welfare law."' ° In-
stead, the prohibition acts to restrict subsidizing one kind of litigation.' 5
Second, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's assertion that
the welfare funding restriction seeks to control a medium of expression
traditionally found to be a public forum for free speech. 6 He found the
analogies to the broadcasting and student newspaper cases unconvincing
and misplaced.'0 7
Finally, the majority's assertion that a welfare recipient will be un-
likely to find other counsel troubled the dissenters.'08 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the restriction leaves the welfare recipient in "no worse con-
dition than he would have been in had the LSC program never been en-
98. See id. See also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (discussing that patients can
seek out other options for abortion counseling).
99. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051.
100. Id. at 1052.
101. See id. at 1053-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., &
Thomas, J.).
102. Id. at 1055.
103. Id. Cf. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (discussing the similarities between Title X and LSC
programs).
104. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1055.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1055-56.
107. See id. at 1056 (distinguishing the instant case from Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995); and FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)).
108. See Legal Servs. Corp. at 1057.
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acted."' 9 He concluded that "the LSC subsidy neither prevents anyone
from speaking nor coerces anyone to change speech," and is indistin-
guishable from Rust."0 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, the LSC restric-
tion should be declared constitutional."'
V. ANALYSIS
While the outcome of this case should be applauded, the Court's rea-
soning should have been more forthright. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court once again failed to clarify the framework for courts to use in ex-
amining constitutional challenges to restrictions placed on government
programs, thereby leaving the door open for lower courts to construe
such challenges in a myriad of ways. Instead of skirting around the legal
issues, as the majority did in coming to their decision, the Court should
have boldly and clearly explained the appropriate classifications and
factors to be considered in properly ruling on the constitutionality of
each restriction. Given the confusing state in which the law concerning
the constitutionality of restrictions on government programs exists today,
there are several conclusions that can be drawn from this most recent
decision, as well as other Supreme Court cases addressing the issue.
A. Public policy dictates whether a certain restriction is unconstitutional
based on viewpoint discrimination.
Over the past few decades, the Justices on both the conservative and
liberal sides of the Court, depending on the subject matter, have success-
fully argued that a particular restriction is unconstitutional when view-
point discriminatory. Furthermore, these recent opinions have directly
created the current confusing state of the law in this area.
For example, in Rust the restriction centered on abortion, a highly
controversial topic in our courts today."12 Since Roe v. Wade,"3 the con-
servative members of the Court steadily have attempted to limit access to
abortion and public information regarding abortion.' '" Rust provided an-
other opportunity to restrict access to information regarding abortions."'
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a conservative
member of the Court, based its conclusion on a viewpoint discrimination
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1058 (concluding that the holding in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) is
indistinguishable from the present case).
111. See id.
112. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78.
113. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
114. See C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd To Confusion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30
Hou. L. REV. 1457, 1467-75 (1993) (detailed discussion of the last twenty years of abortion
jurisprudence).
115. See Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1725
(1995) (arguing that the Rust decision more clearly articulated the Court's emerging view that
abortion is "no longer a fundamental right.").
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First Amendment analysis."6 However, because of the ambiguities pres-
ent in this line of cases,"7 the Court successfully argued that the pro-
gram's purpose was to convey government messages,"' and thus classi-
fied the Title X program as a nonpublic forum. In conclusion, the Court
held the program's viewpoint discriminatory abortion restriction consti-
tutional." 9
Conversely, the Court's conservative members aligned to reach the
opposite conclusion of that in Rust in three more recent cases.'20 In
Lamb's Chapel and Milford, religious groups' access to school facilities
was the central issue, another highly controversial topic in the courts
today.' In contrast to Rust, the Court concluded that a school district
opening its facilities creates a limited public forum, rather than a non-
public forum.' By framing the issue in this manner, the Court had pre-
determined its conclusion. Thus, the Court determined that the restriction
excluding religious groups from meeting on school facilities constituted
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
2 3
In Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 124 public policy considerations
once again dictated the Court's decision. This time, however, the liberal
side of the Court successfully argued unconstitutional viewpoint dis-
crimination."" The legal profession and litigation were the disputed
topic.126 The Court again concluded that the LSC's intended purpose
placed the program into the limited public forum classification. 2 Thus,
because the qualification on the welfare restriction discriminated based
on viewpoint, the restriction violated the First Amendment's free speech
clause.'2
Another interesting distinction that the Legal Servs. Corp. opinion
pointed out was the supposedly apparent differences between the ethical
obligations of the medical and legal professionals. 29 In Rust, the dis-
senting opinion sensibly argued that the "physician has an ethical obliga-
116. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
117. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
118. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
119. See id.
120. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, 2001 WL 636202, (U.S. June
11, 2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
121. See Milford, 2001 WL 636202, at *1; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386.
122. See Milford, 2001 WL 636202, at *5 (contrasting with the reasoning in Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
123. See id at *6.
124. 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).
125. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1043.
126. See id. at 1046.
127. See id. at 1052.
128. See id. at 1050.
129. See id. at 1049-50.
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tion to help the patient make choices from among the therapeutic alter-
natives consistent with good medical practice," yet the majority opinion
failed to be swayed by this argument. "°
In Legal Servs. Corp., the Court discussed the legal profession's
ethical obligations in support of its holding, thereby distinguishing it
from Rust."' The Court stressed the legal profession's "canons of profes-
sional responsibility," which mandates the lawyer exercise "independent
judgment on behalf of the client," implying a differentiation between
legal and medical professions.1
2
But, in fact, both physicians and lawyers are professionals with
similar ethical obligations, including the requirement of making inde-
pendent judgments. For physicians, courts have held that government
restrictions conflict with the obligation to make independent medical
judgments because a physician's professional ethics require that he have
free and complete exercise of his medical judgment and skill.'33 Simi-
larly, courts have held that a lawyer's "professional judgment in render-
ing" legal services cannot be directed or regulated by the person who
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer.343
It appears that the majority in both cases passed over the ethical re-
sponsibilities of the medical profession in order to support their position.
The Rust majority was so compelled to further restrict access to abortion
counseling, and in Legal Servs. Corp., the majority was so intent on pro-
claiming the welfare restriction unconstitutional by way of the virtues of
litigation, that each time the Court failed to perceive the obvious simi-
larities between the medical and legal professional obligations.
Public policy considerations take center stage in determining whether
a restriction violates the First Amendment. The viewpoint discrimination
analysis is so wrought with ambiguities that at this juncture, it is foresee-
able that nearly every issue presented before the Court could be argued
viewpoint discriminatory in nature and therefore unconstitutional.
130. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 214 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting AM. MED.
ASS'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CURRENT OPINIONS OF COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION P8.08 (1989)).
131. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1049-51.
132. Id. (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981)).
133. See Quilico v. Kaplan, 749 F.2d 480, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1984); Lurch v. United States, 719
F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir. 1983). See also Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151, 172-
73 (1996) (analyzing physician cases discussing this issue).
134. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981). See also Post, supra note 133, at 172-
73 (further discussing the ethical and professional responsibilities of a lawyer); supra notes 60-65,
87-89, 131-32 and accompanying text.
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B. The Court's holding in Legal Servs. Corp. likely will have minimal
effect on the LSC program.
Originally, the plaintiffs in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez sought a
preliminary injunction against four of the 1996 restrictions.' While the
Supreme Court holding may appear as a victory at first glance, those
plaintiffs brave enough to initially challenge the LSC restrictions likely
did not feel properly remedied.
36
From its inception, LSC proponents have battled with Republican
Congressmen and women to keep LSC a viable program.'37 To continue
receiving funding, LSC supporters have been forced to compromise with
more conservative factions, allowing the implementation of program
restrictions. 3 8 Only a few renegade LSC lawyers have resisted the whit-
tling away of the LSC program's core. 3 9 Thus, the LSC's recent success
in the Supreme Court does little to return the LSC program back to its
1974 stature.
However, even with this minimal victory, supporters who have
hesitated to openly oppose new restrictions may find the courage to
challenge the constitutionality of further LSC restrictions. With a Su-
preme Court opinion serving as precedent backing LSC supporters, con-
servative Congressmen and women bent on "de-funding" the program
may hesitate to impose additional restrictions or may gravitate towards
attacking other liberal legislative programs.'9 Once again the Court could
have clarified to supporters and opponents of the LSC the possibility that
other restrictions violated the Constitution if they had been more forth-
right in their opinion. However, both sides are now more befuddled than
ever about the question of the constitutionality of a certain restriction.
C. A New Analytical Model for Subsidized Speech & Viewpoint dis-
crimination cases
Based on the recent trend of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to
cases involving viewpoint discrimination and subsidized speech, a simi-
lar case likely will be presented before the Court in the near future, pro-
viding another opportunity for the Court to clarify the legal framework
for constitutional challenges to restrictions on government programs.
Such a case would provide an opportunity for the Court to redeem itself
135. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999), affid, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). See supra notes 66-68
and accompanying text.
136. See Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1046 (holding that a clause of one of the 1996
restrictions violated the First Amendment).
137. See Roth, supra note 60, at 108-09.
138. See id. at 108.
139. See id. at 109.
140. See id.
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from the criticism discussed earlier, and boldly assert a working model
for these types of constitutional challenges. Below outlines a potential
framework that the Court should consider asserting in future cases.
Three legal determinations should be made to ascertain the consti-
tutionality of a particular government restriction. First, the Court must
characterize the relationship between the government and the grantee of
the government's subsidy. Second, the disputed restriction must be clas-
sified as viewpoint neutral or viewpoint discriminatory. Third, additional
factors need to be taken into consideration to determine if a certain gov-
ernment program should be specially protected.
1. Classifying the relationship between the government and the
grantee of the government's subsidy.
The relationship between the government and the grantee should be
classified as either in the nonpublic forum or limited public forum realm.
In the past, the Court has deemed this classification important and has
affirmatively used these categories, but it ultimately failed to provide
clear guidelines to determine what category a specific subsidy falls un-
der. To assist in determining the appropriate classification, courts should
look at the following factors: legislative history, the area being subsi-




First, a court should examine the subsidy's legislative history to ac-
curately determine the classification, looking specifically for several
items. If Congress "conceptualized persons as means to an end rather
than as autonomous agents," or if the "attainment of institutional ends"
was deemed an "unquestioned priority," the subsidy may fall within the
nonpublic forum classification. 142
In addition, a court should characterize the area being subsidized to
determine the proper classification of the subsidy. For example, subsidies
addressing freedom of expression seriously limit the government's abil-
ity to regulate through restrictions. 4 3 The original Constitution and its
Amendments decree the utmost deference by Congress. Any subsidy
regarding the Constitution, therefore, most likely will fall under the lim-
ited public forum classification.
2. Classifying the restriction as viewpoint neutral or viewpoint dis-
criminatory
After determining the proper classification of the government sub-
sidy as either in a nonpublic forum or limited public forum, only then
141. This list should not be seen as exhaustive.
142. See Post, supra note 133, at 171.
143. See id.
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does the concept of viewpoint discrimination become important. Gov-
ernment program restrictions falling under the nonpublic forum classifi-
cation can be both viewpoint discriminatory and constitutional while
those falling under the limited public forum classification can be deemed
unconstitutional if viewpoint discriminatory. While the Court has occa-
sionally alluded to this differentiation, it also has befuddled the area by
forbidding viewpoint discrimination whenever it occurs within subsidies
relating to speech, regardless of its classification as either a nonpublic or
limited public forum.'" In the next case the Court decides, the majority
must clearly assert that viewpoint discrimination is allowed in nonpublic
forum subsidies.
To accurately classify a restriction as viewpoint neutral or viewpoint
discriminatory, several factors can be looked at to simplify this charac-
terization. First, a court should determine if the speaker's "ideology,
opinion, or perspective," rather than the subject matter of the speech, is
being limited by the restriction. 45 If the subsidy restriction involves the
discrimination of a particular speaker's perspective, then it constitutes
viewpoint discrimination; if the restriction discriminates against the en-
tire spectrum of a particular subject matter, then the discrimination is
viewpoint neutral and therefore content discriminatory. Overall, only
viewpoint discriminatory restrictions can be held unconstitutional.
3. Addressing additional factors to determine if a certain subsidy
should receive special protection.
When a court has completed the first two legal determinations of
this framework, it should further explore the subsidy and restriction to
decide whether it deserves special protection. Certain industries, trades
and professions should be given special consideration in this analysis.
The Court has already determined that government subsidies relating to
the press deserve special protection.'4 Additionally, the Court, in Legal
Servs. Corp., followed a long line of cases that granted lawyers a special
degree of protection. 
47
Other industries and professions also deserve this special protection,
and case law and the Constitution provide a guide to appropriately de-
termine which industries and professions should receive this protected
status. Physicians are the most obvious profession deserving this recog-
144. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147-48
(1993). See also Post, supra note 133, at 164-65 (explaining that the general principle forbidding
viewpoint discrimination with respect to subsidized speech is false).
145. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). See also
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). See also supra note 39
and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 60-65, 87-89 and accompanying text.
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nition." Other areas, however, likely deserve special consideration.
Therefore, addressing these additional factors to determine a possible
protected status must be included in such a legal analysis.
By and large, following this legal framework for constitutional chal-
lenges to restrictions on government programs should clarify the current
confusing state of First Amendment jurisprudence. While this framework
can by no means completely ease the tensions that exist in this area of the
law, it should assist the courts in more fairly determining the constitu-
tionality of a particular subsidy restriction.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is exciting that the Court's liberal justices and LSC sup-
porters can claim a small victory with their holding in Legal Servs. Corp.
v. Velazquez,4 9 in reality, mixed results will likely flow from the Court's
decision. With this opinion, the Court has thoroughly complicated the
law regarding the constitutionality of viewpoint discriminatory restric-
tions, and lower courts are now faced with an even more confusing legal
framework to work from. This decision demonstrates an even more com-
pelling need for the Court to lay out a comprehensive legal framework
for constitutional challenges to restrictions on government programs.
Only after the Court establishes a more comprehensible framework
can free speech advocates effectively challenge the constitutionality of
other subsidy restrictions. Until that time, no party who brings a consti-
tutional challenge to such restrictions can predict the ultimate ruling.
Liberal free speech advocates must contain their excitement with the
current decision and join with other First Amendment supporters,
whether a racist, a journalist or a politician, and show their dissatisfac-
tion with the majority opinion, thereby encouraging the Supreme Court
to hear another case in order to clarify the current state of law. Only then
will all First Amendment proponents feel secure that First Amendment
rights are protected impartially.
Carrie S. Bernstein
148. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text. Although the Court failed to extend this
protected status to physicians in Rust, the Court should look for an upcoming case involving the
medical profession to remedy this lapse in judgment.
149. 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001).

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION V. VELAZQUEZ AND THE ANALYSIS UNDER
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
every individual the right to speak freely,' meaning that the government
cannot impose restrictions on a person's right to speak unless they have
compelling reasons. Often, the government provides financial funding to
certain individuals or groups who will then convey a governmental mes-
sage. Yet, when the government provides subsidies or grants to particular
individuals, groups or corporations, First Amendment principles are of-
ten at odds. On one hand, the government has the right to delineate the
scope of their grant programs and can require grant recipients to abide by
certain conditions or restrictions.2 Yet, these conditions are unconstitu-
tional if they penalize individuals for exercising their constitutional
rights.'
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,' the United States Supreme
Court had to decide whether a federal grant program was unconstitu-
tional because it restricted the legal arguments government-funded attor-
neys could assert on behalf of their indigent clients.' In holding that the
restriction was unconstitutional, the Court failed to follow traditional
unconstitutional conditions analysis and instead announced a novel the-
ory that the restriction distorted the attorney's role in the judicial system.'
Part I of this paper examines the formation of the Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC") and the restrictions that have been placed on this
corporation.7 Part II discusses the legal precedent in government subsidy
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.").
2? See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (recognizing that the government may
define its programs); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(describing that when the government creates a limited public forum, certain restrictions may be
necessary to define the limits and purposes of the program).
3. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (acknowledging the
exercise of constitutional rights may not be a basis for refusing recipient benefits); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (forbidding the government from denying benefits based on
the exercise of constitutional rights, especially speech). This is called the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. See generally David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
4. 121 S. Ct. 1043(2001).
5. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1045.
6. Id. at 1050.
7. See infra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
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cases.8 Part III describes the procedural posture and the Court's analysis
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez.9 Part IV argues that the majority's
opinion did not follow established precedent and that the distortion prin-
ciple they announced is erroneous.'" In conclusion, Part V looks to the
future of government subsidy cases.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of The Legal Services Corporation
Congress created the private, nonprofit LSC when it enacted the Le-
gal Services Corporation Act of 1974." The LSC's purpose is to provide
"financial support for legal assistance in non-criminal proceedings or
matters to persons financially unable to afford legal assistance."' 2 The
LSC does not actually represent indigent clients but instead administers
grants to qualified local legal aid offices (called "grantees") rendering
free legal assistance to between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 indigent clients
annually."
Congress has placed significant restrictions on the scope of activities
in which LSC grantees may participate.'4 While President Carter
strengthened the LSC in the late 1970's, President Reagan's administra-
tion established many restrictions that were "designed to rein in the per-
8. See infra notes 25-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 59-104 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 105-115 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 et seq. (2000).
12. Id. § 2996b(a). Furthermore, the Act states that:
[t]he Congress finds and declares that-
(1) there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for
individuals who seek redress of grievances;
(2) there is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be
otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel and to continue the present vital legal
services program;
(3) providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal
counsel will serve best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for low-
income persons consistent with the purposes of this chapter;
(4) for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith in our
government of laws; V
(5) to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from the
influence of or use by it of political pressures; and
(6) attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect the best
interests of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Ethics, and the high standards of the legal profession.
Id. §2996.
13. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 759 (2nd Cir. 1999) (citing Texas Rural
Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The LSC also ensures that the
grantees abide by the restrictions imposed by Congress. Id.
14. See Clifford M. Greene et al., Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the
Legal Services Corporation Act, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 734 (noting that the LSC Act prohibits LSC
offices from becoming involved in any form of political organizing or lobbying); Stephen K. Huber,
Thou Shalt not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of Legal Aid in America, 44 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 754 (1976) (describing the history of the LSC).
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ceived left-wing radicals allegedly in control of legal services programs
across the country."'" When Republicans gained the majority in Congress
in 1994, they again tried to dismantle the LSC but were ultimately vetoed
by President Clinton.'6 As a compromise, Congress agreed to retain the
LSC in exchange for the imposition of new restrictions on grantees.'7
Consequently, Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996 ("OCRAA")'8 which reduced LSC's
funding by thirty percent and established new restrictions on grantees.' 9
One such restriction was the so called "suit-for-benefits" exception.
B. The "Suit-for Benefits" Restriction
The "suit-for-benefits" restriction is found in section 504(a)(16) of
the OCRAA and prohibits LSC grantees from participating in "litigation
* . .involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system."'
Furthermore, LSC-funded attorneys may represent a client "who is
seeking specific relief from a welfare agency if such relief does not in-
volve an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing law."2' If an
LSC-funded attorney determines that a client seeks to involve her in pro-
hibited litigation, the attorney must advise the client that she will be un-
able to accept the representation;' or if the litigation is underway, the
attorney must withdraw.23 Consequently, this restriction meant that LSC-
funded attorneys would continue to receive federal grants as long as they
did not challenge the validity of existing welfare law. The plaintiff-
respondents in Velazquez argued that this condition infringed their First
Amendment free speech rights."
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY CASES
When challenges are made to the constitutionality of restrictions
imposed on recipients of government subsidies, the Supreme Court has
traditionally relied on two competing doctrines: the right-privilege dis-
15. Joseph A. Dailing, Their Finest Hour: Lawyers, Legal Aid and Public Service in Illinois,
16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 7, 21 (1995).
16. See J. Dwight Yoder, Note: Justice or Injustice for the Poor?: A Look at the
Constitutionality of Congressional Restrictions on Legal Services, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827,
834 (1998).
17. Id.
18. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (hereinafter
"OCRAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
19. See Megan E. Lewis, Note: Subsidized Speech and the Legal Services Corporation: The
Constitutionality of Defunding Constitutional Challenges to the Welfare System, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1178, 1178-1179 (1999).
20. 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3 (2000).
21. Id. § 1639.4.
22. Petitioner's Opening Brief at I1, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001)
(Nos. 99-603, 99-960).
23. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.9 (2000).
24. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 761 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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tinction and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.25 The right-privilege
distinction focuses on the inherent differences between constitutional
rights and privileges granted by the government." The doctrine is based
on the principle that because rights are Constitutional guarantees, the
government cannot restrict them unless its justification is compelling."
Privileges on the other hand are viewed more as a public charity and
"may be initially given to recipients on the condition that they surrender
or curtail the exercise of constitutional rights that they would otherwise
enjoy."" However, this doctrine has been severely criticized making the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine the primary analytical tool in gov-
ernment subsidy cases. 9
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine mandates that a govern-
ment-funded benefit may not obligate the recipient to surrender a con-
stitutional right, even if the government could have withheld that benefit
altogether." For example, in Speiser v. Randall,3 a California law condi-
tioned the receipt of veteran property tax exemptions on the individual's
signing a declaration disavowing a belief in overthrowing the govern-
ment by force or violence." In holding this law unconstitutional, the
Court said: "To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain
forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.""
However, the Court has inconsistently applied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine in government subsidy cases making its understand-
ing and application perplexing." According to one commentator, ana-
25. Yoder, supra note 16, at 845. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 69, 72 (1982) (arguing that despite its reported demise, the right-privilege distinction is alive
and well and is an important principle in constitutional law).
26. Yoder, supra note 16, at 845.
27. Jdat 845-46.
28. Smolla, supra note 25, at 72 (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 80
(1947)). See also McAuliffe v . New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) ("The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.").
29. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972) (criticizing the right-privilege
distinction and endorsing the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). But see Charles A. Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (1964) (criticizing the right-privilege doctrine and arguing that
the distinction is an anachronism in an era where people depend on government for so much that is
essential to survival); see also Charles A Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) (arguing that government benefits "are no longer
regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense
a form of charity.").
30. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1415.
31. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
32. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 514-15.
33. Id. at 518. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (explaining that "if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would
allow the government to produce a result which it could not command directly.").
34. See e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983)
(refusing to follow the doctrine and upholding a federal tax law provision that conditioned tax
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lyzing the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on government funded
grantees is particularly difficult because:
It renders uncertain the status of speakers, forcing us to determine
whether speakers should be characterized as independent participants
in the formation of public opinion or instead as instrumentalities of
the government. And it renders uncertain the status of government
action, forcing us to determine whether subsidies should be charac-
terized as government regulations imposed on persons or instead as a
form of government participation in the marketplace of ideas."
Accordingly, the analysis must begin by determining the nature of
the relationship between the government and the restricted grantee."
When the government provides funding to governmental speakers, "the
unconstitutional conditions analysis is more deferential to the govern-
ment because the state is considered a participant in the public discourse
and, therefore, has the ability to organize its resources in such a way to
achieve its goals."37 However, when private speakers are the funding re-
cipients, the analysis is similar to that applied when no governmental
subsidies are involved. 8
The Court's determination of this relationship has resulted in out-
comes that are difficult to reconcile with one another. For example, in
Rust v. Sullivan,39 the government chose to subsidize doctors conducting
family planning counseling on the condition that they did not "encour-
age, promote, or advocate abortion as a method of family planning."
The Court held that the government's use of private speakers to convey a
government message amounted to governmental speech."
exempt status on the prerequisite that the organization not participate in lobbying or partisan political
activities and explaining that "Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated
any First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for [Taxation with
Representation's] lobbying."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (refusing to apply the
doctrine explaining that
[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.)
For discussions and analysis explaining why the doctrine is confusing, see Yoder, supra note 16, at
854-60; Sulli'an, supra note 3, at 1417-20; Lewis, supra note 19, at 1182-91; Cole, supra note 3, at
682-702.
35. Robert C. Post, Essay: Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 152 (1996).
36. Id. at 155 (explaining that understanding this relationship is critical because "substantive
First Amendment analysis will depend on whether the citizen who speaks is characterized as a public
functionary or as an independent participant in public discourse.").
37. Yoder, supra note 16, at 849.
38. See Post supra note 35, at 152-54 (explaining that the analysis is similar to that described
in the text accompanying notes 48-57 infra).
39. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
40. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180.
41. Id. at 193.
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Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,"2
the state made a choice regarding what student organizations would re-
ceive government funding."3 Yet, in Rosenberger the choice was held to
be unconstitutional because:
[In Rust], the government did not create a program to encourage pri-
vate speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific in-
formation pertaining to its own program. We recognized that when
the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. When the gov-
ernment disburses public funds to private entities to convey a gov-
ernmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to
ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.
It does not follow, however.... that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize trans-
mittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage
diversity of views from private speakers.44
Consequently, in both Rust and Rosenberger, the state "selectively
fund[ed] a program to encourage certain activities it believe[d] to be in
the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative pro-
gram which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. '5 Yet, in
Rust the speaker was considered a government actor, whereas in Rosen-
berger the speakers were private. Because both of these cases involve
governmental decisions concerning the allocation of federal subsidies,
the decisions are difficult to reconcile and have therefore caused confu-
sion regarding the proper analysis for determining the government-
recipient relationship.
Once this relationship is determined, the analysis follows traditional
free speech principles. ' Consequently, courts must examine the forum
where the speech occurs as well as the condition's neutrality and preci-
sion. 7
When the funding recipient is a private actor and not an agent of the
government, the government has created a limited public forum." When
the government establishes a limited public forum, it is not required to
allow persons to engage in all types of speech.4'9 However, restrictions on
speech must be content-neutral - meaning it cannot discriminate on the
42. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
43. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824-25.
44. Id. at 833-34 (citations omitted).
45. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
46. See Yoder, supra note 16, at 850.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 851. See also David A. Stoll, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at Kennedy Airport,
Injuring Nine: International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
1271, 1271 (1993) (describing the public forum doctrine).
49. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001).
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basis of viewpoint 0 - and the restriction must be reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum.'
On the other hand, where the funding recipient is an agent of the
government, no public forum is created and the government can impose
content-based restrictions on the recipient so long as the restrictions are
proportional to the government's funding52 and are related to the govern-
ment's message. 3
Finally, under "precision" analysis, the court will ensure that the
restrictions are not overbroad or vague. A restriction is unconstitution-
ally vague if a reasonable person cannot determine what speech is pro-
hibited and what is permitted." Furthermore, a restriction is overbroad if
it restricts speech that is otherwise protected.' Accordingly, restrictions
must be narrowly tailored so as to ensure clarity in what speech is pro-
hibited and limit the types of speech that are covered by the restriction to
only those that are absolutely necessary to achieve the government's
purpose.
As the above discussion shows, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is confusing because of the Court's inconsistent application. The
decisions seem to indicate that if the Court wants to uphold a restriction,
it determines that the government is making a legitimate choice to fund
one activity and not others.7 On the other hand, if the Court wants to
strike down a restriction, it determines that the speaker is a private actor
and the government is unconstitutionally conditioning their free speech
rights. In Velazquez, the Court had the opportunity to define the pa-
rameters of the doctrine thereby clarifying its meaning. However, as dis-
cussed in Part IV, the Court utterly failed to take advantage of this op-
portunity and instead announced a novel rationale for its decision.
50. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983); Nicole B.
Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination,
64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 512 (2000) (defining "viewpoint" to mean "expression representing a
particular perspective by a speaker or class of speakers.").
51. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
52. In other words, "the government must allow for adequate alternative channels for
engaging in restricted speech or activities using nongovernment funds." Yoder, supra note 16, at
854.
53. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-95 (1991).
54. See Yoder, supra note 16, at 851.
55. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
56. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-01 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
58. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995).
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III. THE VELAZQUEZ DECISION
A. Procedural Posture
LSC-funded attorneys from New York City, along with private LSC
contributors, and state and local officials who donated to LSC grantees
("respondents") filed suit against the LSC 9 ("petitioners") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The respon-
dents sought a preliminary injunction alleging that the "suit-for-benefits"
restriction violated their rights under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. ' The district court denied the respondents' motion
holding that the regulation was appropriately tailored to the govern-
ment's legitimate interests and it permitted adequate channels for re-
spondents to conduct restricted activities.6 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed stating that because the "suit-for-benefits" restriction allows the
distribution of funds to those who represent clients who will not chal-
lenge the existing rules of law, but denies funding to those who will
challenge existing rules, the provision "clearly seeks to discourage chal-
lenges to the status quo," and is therefore an impermissible viewpoint-
based restriction on expression.62 The LSC, challenging the Court of Ap-
peals' conclusion that the restriction was unconstitutional, filed a petition
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which the Court
granted.63
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined by four other Justices,' delivered the opin-
ion of the Court which affirmed the Second Circuit's decision. The
Court's analysis began by examining the government-recipient relation-
ship.' It recognized that the rationale for allowing the government lati-
tude to restrict speech when the speech delivers the government's mes-
sage is based on the fact that the government is accountable to the elec-
torate and if the restriction is unpopular, newly elected government offi-
cials can promote a different message.' However, this rationale does not
59. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001). The United States Government
intervenened as a defendant in this case.
60. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F.Supp. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The plaintiffs
also challengenged several other restrictions enumerated in the 1996 Act, but since the issue before
the Supreme Court only dealt with the "suit-for-benefits" restriction, the challenges to these other
restrictions are beyond the scope of this paper.
61. Velazquez, 985 F. Supp. at 326-27.
62. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 769-70 (2nd Cir. 1999).
63. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 529 U.S. 1052 (2000).
64. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer joined the majority opinion).
65. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1053.
66. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
67. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1048-49 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 235 (2000)).
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apply when the speech is private. ' Here, like the program at issue in Ro-
senberger,' the LSC program promoted private speech rather than gov-
ernmental speech;' when a lawyer argues on behalf of his client, this
cannot be considered government speech.7'
With the government-recipient relationship established, the Court
then discussed forum.72 Because this case involved a subsidy, limited
forum cases73 were not controlling but did provide guidance. ' Here, the
limitation foreclosed alternative forums of expression because LSC law-
yers could not undertake representation of a particular client if the cli-
ent's case would question the validity of current welfare laws." The
premise behind the LSC program is to provide legal representation "to
persons financially unable to afford legal assistance." 6 Therefore, in
cases where the LSC attorney must withdraw, the indigent client will be
unlikely to find another attorney, and will therefore not have another
source from which they can receive legal assistance pertaining to their
constitutional challenge to welfare laws.'
Consequently, by not allowing LSC attorneys to advise or advocate
for their clients concerning the validity of a particular welfare statute, the
"suit-for-benefits" restriction altered the traditional role these attorneys
play in the legal system." As Justice Kennedy explained, "[b]y seeking to
prohibit the [federally funded] analysis of certain legal issues and to
truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits
speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper
68. Id. at 1049 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
69. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995) (discussing
subsidies to student organizations).
70. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1049. According to the majority, this was the critical
distinction between this case and Rust. The Rust Court held that the speech at issue there was
governmental speech because the government was using private speakers to promote a governmental
message. Here, however, the advice an attorney gives to her client and the arguments the attorney
makes to the court cannot be classified as governmental speech. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
73. See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educator's Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(establishing three types of government property: public forums, limited public forums, and non-
public forums); see also, Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391-
394 (1993) (holding that once the school district chose to open its facilities to community groups it
could not discriminate against those engaging in religious speech unless strict scrutiny was met).
74. These cases are not controlling because by granting a subsidy, the government has merely
made choices about how to spend its money; it has not created a forum in the true sense of the word.
See generally Yoder, supra note 16.
75. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1050.
76. Id. at 1051. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2996(a)(3)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1050. The Court stated "[b]y providing subsidies to LSC, the Government seeks to
facilitate suits for benefits by using the State and Federal courts and the independent bar on which
those courts depend for the proper performance of their duties and responsibilities." Id. Therefore,
by restricting the arguments LSC-funded attorneys can make, the program distorts this critical
relationship. Id.
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exercise of the judicial power.""9 In other words, because the LSC attor-
neys are unable to represent their clients zealously, there may be incom-
plete analysis in certain cases that will cause the public to question the
sufficiency and integrity of the judicial system."
This, in turn, raises separation of powers concerns because Congress
has tried to insulate Congressional welfare legislation from judicial re-
view." Justice Kennedy explained, "[tihe statute is an attempt to draw
lines around the LSC program to exclude from litigation those arguments
and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their nature are
within the province of the courts to consider." 2 However, as was estab-
lished in Marbury v. Madison, "[i]t is emphatically the province and the
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 3
Finally, Justice Kennedy rejected the petitioners' argument that the
"suit-for-benefits" restriction was necessary to define the scope of the
federal program. Since the effect of the restriction was to insulate wel-
fare laws from constitutional attack, the condition endangered the basic
principle that the First Amendment "'was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.""' Accordingly, the Constitution does not allow
Congress to suppress ideas that are thought to be adverse to the best in-
terests of the government, which is what Congress had done here.'
C. The Dissent
Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, dissented." The dissent
initially pointed out that despite the majority's agreement that the "suit-
for-benefits" restriction did not directly regulate speech, did not create a
public forum, and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, the
Court refused to apply traditional government subsidy analysis and in-
stead "applie[d] a novel and unsupportable interpretation of [the Court's]
public-forum precedents."8 The dissent argued that Rust was controlling
and that the majority's attempts to distinguish that case were misguided.'
79. Id. at 1051.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1052.
82. Id. at 1051.
83. Id. at 1050 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
84. Id. at 1051.
85. Id. at 1052 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
86. Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983));
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958).
87. Id. at 1053 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Conner and Justice Thomas.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1058.
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Applying Rust's traditional government subsidy analysis, the dissent
argued the restriction was viewpoint neutral because LSC attorneys can-
not represent clients who seek to challenge welfare laws or clients who
seek to defend welfare laws.' Furthermore, the restriction does not fore-
close alternative sources of legal assistance because LSC lawyers can
express their opinions concerning the constitutional validity of a welfare
law and may refer the client to another non-LSC attorney who can pursue
the matter.9'
Moreover, because the LSC Act is a federal subsidy program rather
than a federal regulatory program, it does not directly restrict speech and
will only indirectly restrict speech if the program is "manipulated to have
a coercive effect on those who do not hold the subsidized position." 2
Proving coercion in a limited spending program that does not create a
public forum (like the LSC Act) "is virtually impossible, because simply
denying a subsidy does not coerce belief."3 Furthermore, the test for
unconstitutionality is "whether denial of the subsidy threatens to drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."' If this threat does not
exist, "the Government may allocate . . . funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a crimi-
nal penalty at stake." 5
Justice Scalia then attacked the majority's contention that the re-
striction distorts the usual functioning of an existing medium of expres-
sion.' He argued that this assertion was wrong on the law because there
was no precedent to support it; the three cases the majority cited never
mentioned this new principle.' He argued it was also wrong on the facts
90. Id. at 1053-54.
91. Id. at 1054.
92. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
93. Id. (quoting Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988)).
94. Id. (quoting Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998)).
95. Id. (quoting Nat'l Endowment, 524 U.S. at 587, 588).
96. Id. at 1055.
97. Id. at 1056. One case the Court cited was Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va-, 515 U.S.
819 (1995). According to Justice Scalia, this case did not stand for the principle that the usual
functioning of student newspapers is to express many different points of view, "but rather that the
spending program itself had been created 'to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.'
What could not be distorted was the public forum that the spending program had created." Id.
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834) (emphasis in original). Additionally, Justice Scalia argued
that Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), "discussed the nature of
television broadcasting, not to determinie whether government regulation would alter its usual
functioning and thus violate the First Amendment[, ... but rather to determine whether state-owned
television is a 'public forum' under our First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. (quoting Forbes, 523
U.S. at 673-74). Finally, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal. 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court
stated that "of course, the restriction on editorializing would plainly be valid if Congress were to
adopt a revised version of [the statute] that permitted [public radio] stations to establish affiliate
organizations which could then use the station's facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds." Id.
(quoting FCC, 468 U.S. at 400). Justice Scalia asserted that this is what occurred under the LSC Act
since the regulations allow grantees to establish affiliate organizations to represent clients on matters
that fall outside the scope of the LSC Act. Id.
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because there was no foundation for the assertion that because LSC at-
torneys cannot advise or argue concerning the validity of welfare laws,
this restriction distorts the function of the judicial system. 8 Justice Scalia
stated that it is not the function of the courts to inquire into the validity of
statutes in all cases." The courts must only focus on the issues presented
and argued by the parties, "and if the Government chooses not to subsi-
dize the presentation of [questions concerning the validity of statutes],
that in no way 'distorts' the courts' role.''1'
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's irrelevant concern that in
cases in which an LSC attorney must withdraw, the client will unlikely
obtain other counsel.'' This fact is irrelevant to Justice Scalia because the
client will be in "no worse condition than he would have been in had the
LSC program never been enacted."'0" Justice Scalia emphasized that the
Government is not required to provide welfare recipients with free legal
representation. 3 In other words, the LSC program is a government bene-
fit, not a Constitutional right. Therefore, "[iut is hard to see how provid-
ing free legal services to some welfare claimants (those whose claims do
not challenge the applicable statutes) while not providing it to others is
beyond the range of legitimate legislative choice."'" Accordingly, the
dissent would have found the "suit-for-benefits" restriction constitu-
tional.
IV. ANALYSIS
As previously mentioned, the Court's Velazquez analysis could have
gone a long way towards clarifying the analytical framework courts
should apply under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. For exam-
ple, the Court could have elaborated on the characteristics that make a
recipient of federal funds a government speaker rather than a private
speaker. Instead, without clearly explaining its rationale, the Court ap-
plied a fact specific analysis and simply carved out a niche of non-
governmental speech for advice and advocacy given to a client by an
attorney.'5 This means that courts will continue to guess regarding the
appropriate nexus needed to make speech governmental - ultimately




101. Id. at 1057.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Id. The majority also conceded this point but argued that the scope of the restriction was
unconstitutional because it insulated welfare laws from judicial review. See id. at 1052.
104. Id. The dissent also focused on the issue of severability which was decided by the Second
Circuit but which was not argued or briefed before the Supreme Court. See id. at 1058-60. This issue
is beyond the scope of this paper.
105. Id. at 1049.
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The Court's opinion was also erroneous in that it did not discuss
viewpoint discrimination. As the dissent emphasized, the "suit-for-
benefits" restriction is not viewpoint based because the restriction pro-
hibits litigation that either challenges or defends welfare laws.'" At most
the restriction is content-based discrimination because it prohibits all
forms of litigation dealing with the validity of the welfare system; in
other words, Congress was merely defining the scope of the LSC pro-
gram. As the Court stated in Rosenberger, "in determining whether the
State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created so that the
exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinc-
tion between ... content discrimination, which may be permissible if it
preserves the purpose of that limited forum, and.., viewpoint discrimi-
nation, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations."' 7 Here, the purpose of the
program is to provide "financial support for legal assistance in noncrimi-
nal proceedings or matters to persons financially unable to afford legal
assistance."' 8 The purpose is not to create a forum for litigants to chal-
lenge the validity of welfare laws. Therefore, because the restriction pro-
hibits all litigation concerning welfare reform - pro or con - the restric-
tion is not viewpoint based.
Nonetheless, instead of following this traditional analytical frame-
work, the majority relied on the imprecise theory that the "suit-for-
benefits" restriction distorted the role of attorneys in the judicial system.
" Yet, the majority did not point to any proof that the restriction had in
fact distorted the attorney's role in any actual case. The Court simply
hypothesized that in cases where the LSC funded attorney must withdraw
from representation, "the client is unlikely to find other counsel."'' 0
However, this is simply wrong because as the dissent emphasized,
LSC-funded attorneys who must withdraw "are also free to express their
views of the legality of the welfare law to the client, and they may refer
the client to another attorney who can accept the representation.'""
Moreover, as LSC explained in its brief:
the regulations do not prohibit part-time employees of LSC grantees -
- including lawyers -- from participating in the restricted activities as
employees of non-LSC funded organizations.... [Additionally], full-
time employees of LSC-funded organizations are free to engage in
the restricted "advocacy" activities in their individual capacity, on
their own behalf, and on their own time. As a result, LSC-funded at-
torneys can express their personal opposition to existing welfare laws,
106. Id. at 1053-54.
107. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995). See also Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,103 S.Ct. 948, 955 (1983).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000).
109. See supra notes 79-84.
110. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 1054.
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and their personal views on welfare reform, as long as these unsubsi-
dized activities occur outside the LSC program."1
2
Therefore, if LSC-funded attorneys are unable to represent a client
on their own time, they are free to refer the client to an attorney who can
represent him. This referral should be effective since attorney ethical
rules encouraged at least fifty hours of pro-bono work per year."3 There-
fore, contrary to the majority's contention that the restriction leaves "no
alternative channel for expression,""' there are ample alternative outlets
for those who seek to challenge the validity of welfare laws - either
through LSC attorneys when they are working on their own time, or pri-
vate attorneys who accept the client's case pro-bono. Accordingly, "[t]he
[restriction] did not distort the traditional adversarial role of the lawyer;
it simply insisted that constitutional challenges or defenses of welfare
rules be undertaken by non-subsidized attorneys to leave more resources
for more routine non-constitutional welfare litigation in which courts
would still enjoy the final word.""' 5
Finally, the "suit-for-benefit" restriction was one of many restric-
tions intended to define the scope of the LSC program. Because the gov-
ernment is providing a subsidy that it does not have to grant, it should be
able to define the scope of that program by prohibiting activities that are
designed to defeat the welfare system that it is trying to promote. The
program was designed to provide equal access to the legal system for
those with insufficient means. The program was not designed to use tax
dollars to promote welfare litigation aimed at welfare reform. This type
112. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 11, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (Nos.
99-603, 99-960) (citations omitted).
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2001). The American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 states:
A lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per
year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority
of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of
limited means or (2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and
educational organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of
persons of limited means.
Furthermore, the issue of pro bono legal service has been the subject of considerable scholarly
discussion. See, e.g., Thomas Bradley, The Private Bar and the Public Lawyer: An Essential
Partnership, 4 NOVA L.J. 357 (1980) (advocates partnership of private bar and public lawyers to
help provide legal services to poor); The Honourable Mr. Justice Brian Dickson, The Public
Responsibilities of Lawyers, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 175 (1983) (discussion of pro bono responsibilities);
Stephen T. Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the Supreme Court of Florida to Promote the Full
Availability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (1987) (studies responsibility to make legal
aid available to poor in Florida); B. George Ballman, Jr., Note, Amended Rule 6.1: Another Move
towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That What We Want?, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1139 (Spring
1994) (traces history of pro bono and suggests that mandatory pro bono equates to involuntary
servitude, which courts choose to ignore in preference to benefits of mandatory pro bono).
114. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 S. Ct. at 1051.
115. Bruce Fein, Free Speech Don Quixote, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at A16 (Mr.
Fein is general counsel for the Center for Law and Accountability, a public interest law group
headquartered in Virginia).
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of activity should be left for the legislative branch because it is account-
able to the electorate.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's government subsidy cases have created tre-
mendous confusion and uncertainty. In Velazquez, the Court had the op-
portunity to clarify the appropriate analysis under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Instead of following traditional unconstitutional
conditions analysis, the Court announced the faulty distortion principle.
Because the government provides millions of dollars each year towards
subsidies and grants, the boundaries of what the government can and
cannot do need to be better defined.
Furthermore, as the Court correctly explained, the legislative branch
cannot pass laws and then forbid the judicial branch from examining
those laws because this would create a separation of powers problem.
However, as explained above, this problem does not exist under the LSC
program because there are several alternate forums from which chal-
lenges to welfare laws can originate.
In practice, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is superior to
the right-privilege distinction because the right-privilege distinction
gives the government too much power. The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is a check on the government ensuring that it does not unjusti-
fiably infringe the constitutional rights of individuals. Nonetheless, the
doctrine needs to be examined and explained so courts across the country
can understand what is prohibited and what is not. For the most part, the
Court avoided this task in the Velazquez case and instead applied an er-
roneous distortion doctrine. One can only hope that the next time the
Court has the opportunity to expound on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, it will not dodge its responsibility.
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